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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation examines investor reactions to corporate press and stock exchange 
releases on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Investor reactions to corporate 
announcements are measured in changes in the corporate stock price. The dissertation 
focuses on a corporate’s acquisition target and its strategic intention to move within its 
value network, hypothesizing that different types of acquisitions create different 
cumulative abnormal return. Acquisition types are extended from traditional horizontal 
vs. vertical and related vs. unrelated acquisitions to cover all types of acquisitions. More 
detailed acquisition categories are needed to focus on strategic company moves and 
their impact on the share price. 
Investor reactions have traditionally been studied by using event study on day-level 
analysis. Such analysis does not sufficiently reflect current stock trading, whereas 
algorithmic trading represents most of the total volume. Recently high-frequency 
trading and the overall speed of the information flow have underscored the importance 
of transaction-level analysis, which was adopted for this dissertation. 
The hypotheses in this dissertation were tested with all stock transactions during 2006-
2010 in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. These publicly listed companies published over 
30,000 releases, including 548 M&A actions. 
Consistent with theory, the findings showed a positive compounded abnormal return 
(CAR) in all M&A actions. Additionally, transaction level analysis revealed a CAR in 
unrelated acquisitions representing an upstream change in the center of gravity, whereas 
day-level analysis produced no CAR. Finally, the multiple regression model of 
transaction-level analysis improved the coefficient of determination significantly over 
day-level analysis.  
 
Whereas day-level analysis is too ambiguous and therefore allows possible 
misinterpretation of the event time, transaction-level analysis will give additional 
research topics such as the speed of response to press release and investors’ pre-
announcement reactions. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Tämä väitöskirja tutkii sijoittajien reaktioita lehdistö- ja pörssitiedotteisiin, jotka 
käsittelevät yritysostoja tai fuusioita. Sijoittajien reaktioita yritysten tiedotteisiin 
mitataan pörssikurssien muutoksilla. Väitöstutkimus keskittyy yritysostojen kohteisiin 
ja yrityksen strategiseen tavoitteeseen liikkua arvoverkostossaan. Hypoteesit luodaan 
sillä oletuksella, että erilaiset yritysostotyypit aiheuttavat erilaisen epänormaalin tuoton. 
Yritysostotyyppejä laajennetaan traditionaalisesta horisontaalisesta vs. vertikaalisesta ja 
toisaalta samankaltaisesta vs. riippumattomista yrityskaupoista malliin, joka sisältää 
kaikki eri tyyppiset yrityskaupat. Tarkemmat yritysostokategoriat tarvitaan, kun 
tutkitaan yrityksen strategisia liikkeitä ja niiden aiheuttamaa vaikutusta 
pörssikursseihin. 
 
Sijoittajien reaktioita on perinteisesti tutkittu tapaustutkimuksella käyttäen päivätason 
analyysia. Päivätason analyysin käyttö ei vastaa riittävästi nykyistä kaupankäyntitapaa, 
koska algoritmipohjainen kaupankäynti edustaa jo suurinta osaa pörssin 
kokonaiskaupoista. Viime aikoina algoritmipohjainen nopea kaupankäynti ja 
tiedonsiirron nopeus ovat nostaneet merkitystään kaupankäynnin tason analyysissa, ja 
tässä tutkimuksessa käytetään tapahtumatason analyysia.  
 
Hypoteesit testattiin käyttämällä kaikkia pörssitiedotteita vuosien 2006 ja 2010 välillä. 
Pörssiyritykset, jotka oli listattu tutkimusaikana NASDAQ OMX Helsingin pörssiin 
julkaisivat kaikkiaan yli 30.000 tiedotetta, joista 548 koski yritysostoa tai fuusiota. 
 
Teorian mukaisesti kaikki yrityskauppatiedotteet aiheuttivat epänormaalin tuoton 
(CAR). Tutkimuksessa löydettiin tapahtumapohjaisen analyysin avulla epänormaalia 
tuottoa silloin, kun riippumaton yritysosto tai fuusio tapahtui arvoketjussa raaka-aineita 
kohti, vaikka päivätason analyysista ei tällaista käynyt ilmi. Lineaarinen regressiomalli, 
jossa käytetään tapahtumapohjaista analyysia, parantaa analyysin tarkkuutta 
merkittävästi verrattuna päivätason analyysiin.  
 
Päivätason perusteella tehtävä tutkimus on epämääräinen ja mahdollistaa jopa väärän 
tulkinnan pörssitiedotteen tapahtuma-ajan osalta. Lisäksi tapahtumapohjainen tutkimus 
mahdollistaa uusia tutkimuskohteita, koska investoijien reaktioiden vasteaikaa ja ennen 
tiedotteen julkistamista tapahtuvaa käyttäytymistä voidaan tarkasti tutkia. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATION 
Algorithmic trading 
Registrations in the form of placements, changes or cancellation of Orders in the Order 
Bool through the use of software which automatically generates Orders in response to 
specific pre-programmed factors 
ANOVA 
Analysis of Variance – statistical test if the means of several groups are equal 
AR 
Abnormal Return 
Automatically Matched Trade  
A Trade, which is executed in the Trading System by Automatic Order Matching 
Automatic Order Matching  
The process in the Order Book by which Sell and Buy Orders are matched 
automatically when the price, volume, and other specifications for a given Order 
correspond with Order(s) previously entered in the Order Book  
Buy Order  
An order to buy a specific instrument 
CAR 
Compounded Abnormal Return 
Exchange Day   
A day on which the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Exchange is open for trading 
Instrument   
Securities and other rights and obligations suitable for trading on the securities markets 
that are admitted to trading at NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
Manual Trade  
A Trade entered from outside the Order Book and on which the Member and the client, 
prior to execution, agree shall be done in accordance with the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
Member Rules 
Member  
An undertaking, which has been granted membership by the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
and has signed a Membership Agreements with the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki 
viii 
 
Minimum Tradable Volume  
The smallest amount that can be matched at one and the same time 
In this dissertation, the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki is describe as both OMX Helsinki and 
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. During the study period, an acquisition occurred when 
NASDAQ acquired OMX Helsinki in February 2008 
Order   
A binding offer from a Member to buy or sell Instruments which are placed in the Order 
Book 
Order Book  
The arrangement of Sell and Buy Orders or Interests placed in the Trading System, as 
well as other information related to a particular Instrument such as information 
regarding the clearing system where relevant, number of decimals for the price, size of 
Round Lots, Minimum Tradable Volumes etc 
RBV  
Resource Based View 
Round Lot  
The minimum number or the minimum nominal value of an Instrument 
SAR  
Standardized Abnormal Return 
Sell Order  
An Order to sell a specific Instrument 
SCAR 
Standardized Compounded Abnormal Return 
Shares   
Shares and depository receipts 
SIC 
Standard Industrial Classification, a four digit code used to classify industries 
Spread  
The range between the highest Buy Order and the lowest Sell Order 
Tick Size  
The smallest possible price change that can be entered into the Trading System 
ix 
 
 
Time of Trade 
The time, at which an Automatically Matched Trade is matched or a Manual Trade has 
been entered into 
Trade  
An agreement for the purchase and sale of Instruments registered either as an 
Automatically Matched Trade or as a Manual Trade 
Trading System  
The electronic system(s) for trading on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, providing order 
entry, member’s private information, and related reference data and market data 
VIF 
Variance Inflation Factor 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background  
Companies exist to make profit for their shareholders. In Finland, this has been stated 
also in the law on limited liability companies (Osakeyhtiölaki, 2006). Other corporate 
missions are corporate social responsibility, which takes other stakeholders into account 
(Carroll & Buchholz, 2006), but a company’s first reason is to produce wealth for its 
shareholders with a secondary target to cover other stakeholders’ interests (Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2010; Godfrey et al., 2009). Shareholders gain wealth through dividends and 
increased value of the company’s securities (Rappaport, 1998). Dividends can be paid 
from the company’s results produced through profitable business operations. Increases 
in share price come from the stock market’s evaluation of the company’s value as an 
indirect effect from the company’s past performance and future predictions. Investors 
making investments in the stock market evaluate the company’s current success and 
predict its future success. Evaluating the future, investors prefer growth in terms of 
revenues and profits that may be paid out as dividends or additional investments in the 
company’s growth. 
Growth through mergers and acquisitions is called acquired growth. Acquired growth is 
one way to grow with external resources. When a company is growing using external 
resources it is called inorganic growth and its opposite is called organic growth. Organic 
growth occurs when companies grow by increasing productivity through, e.g., 
investments and recruitments. Inorganic growth is normally a faster way for a 
corporation to expand its business than growing organically. However, the risk of 
making an unsuccessful investment increases along with an increasing speed of growth. 
Although the risks of making an unsuccessful acquisition are higher, acquired growth is 
normally rewarded positively on the stock market. In previous studies, acquisitions 
could increase the economic value of successful bidding firms (e.g., Salter & Weinhold, 
1979).  
Because the main target is growth that makes the company’s business bigger and more 
profitable, the intention to grow is expected to be positively rewarded on the stock 
market. M&A has become a popular way for corporations to expand their operations 
rapidly; for example, in the United States, the number of acquisitions doubled in each 
decade in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Oler et al., 2011; Loughran & Vijh, 1997). The 
value of acquisitions grew even faster, and when the number of acquisitions grew 
twofold, the value of total acquisitions increased fourfold in each decade.  
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This study measures investor reactions to corporate merger and acquisition 
announcements. The value of company acquisitions is under constant debate, and it is 
important to understand if such actions are rewarded with an increased market value, 
and, more precisely, what type acquisitions have the highest impact on the market value. 
 
Figure 1. Global M&A volume in 2003–2011 (Houlihan&Lokey, 2012). 
Though the total number of corporate acquisitions decreased during the economic 
downturn in 2008 and 2009, the number of acquisitions started to grow again after 2008, 
as shown in Figure 1. For example, in 2012 the number of mergers and acquisitions 
grew by 30% from 2011, and the total value reached USD 2.6 trillion in 2012, according 
to the Wall Street Journal on January 28, 2013. Regionally, the volume was USD 871 
billion in the United States, USD 737 billion in Europe, and USD 584 billion in Asia. In 
these three regions, the volumes were slightly lower than in 2011, and even globally the 
M&A volumes have not yet reached the same level as before the 2008 economic crisis. 
In 2007, the M&A volume reached a record high of USD 4.27 trillion (WSJ / Dealogic, 
Houlihan & Lokey / Thomson & Reuters).  
In Finland, the decline followed the global stock markets, but the drop was even faster, 
and the recovery has been even slower (Figure 2). When the volume of M&A dropped 
globally by 57% between 2007 and 2009, it dropped over 90% in Finland over the same 
period.  
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Figure 2. Corporate acquisitions and buyout in Finland in 2003–2009 (Katramo, 
2011). 
The research period is from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2010. This is an 
interesting period as it witnessed both a strong increasing trend on the stock exchange 
and in M&A activities in 2006, followed by a rapid decline both in 2008 and 2009. The 
research period is therefore an interesting combination of large corporate value changes 
and many M&A activities. Additionally, this period is of particular interest not only due 
to a large total volume, but also because some of the largest acquisitions in Finnish 
history took place at this time. Therefore, quick changes in stock prices can be expected 
as a result of this dissertation, too.  
1.2. Objectives and scope  
This study sought to determine how stock markets react to corporate-initiated stock 
exchange releases and press releases on mergers and acquisitions. An additional 
objective was to study how different types of mergers affect the abnormal return of the 
corporate share price. All acquiring companies in this study are listed on the NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki, and both press and stock exchange releases were used to define the 
M&A actions and their impact on company stock prices. 
Mergers and acquisitions are normally very complex transactions: the impact of a 
merger may not be acknowledged at all, or a merger or acquisition may have either a 
positive or negative impact on the company’s stock price, depending on the terms of the 
acquisition. Researchers have found basically three common patterns in acquisitions:  
1) The target company’s shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal 
returns from all acquisitions. Finance studies from the 1990s showed that the 
premiums paid to target firms’ shareholders averaged 19% in the 1960s, 35% 
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in the 1970s, and 30% in the 1980s (e.g., Lubatkin, Srinivasan & Merchant, 
1997). 
2) The acquiring company’s shareholders earn little or no return from tender 
offers, and they are not statistically distinguishable from zero (e.g., Zollo & 
Singh, 2004). 
3) The acquiring company’s shareholders earn negative abnormal returns from 
mergers (e.g., Loughran & Vijh, 1997). 
This study focused on mergers and acquisitions and their impact on the company’s short 
term share price value. A company’s action to make an acquisition was evaluated based 
on their press or stock exchange release and how investors reacted to it. Based on 
Meglio & Risberg (2011) definition, this dissertation measured the type of market 
performance in the market value dimension. In this domain, a market reaction is 
measured using the event study methodology, and abnormal return is calculated. Event 
study is based on stock price changes that measure the financial impact of a change in 
corporate policy (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Abnormal return is briefly described as 
an unanticipated return that cannot be predicted based on the index and the company’s 
share price evolution.  
In scope, the dissertation studied empirically investors’ short term reactions to corporate 
announcements on M&A action, whether any or no reaction occurred and whether the 
reaction was positive or negative. There is no unanimous definition of a successful 
acquisition nor a correct time span for measuring the success of M&A. The time span 
between an M&A action and measuring the impact is called an event window. For 
example, Dann et al. (1977) found that the market price of a stock fully adjusts within 
15 minutes of the release of firm-specific information. Ryngaert & Netter (1990) proved 
empirically that a short event window would usually capture the significant effect of an 
event. Significantly longer event windows have been used, and McWilliams & Siegel 
(1997) showed that even 181 trading-day (approximately 9 months) event windows are 
not uncommon in research.  
Traditionally, event studies have used daily closing share prices rather than transaction-
level data. Transaction-level data analysis takes into account all transactions after the 
event is announced and not only one stock price level defined by the stock closing time. 
Use of a closing value poses some challenges to analysis, as it may not be able to 
pinpoint the exact causal relation between an event and its impact due to many other 
events possibly occurring at the same time. Additionally, the response time to new 
information is shortened due to more and more popular fast trading on the stock 
exchange. In 2007, algorithmic trading accounted for 38% of all transactions on the 
NYSE, and in 2009, it represented already about 70% in the whole United States (Clark, 
2010). In Finland, algorithmic trading equaled about one third in 2007 (Erola, 2007). 
One practical example of fast movements happened on April 23, 2013, when the News 
agency AP’s Twitter account was hacked. Erroneous news about two explosions in the 
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White House caused a huge number of stock transactions, and the whole incident was 
over in five minutes. In those five minutes, the incident erased two hundred billion US 
dollars of value from the United States stock exchange—mainly because of algorithmic 
trading when computers started to sell and buy stocks in large numbers (WSJ, April 24, 
2013). This incident shows how fast reactions can take place today and why even short-
term studies are needed (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. News may have a very wide and rapid effect on the stock market (WSJ, 
2013). 
In current stock trading the increased volumes, faster trading, increased amount stock 
market information and increased amount of algorithm trading have caused that 
traditional analysis method is not enough to measure investor reactions on corporate 
announcements. This research will contribute to the methods as event studies can be 
used to measure reactions, however it needs to take into account investors’ current stock 
market behavior. The quick reactions like illustrated in Figure 3. are totally 
unrecognized with traditional methods. As more people are moving into the space of 
trading shares, an increasing number of private investors are interested in these methods 
that help analyzing stock market reactions. In September 2012, the number of 
households investing in publicly listed shares reached its record of 824,900 
(Pörssisäätiö, 2013). This has increased the importance of rightful and timely investor 
communications from publicly listed companies as well as accurate methods for 
analysis. 
According to Zollo & Meier (2008), the short-term financial performance section of 
M&A analysis has been the most popular topic among researchers: 35 studies, 
representing 40% of the total research volume in M&A. Zollo & Meier (2008) studied 
all M&A publications in top management and finance journals between 1970 and 2006, 
and  analyzed a total of 88 articles and divided them into twelve categories listed below. 
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The categories were not mutually exclusive, and hence some studies appear in several 
categories: 
 Integration Process Performance  8 (9%) 
 Overall Acquisition Performance  12 (14%) 
 Employee Retention   6 (7%) 
 Customer Retention   0 (0%) 
 Accounting Performance   25 (28%) 
 Long-Term Financial Performance 17 (19%) 
 Short-Term Financial Performance 35 (40%) 
 Acquisition Survival   4 (5%) 
 Innovation Performance   5 (6%) 
 Knowledge Transfer    1 (1%) 
 Systems Conversion   1 (1%) 
 Variation in Market Share  1 (1%) 
In these 35 studies on Short-Term Financial Performance, the event window was about 
one year or less. The short term covered the first phases of the integration process, 
which was faster in companies in high tech and longer in companies working in a less 
dynamic environment such as electric utility and chemical industries. 
Zollo & Meier (2008) define the first level as “the level of analysis” with three levels 
(task level, transaction level, and the firm level) and the other dimension as the “time 
level” (Table 1.). The time level dimension has two levels: short- to medium-term 
analysis and long-term analysis. Their short term covers days to a maximum of one 
year. This dissertation employed event study but sought to extend the approach to an 
even shorter time, i.e., from days to minutes and to individual trade level information. 
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Table 1. Zollo & Meier (2008) categorized M&A studies in two dimensions: level of 
analysis and time horizon. 
 
Zollo & Meier (2008) found three main components using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) and constructed a model where Integration process performance, 
Employee retention, and Overall acquisitions performance formed the first component. 
Customer retention, Accounting Performance, and Long term financial performance 
formed the second component and Short-term financial performance (event study) the 
third. They concluded that event studies show no significant connection with other 
metrics used, and that event studies do gauge something different than actual acquisition 
performance. Their view was that event studies gauge the collective cognitive heuristic, 
the overall market “sentiment” about how a given typology of acquisitions should 
perform. The typology was defined as moves in the market moves (e.g., “horizontal 
acquisition in industry X done by domestic acquirers with competitors in neighbouring 
locations”), which refers to the market expectation of a firm’s performance rather than 
to an acquisition as such (Zollo & Meier, 2008). This was the main dimension of M&A 
event research in this study.  
M&A research can be categorized otherwise as well. For example, Meglio & Risberg 
(2011) used as the first performance dimension Financial vs. Non-Financial M&A 
actions. In their categorization, the non-financial domain includes long-term measures 
such as innovation, marketing, and productivity. Consequently, Meglio & Risberg 
(2011) used a considerably different approach to categorize M&A research than Zollo & 
Meier (2008). 
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Figure 4. Meglio & Risberg (2011) classified different M&A studies into financial 
and non-financial domains. 
Figure 4 illustrates how Meglio & Risberg (2011) categorized M&A studies. Based on 
their definition, this dissertation is categorized under Financial domain using the market 
performance type measures in the market value dimension. In this definition, accounting 
performance measures such as profitability improvements and sales growth are in the 
same domain, but under accounting performance. These accounting performance 
measures need a longer time span for analysis.  
According to the above categories, this study addressed the most common area of M&A 
research, covering short-term analysis on both acquisitions and firm level but extending 
research to a shorter time span of minutes and individual trades after an M&A 
announcement rather than days or years. This represents a collective market judgment 
(Meglio & Risberg, 2011) at the time of the announcement of a transaction on the 
likelihood of success of the strategic move (Zollo & Meier, 2008). Therefore, a short 
event window gives a rapid response from the market. This response indicates an 
investor reaction generated without comprehensive analysis of the parties of the merger 
and acquisition announcement or detailed terms of the agreement. 
Previous studies have focused on longer event windows using daily closing prices. 
Though fast stock trading has become popular, research using a short time window has 
been minimal compared to studies using the daily analysis method. From a practical 
point of view, intraday forecasting is particularly relevant for finance practitioners, i.e., 
shareholders, because they gain high returns in daily trading (Reboredo et al., 2012). 
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Also non-linear modeling and more complex mechanisms such as Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN) have been used to secure better tools for online analysis of company 
announcements (Kyoung-Jae, 2002; Reboredo et al., 2012). 
Reboredo et al. (2012) compared several non-linear models to study volatility dynamics 
in time intervals of 5, 10, 30, and 60 minutes. They studied both linear and non-linear 
models, and one finding was that a 60-min period yielded the best out-of-sample 
profitability for both high and low volatility sample periods. This was the reason why 
this time interval was also used in this study, though Reboredo et al. focused on 
volatility dynamics and not abnormal return  as such. 
Chordia et al. (2011) estimated that the speed of convergence to market-efficiency-
based pricing is due to a widespread use of quantitative trading strategies. This has also 
caused more sensitivity to turnover returns and lower cross-sectional predictability of 
returns. During the 15-year period from 1993 to 2008, the value-weighted average 
turnover of shares increased from 5% to 28%, but the number of transactions grew 
ninetyfold during the same period. One more finding was that the securities with 
institutional holdings increased turnover associated with greater information-based 
trading. This study proves a fast increase in the number of transactions and small order 
sizes. 
Among current research articles on intra-day reactions, only one article focused on 
M&A, covering increase in pre-announcement value (Rodrigues et al., 2012). The 
researchers found that most previous financial market studies relied on collecting data at 
discrete and equally spaced points in time. A high frequency study needs to measure a 
reaction as measurements in variable time intervals. They focused on intraday market 
behavior before a takeover announcement and studied both bidder and target companies 
in periods of six to four months before the announcement and then three months after 
the announcement. However, they did not study the reaction after the announcement 
was made. They found that the intraday trading behavior of takeover targets was 
affected by traders who held private information at least three months before the official 
announcement. The sample data consisted of stocks traded on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) and was sourced between 2004 and 2008.  
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Table 2 List of previous studies using intraday analysis 
Aitken, M.J.; Frino, A; McCorry, M.S.; 
Swan P.L.  
Journal of Finance 1998 
Kawaller, I.G.; Koch, P.D.; Peterson, J.E. Journal of Futures Markets  2001 
Töyli, J.; Sysi-Aho, M; Kaski, K. Quantitative Finance  2004 
Fehle, F; Tsyplakov, S.; Zdorovtsov, V European Financial Management 2005 
Kanagaretnam, K.; Lobo, G.J.; Whalen, 
D.J. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 2005 
Chou, R.K.; Wang, G.H.K Journal of Futures Markets  2006 
Entorf, H.; Steiner, C. Jahrbücher für Nationalekonomie und 
Statistik 
2007 
Tookes, H.E. Journal of Finance 2008 
Lee, B.S., Rui, O. & Wu W.F. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 2008 
Gu, G.F.; Chen, W., Zhou W.X. Physica A-Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications 
2008 
Wagener, M.; Riordan, R. Value Creation in E-business management 2009 
Ren, F.; Gu, G.F.; Zhou, W.X. Physica A-Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications 
2009 
Muntermann, J. Decision Support Systems 2009 
Cont, R.; Stoikov, S.; Talreja, R. Operations Research 2010 
Jayaram, K.R.; Jayalath, C.; Eugster, P. Middleware 2010 2010 
Mu, G.H.; Zhou, W.X.; Chen, W.; 
Kertesz, J. 
New Journal of Physics 2010 
Kappou, K.; Brooks, C.; Ward, C. Journal of Banking and Finance 2010 
Yu, H.C.; Wu, C.Y.; Hsieh, D.T. African Journal of Business Management 2011 
Rosa, C. Journal of Empirical Finance 2011 
Bollerslev, T.; Todorov, V. Journal of Finance 2011 
Axioglou, C.; Skouras, S. Journal of Empirical Finance 2011 
Groth, S.S.; Muntermann, J. Decision Support Systems 2011 
Asharian, H.; Holmfeldt, M.; Larson, M. Quantitative Finance  2011 
Walter, T & Corones, Z. Jassa-The Finsia Journal of Applied Finance 2012 
Rodrigues, B.D.; Souza, R.C.; Stevenson, 
M.J. 
International Review of Financial Analysis 2012 
Fushing, H.; Chewn, S.C.; Hwang, C.R. Quantitative Finance  2012 
Zhou, H.G.; Zhu, J.Q. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal  2012 
Songyoo, K Asia-Pacific Business Innovation and 
Technology Management 
2012 
Garcia, C.J.; Herrero, B.; Ibanez, A.M. European Journal of Finance 2012 
Tsai, C.L. Energy Economics 2013 
Bollerslev, T.; Todorov, V.; Li, S.Z. Journal of Econometrics 2013 
Boehmer, E.; Wu, J. Review of Financial Studies 2013 
 
As shown in Table 2, the publications vary, e.g., between finance, physics, operations 
management, economics, and innovation management; hence the topic is becoming 
popular in various research fields. An increasing trend is to use intraday data to study 
market reactions; however, most studies concentrate on the index level and do not 
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measure the impact on the individual company level. In this study, intraday data and 
each transaction were examined.  
Because of the increasing trend to measure intraday data, the first research question 
when using transaction-level data is to measure investor reactions to M&A 
announcements.  
Research question 1: Does moving to transaction-level analysis reveal new information 
compared to day-level analysis in measuring investor reactions to M&A 
announcements? 
Mergers and acquisitions are strategic moves with a long-term impact on company 
operations and profitability. They are called strategic actions because they are actions 
with great implementation requirements and difficult to reverse (Smith et al., 1992; 
Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2001; Chen & Miller, 2012). They are also perhaps the 
most expensive strategic decisions (Rappaport, 2006) management will ever make. 
Acquisitions can also be categorized as defensive M&A actions to protect existing 
business or offensive M&A actions to achieve a more competitive position. In addition 
to strategic acquisitions, there are also financial acquisitions, e.g., by investment 
companies that are conducted only to bring earnings to investors at the time of selling 
companies or during company development before selling it to the next investor. 
One common topic in current studies has been to research related mergers’ and 
horizontal mergers’ abnormal returns. A horizontal merger occurs when an acquiring 
company acquires a direct competitor. In a related merger, the connection can be both 
vertical and horizontal, i.e., the target company is related when it operates as the 
supplier or customer of an acquiring company. Related companies can also operate in 
the same position in the value chain, although they are not direct competitors. Hence 
they can share either their suppliers or customers. These two strategic moves partially 
overlap, because all horizontal mergers are also related mergers.  
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Table 3 M&A studies in Zollo & Meier’s (2008) research 
Wansley, J.W., Lane, W.R., & Yang, H.C. Financial Management 1983 
Jensen, M.C., & Ruback, R.S. Journal of Financial Economics 1983 
Eckbo, B.E. Journal of Financial Economics 1983 
Chatterjee, S. Strategic Management Journal 1986 
Travlos, N.G. Journal of Finance 1987 
Lubatkin, M. Strategic Management Journal 1987 
Shelton, L.M. Strategic Management Journal 1988 
Seth, A. Strategic Management Journal 1990 
Slusky, A.R., & Caves, R.E. Journal of Industrial Economics 1991 
Harris, R.S., & Ravenscraft, D. Journal of Finance 1991 
Franks, J., Harris, R. & Titman, S. Journal of Financial Economics 1991 
Chatterjee, S. Academy of Management Journal 1991 
Travlos, N.G., & Waegelein, J.F. Managerial & Decision Economics 1992 
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M.H., Schweiger, D.M., 
& Weber, Y. 
Strategic Management Journal 1992 
Markides, C.C., & Ittner, C.D. Journal of International Business 
Studies 
1994 
Berger, P.G., & Ofek, E. Journal of Financial Economics 1995 
Lubatkin, M., Srinivasan, N., & Merchant, H. Journal of Management 1997 
Kroll, M., Wright,P., Toombs, L., & Leavell, H. Strategic Management Journal 1997 
Holl, P., & Kyriazis, D. Strategic Management Journal 1997 
Hayward, M.L.A., & Hambrick, D.C. Administrative Science Quarterly 1997 
Barber, B.M., & Lyon, J.D. Journal of Financial Economics 1997 
Haleblian, J. & Finkelstein, S. Administrative Science Quarterly 1999 
Walker, M.M. Financial Management 2000 
Palich, L.E., Cardinal, L.B., & Miller, C.C. Strategic Management Journal 2000 
Seth, A., Song, K.P., & Pettit, A.R. Strategic Management Journal 2002 
Hayward, M.L.A. Strategic Management Journal 2002 
Capron, L., & Pistre, N. Strategic Management Journal 2002 
Beckman, C.M., & Haunschild, P.R. Administrative Science Quarterly 2002 
Pangarkar, N. & Lie, J.R. Strategic Management Journal 2004 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingemann, F.P., & Stulz, R. Journal of Financial Economics 2004 
Feea, C.E., & Thomas, S. Journal of Financial Economics 2004 
Carow, K., Heron, R. & Saxton, T. Strategic Management Journal 2004 
Shahrur, H. Journal of Financial Economics 2005 
Harrison, J.S., Hitt, M.A., Hoskisson, R.E., & 
Ireland, R.D. 
Unpublished manuscript 2005 
DeLong, G., & DeYoung, R. Journal of Finance 2007 
 
None of the listed studies makes a difference between vertical mergers and horizontal 
mergers, because by definition a non-horizontal merger also encompasses related 
mergers from another value chain as well as vertical mergers. The same also applies to 
the direction of integration in vertical mergers. Therefore, the new type categories of 
M&A action fill the research gap while they also give us an opportunity to cover 
traditional horizontal vs. non-horizontal and related vs. unrelated research topics. In 
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Table 3, M&A studies have been listed as those by Zollo & Meier, 2008. The list 
encompasses 35 studies published in top management and financial journals. 
The second research question covers the analysis of reactions to different types of M&A 
actions and company strategic moves in its value network. The different types of M&A 
are further explained in the theory section in chapter 2. 
Research question 2: Do announcements of different M&A types create 
investor reactions and do the reactions differ? 
Exact motives for taking M&A action are normally missing in press and stock exchange 
releases; therefore, it is not possible to explicitly measure the results of a company’s 
strategic moves. As illustrated in Figure 2, acquisitions have been common during the 
times of active stock markets. Therefore, the market trend may affect investor reactions 
to M&A announcements. It is also possible that large companies may make more 
acquisitions than small companies, because they can easily afford to acquire new 
resources and effectively digest acquired companies. The profitability of a company 
may have an impact, for investors may think that successful management that has 
previously made good strategic moves can also make them in the future; therefore, they 
rather invest in companies that take M&A actions. Some companies’ core business is to 
acquire a company, develop it further, divest some of the business, possibly merge with 
similar companies, and finally sell out the stocks.  
In the above few cases, the motives could be implicitly estimated based on the 
company’s original business domain. The goal in this study was not to make 
assumptions about possible buying motives but to concentrate on the official press 
release or stock exchange release and what it explicitly said. Additionally, other 
variables studied in the past were taken into account to further investigate possible 
factors beyond the different types of M&A action, factors mostly related to, e.g., the 
profitability, size, and nationality of both the acquiring and target company. 
Research question 3: What other independent factors influence investor 
reactions to M&A announcements? 
As explained above, the first research gap comes from different types of M&A action. 
Many studies have focused on either related vs. unrelated or horizontal vs. non-
horizontal acquisition types but overlooked how different moves in a corporation’s 
strategic position change the abnormal return. The second research gap comes from 
adapting a proven method to accurate data on the transaction level and narrowing the 
event window radically from one day to one hour. These two areas form the research 
gap covered in this dissertation.  
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1.3. Research approach and methods 
The implication of corporate actions was studied using quantitative analysis on changes 
in security prices after an event was announced by the corporation taking the action. 
This nomothetic study using a hypothetico-deductive scientific method to either support 
or reject a hypothesis is often used in these studies. Hypothesis creation relies on 
previous research on the same topic or similar research on the market impact of 
corporate action.   
Quantitative research exploits three main methods. The first is content analysis, in 
which M&A events are collected and categorized into different merger types. Merger 
type is defined based on the corporation’s move in its strategic position. The second 
method is event study, which is used to calculate the abnormal returns of the 
corporation’s security price. The third method is statistical analysis, which compares the 
abnormal returns of different merger types. The present study followed a typical 
nomothetic research approach, whereby hypotheses are verified against statistical 
analysis in stock value. 
Content analysis 
Research collects initial data from corporations’ official press and stock exchange 
releases and filters only items related to mergers and acquisitions, and then categorizes 
the filtered releases into ten different types according to content analysis. Thereafter, the 
time stamp of the release is used to calculate the abnormal return of the corporation’s 
security price. 
This study exploited two different data sources: press releases and stock exchange 
releases. Stock exchange releases were collected both from the Kauppalehti website, 
which announces all corporate stock exchange releases, and from corporate websites. In 
case of a difference between these two sources, the earlier time stamp was selected. 
Stock exchange releases were all in Finnish, but press releases were collected in both 
Finnish and English from company websites. Normally, stock releases give both a date 
and time. Company press releases given in other countries or different languages were 
not included in this study. 
Press and stock exchange releases were printed and stored electronically to preserve 
them for later study and to retain the data if they disappeared from the Web. After 
collection, the releases were categorized into M&A events by three observers according 
to a guidebook. The final process stage was classification, conducted independently by 
three persons. 
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Event study 
Popular in research on corporate public releases, the event study method is used to 
analyze official releases’ impact on stock value (Oler et al., 2008). With this method, 
the researcher determines whether an “abnormal” stock price effect is related to an 
unanticipated corporate event (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Commonly, changes are 
related to mergers and acquisitions (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; 
Chatterjee et al., 1992; Seth, 1990; Shelton, 1988; Chatterjee, 1986), divestitures, 
changes in executive positions (Worrell et al., 1993; Davidsson et al., 1993; Lubatkin et 
al., 1989; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Worrell et al., 1986; 
McQuire et al., 1988), anticipated layoffs (Worrell et al., 1991), plant closures 
(Clinebell & Clinebell, 1994), product recalls (Davidson & Worrell, 1992), joint 
ventures and strategic partnerships (Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Madhavan & Prescott, 
1995), profit warnings, and other significant announcements reflected in the company’s 
stock price. In all event studies, the impact on a company’s stock price is measured after 
the event is published. In this study, the event time was defined as the announcement 
time of the press release or stock exchange release by the acquiring company.  
Traditionally, event analysis has used the daily closing price, and the width of the event 
window has been multiple days. This study exploited both the daily analysis method of 
a three-day event window and a new method using transaction-level data. In addition to 
individual transactions, corporate announcements were tracked on a minute level.  
Despite its popularity, event analysis has also been criticized for measuring strategic 
events (Oler et al., 2008). Criticism has mainly focused on the complexity of merger 
and acquisition events, which may result in biased or incomplete analysis and investor 
preference for horizontal acquisitions over the more complex non-horizontal 
acquisitions, which require more time for analysis. This would also mean that an initial 
positive abnormal return of a horizontal acquisition is contradicted by a negative long-
term post-acquisition return (Oler et al., 2008). Oler et al further proposed that short-
term stock price adjustments should not be interpreted as completely accurate 
predictions, but rather as collective opinions of investors. In fact, some scholars have 
proposed that in event studies the dependent variable should be called market 
expectation about firm performance rather than acquisition performance (Zollo & 
Meier, 2008). Whether called dependent variable market expectations or acquisition 
performance, it is a factual event when a company’s security gets an abnormal return 
due to a published event. Clearly, acquisition performance is not a suitable term to 
measure the total impact of such a strategic event, but it reflects the initial response to a 
corporation’s strategic activity on the stock market. Therefore, in this dissertation, 
abnormal return is called investor reactions to corporate announcements. 
Because event studies measure only a short-term impact, it is obvious that long-term, 
market-based measures should be included alongside event studies or through other 
16 
 
studies to justify a strategic action such as a merger or an acquisition. The use of very 
long windows in many management studies implies that some researchers do not 
believe that the effects of events are quickly incorporated in stock prices 
(e.g.McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). On the other hand, this can be seen as a violation of 
efficient markets, which is the pre-requisite of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 
1970). Long-term studies face challenges to capture an acquisition’s long-term impact, 
when a company makes hundreds of annual announcements. Therefore, the total impact 
of one event is difficult to measure, because other events cloud the results. This is also a 
threat in short time span analysis, because other events may affect the event to be 
measured. Other events that interfere with measured events are called confounding 
events. Consequently, this study sought to improve the event study methodology 
especially for short-term analysis to capture abnormal returns without major 
interference from confounding events. 
Though strategy is information on a company’s longer-term target, we can assume that a 
change in company strategy can markedly affect its share price. Based on the efficient 
market hypothesis (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991), a company’s current strategy is visible in 
the available information and reflected in the company’s current share price. On the 
other hand, a change in strategy becomes visible when a company announces something 
that indicates a change in its strategy. This new information is then reflected in the new 
share price, and the delta can be measured through the abnormal return. This justifies 
event study also for measuring strategic moves, because a change in strategy may have 
a major impact, as scholars have observed in the past.  
 Research process and data 
The data in this study included all corporate stock exchange releases and Finnish press 
releases collected from stock exchange and company web pages. Such releases signal 
the first time of a merger and acquisition announcement T0.  
The announcement time T0 was used to calculate abnormal return right after the 
announcement. Announcements were divided into different merger categories by 
triangulating their content.  
When the company name and stock quote are known, the company’s International 
Securities Identification Number (ISIN) is also known and used as the key for the 
announcement, together with the date and time of the event. An event study requires an 
estimation window to describes the current value of the stock price and its trend   . 
Another important factor is the market index OMXHPI, which represents the variable    
and describes a normal market trend. With these two trends, we can calculate the market 
model  
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Calculations are described in detail in section 3.2.6.  
In brief, this dissertation employed the daily analysis and the transaction-level method 
in parallel. The daily analysis method gives a benchmark to global research on merger 
and acquisition events, and, additionally, enables comparison between the transaction-
based method and the daily analysis method to assess its contribution to research 
methods. Finally, the different merger types were compared using statistical analysis. 
1.4. Outline of the dissertation 
The outline of the dissertation is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Outline of the dissertation. 
The introduction is followed by a theoretical background on mergers and acquisitions. 
This chapter is followed by a chapter on the main methods used in the dissertation and a 
description of the data collected and analyzed. This chapter justifies the methodology as 
useful and applicable to merger and acquisition events and reviews of similar studies 
from other stock markets and their findings. Chapter four reports results by both daily 
closing price analysis and transaction-based analysis, compares the two, and tests the 
effect of the control variable on the results. Chapter five makes a conclusion and 
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suggests possible implications. Finally, chapter six introduces topics for further study 
and discussion topics for merger and acquisition research. 
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
This chapter discusses the theoretical foundation of the study. The first step is to 
examine why corporations exist and what their main mission is. After the main mission 
is discovered, a brief description follows on the ways shareholders can gain value from 
their stock ownership. There are only two main ways for this, i.e., dividends and 
increased security value, which afford opportunities to sell corporate shares at a higher 
than their purchase price. Company management seeks to both increase the value and 
their ability to pay dividend—at least that should be their main task. Therefore, 
management takes action to increase their short-term profitability and ability to pay out 
dividends. 
The next section 2.2 focuses on possible strategic decisions to improve the corporate’s 
strategic position. One decision is to make an acquisition or merger. These are probably 
the most expensive strategic decisions (Rappaport, 2006) management ever makes. 
Hence the interest in studying the impacts of M&A action. 
The following section 2.3 discusses different types of M&A action in terms of 
improving the company’s strategic position in its value chain or value network. In this 
context, hypotheses are created and reasons are given for different M&A actions 
increasing the security prices differently. 
Section 2.4 combines market information and its implications with share price under the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis theory. This theory combines action (information) and 
reaction (share price) and clarifies why the market reacts to corporate announcements. 
Section 2.5 summarizes the theory part and concludes with five hypotheses examined in 
this dissertation. 
2.1. Corporation’s main mission 
Though a lot has been said about corporate missions along with corporate social 
responsibility or shared value to other stakeholders in a corporate operational 
environment (Porter&Kramer 2006), it remains a fact that corporations exist to make 
profit to their shareholders (Sundaram&Inkpen, 2004). The main reason is that when 
management focuses on shareholder value, they also indirectly serve other stakeholders. 
Stakeholder is a homogenic, clearly identifiable individual or group of individuals 
interested in the corporation’s business. By definition, stakeholders include, e.g., 
customers, employees, government, and suppliers. Carroll & Buchholtz (2006) divided 
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stakeholder groups into five categories: government, employees, owners, consumers, 
and community (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Different stakeholder groups (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2006, p. 70) 
The company’s social responsibility increases its importance. Porter & Kramer (2011) 
used the term Creating Shared Value rather than Corporate Social Responsibility in their 
article in Harvard Business Review (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Already in 2006, they 
detected an evolution in corporate ethics when they proposed a link between corporate 
social responsibility and competitive advantage (Porter & Kramer, 2006). 
Porter & Kramer (2011) claimed that the whole capitalist system is under siege due to 
some recent incidents that have caused severe damage to its business image. Today, 
there are more than enough examples such as Enron, Lehman Brothers, Arthur 
Andersen, even Martha Stewart, to name a few. “The more business has begun to 
embrace corporate responsibility, the more it has been blamed for society’s failures,” 
claimed Porter in the article. 
Though corporate social responsibility has been emphasized recently, one basic 
stakeholder group, corporate shareholders, has gained precedence over other 
stakeholder groups. Sundaram & Inkpen (2004) gave the following five reasons why 
maximizing shareholder value is the top item on management’s agenda: 
1) The goal of maximizing shareholder value is pro-stakeholder. 
2) Maximizing shareholder value creates appropriate incentives for managers to 
take entrepreneurial risks. 
3) Having more than one objective function makes governing difficult, if not 
impossible. 
21 
 
4) It is easier to make shareholders out of stakeholders than vice versa. 
5) In the event of breach of contract or trust, stakeholders, compared to 
shareholders, are protected (or can seek remedies) by contracts and the legal 
system. 
Though their management priorities are clear, Sundaram & Inkpen also reject the view 
that management might shirk their moral and even legal duty to stakeholders, if they 
actively pursued their responsibility to shareholders. Therefore, management’s task is to 
create value first to shareholders, and by doing that, they can fulfill all other stakeholder 
needs as well.  
This logic is based on the residual nature of dividends and other monetary value of 
owning shares. Residual value comes from all other stakeholders having received their 
stake, like employees their wages, suppliers their payments, landlords their rents, and 
government its taxes. Therefore, only residual claimants have an incentive to maximize 
the total value of the firm. This also reflects on risk taking, because shareholders have 
the greatest incentive for the success of risky activities, while fixed claimants gain 
nothing extra if the company performs “extremely well” or just “well enough.”  
And, finally, the fifth reason stems from the legal rights if the risks become reality, 
because stakeholders have explicit contracts with the firm, whereas a shareholder’s 
contract is implicit. The relation is implicit and represented only by a claim on the 
firm´s residual cash flows. These reasons lead to the next section on increasing 
profitability. 
Corporate mission has been studied extensively and its role in creating wealth to its 
shareholders vs. all stakeholders has been continuously debated. When corporations´ 
main shareholders are public authorities such as governments, the debate is more 
understandable, because taxpayers can voice an opinion on how decisions are made in 
publicly owned corporations. In privately owned corporations and especially publicly 
listed companies, the priorities should be clear, because investors invest in corporate 
securities to gain a return either through receiving dividends or increased value.  
To emphasize the importance of shareholders’ role in management decisions, legislation 
has been introduced to guide management. Accordingly, Finnish law helps with the 
right priorities regardless of company theories on creating value. For example, the 
Finnish legislation on limited companies (Osakeyhtiölaki, 2006; Ministry of Justice, 
2012) states that “the purpose of a company is to generate profits for the shareholders, 
unless otherwise provided in the Articles of Association.” This is clearly stated in the 
law for a corporation’s part 1, chapter 1, section 5, and it provides the basic guidelines 
for this study. Based on section 5, the main purpose of a company is to make profit to 
its shareholders. Shareholders’ wealth is the driver that a company is trying to follow. 
Legislation gives also other guidance to corporate management, and in the following 
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section two other major principles are selected to clarify the limits legislation sets to 
management. They include, e.g., the definition of which members of corporate 
management are included in “management” and how shareholders should be treated. 
This clarification is necessary when motives are discussed and why official releases are 
announced at the same time for all shareholders. 
The law gives also reminds company management of its mission to create wealth to its 
shareholders. In company governance, the shareholders’ aim to gain profits is 
implemented through a Board of Directors, elected by the shareholders. The Board of 
Directors selects the managing director to take care of the operational duties within the 
company. Both the Board of Directors and the managing director seek to maximize 
shareholder value as stated by the law. This task is also written in the same part 1, 
chapter 1 in the law on publicly listed companies. Section 7 states that “The General 
Meeting, the Board of Directors, the Managing Director or the Supervisory Board shall 
not make decisions or take other measures that are conducive to conferring an undue 
benefit to a shareholder or another person at the expense of the company or another 
shareholder.” Though this is written under the section on equal treatment, it describes 
the main decision makers and their obligation to all shareholders equally. Treating 
shareholders equally means also that information on company activities must be 
distributed to all shareholders at the same time, and, further, that though management 
owns shares in the company, they cannot use their insider information to their own 
benefit. 
To further clarify management responsibilities and equal treatment of all  shareholders, 
the short section 8 on management’s duty explains management’s obligation to the 
company itself and its success. It specifies that “The management of the corporation 
shall act with due care and promote the interests of the company.” These three sections 
in the Finnish law provide the basis for company management and shareholder 
expectations (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
Legislation is discussed in this context because this dissertation examines how Finnish 
publicly listed corporations operates and how they—as corporate citizens of Finland—
follow this legislation regardless of the theory discussed in this section. As shown, there 
is no contradiction between legislation and theory, because the purpose of a company is 
to generate profits to its shareholders, and because all management action should thus 
focus on creating shareholder value (Rappaport, 1998; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). 
2.1.1. Corporation’s possibilities to increase shareholder value 
The task of management has been defined to first prioritize shareholders over all other 
stakeholders and treat all shareholders equally. The next step is to maximize shareholder 
value. First, we need to define shareholder value and if it can be measured in some way. 
Second, we should understand the right timing of comparing today’s  shareholder value 
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with yesterday’s value. Is shareholder value about dividends the company pays based on 
annual results, or is it about continuous increase in the share price? These are the only 
two components of shareholder value, and in estimating shareholders’ return, there are 
only two ways for a company to increase the profit of its shareholders (Rappaport, 
1998): either by increasing the value of the stock or increasing the dividend paid by the 
company. We can now calculate the total shareholder return (TSR) with the following 
formula:  
TSR = Pe – Ps + D   
which produces the absolute value and similarly the normative value by 
TSR % = (Pe – Ps + D) / Ps 
where Pe is the stock price at the end of the period, and Ps is the stock price at the start of 
the period, and D is the dividend paid during the period.  
The formula is very simple and also valid, because all other value creation possibilities 
stem from it. For example, another possibility such as issuing bonus shares, whereby the 
shareholders receive more shares, is implemented in such a way that the market cap 
(total value of all the shares) remains constant. However, if the number of total shares is 
increased, the real value of one share should decrease by the relational value of all 
shares released. Thus issuing new shares to current shareholders reduces the value of all 
shares at the same time. This is the simple mathematical explanation, but there is also an 
extra increment in share value based on bonus shares issuance (Sarma, 1993). 
When the opposite happens, i.e., a company acquires its own shares, the company uses 
its capital to increase the value of old shares, but the capital reduces the company’s 
ability to pay out dividends, thus reducing the D in the formula. As explained above, 
share price and dividend are the main instruments for increasing shareholders’ profit, 
and they are related, as TSR shows, in that if there is a dividend payout in the period, Pe 
should be reduced by D correspondingly to maintain the same TSR. This study 
concentrated on the share price, which affects shareholder return in the short term. 
The above mathematical formulae do not take into account the psychological impact 
when, e.g., stocks are split to make them look cheaper to buy. Another direction when 
the company acquires its own shares can also imply that company management sees this 
as the best of all possible alternatives to create shareholder value, because they believe 
the company’s share is undervalued. Many other explanations exist, but, theoretically, 
the actions create no shareholder value. 
The relation between corporate shareholders’ interest and management’s main task has 
been captured in the above definitions. Corporate management seeks to ensure the 
growth of their value; therefore, management tries to improve the corporation’s 
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financial capability to pay dividends and simultaneously improve the market value as 
defined on the stock market. 
To increase their corporate share price, companies are looking for growth and improved 
financial performance. Creating shareholder value has become the basic global measure 
of success (Rappaport, 1998). Though this is becoming self-evident in some countries, it 
is still far from being a universally accepted measure to guide, e.g., resource allocation 
in a market-based economy.  
The next step is to find possible alternatives for management to increase shareholder 
value and improve financial performance for paying dividends. An improved share price 
increases capital gains, as illustrated in the shareholder value network (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. The shareholder value network (Rappaport, 1998). 
Rappaport combines the dependencies in the corporation’s goal to add to the 
shareholder value (SVA). His definition starts from management decisions on 
operations, investments, and financing. Operating decisions on product mix, pricing, 
promotion, advertising, distribution, and customer service are linked to sales growth, 
operating profit margin, and income tax rate. Investments decisions such as increasing 
inventory levels and capacity expansion are reflected on two value drivers for both 
working capital and fixed capital. And, finally, Financing decisions define the 
proportion of debt and equity used to fund the business. Eventually, all management 
decisions lead to added shareholder value by either capital gain or dividends. This 
establishes a connection between three different types of management decisions and 
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shareholder value creation (SVA). The actions a company can take are short-term to 
improve its profitability and long-term to improve its strategic position. 
2.1.2. Corporation’s possibilities to enhance its profitability  
The next step in value creation analysis is to find the areas where a company can 
improve its profitability. A company’s position in its environment in terms of its 
internal capabilities can be studied from two perspectives. One is to focus on products 
and their position in the markets (e.g., Porter, 1980), the other to focus on company 
resources (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). For a company, they are the two sides of 
the same coin. The latter covers, e.g., labour, capital, land, technological skills, and 
intellectual property. The same resources can be utilized to make different products, and 
one product may need several resources. Prahalad & Hamel (1990) linked core 
competences and products together to enable companies to use the same competences to 
address new markets with new products. Resources are used to make products and 
hence they represent more stable competitive advantage than current products. The 
resource-based view (RBV) is suitable for studying a corporation’s possibilities to 
utilize its current resources in new markets and to understand which resources are 
needed in the current markets to meet market needs.  
Apparently, a company can improve its accessible markets by improving its position 
geographically by penetrating to new markets, by increasing its offering with enhanced 
products and service offerings to its customers, by improving its internal efficiency by 
speeding up manufacturing and product launches to gain a more competitive offering, 
and also by selling at higher prices than competitors, i.e., by making more profit. These 
activities are well captured in the Hambrick & Fredrickson article (Hambrick & 
Fredrickson, 2005), where they introduce the concept of arenas. Arenas define not only 
geographical presence, but also expand the market segments and product categories. 
Staging defines improved speed of expansion and sequencing of new initiatives to the 
market, whereas differentiators describe a company’s offering to its competitive 
environment. Economic Logic defines the profitability and scale advantages, which rely 
on its components. In this frame, vehicles are, e.g., acquisitions, joint ventures, internal 
development, and licensing, i.e., factors about how to make things. These five major 
elements of strategy are described in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. The Five Major Elements of Strategy (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005). 
A company’s strategic positioning describes how well it positions itself in the 
competitive environment. Strategy is defined in many different ways, one common 
definition being Porter’s “finding positions in the industry where competitive forces are 
weakest” (Porter, 1979, p. 143). Later, Porter modified his definition to “creating a 
unique and valuable position ideal for each firm” (Porter, 1996, p. 68).  
Competitive positioning has been claimed too static to describe the competitive arena of 
dynamic markets and changing technologies. This is also due to fast-moving rivals that 
can quickly copy any market position, making competitive advantage at best temporary 
(Porter, 1996). Porter states also that a company can outperform rivals only if it can 
establish a difference that it can preserve. Porter developed three generic competitive 
strategies to achieve competitive advantage. These strategies are cost leadership, 
differentiated product, and segment/niche play. They explain neither how to select the 
best one for the company nor how it should position itself to pursue even more multiple 
strategies at the same time. 
2.2. Corporation’s strategic position in the industry  
When a corporation improves its strategic position, it needs to improve its capabilities 
and resources to compete in the areas mentioned above. Capabilities are the essential 
organizational competences that allow a company competitive advantage or strength 
(Sudarsanam, 2010). Prahalad & Hamel (1990) linked competitive advantage to 
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company core competences and built a bridge between core competences companies use 
to build core products, which can be diversified into separate businesses and end 
products. Core competences represent collective learning in the organization. On the 
other hand, resources that are easily imitated, replicated, substituted, traded, or mobile 
are unlikely to confer sustainable competitive advantage. Discussions about competitive 
advantage (CA) and sustained competitive advantage (SCA) have produced different 
views about sustainability. Some authors have suggested that a sustained competitive 
advantage is linked to calendar time that lasts long enough (Jacobsen, 1988; Porter, 
1985), whereas others have linked it to possibility of duplication. These scholars have 
defined competitive advantage as sustainable only if it continues to exist after efforts to 
duplicate the advantage have ceased (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984). Barney 
categorized resources based on their nature. The resources that can create sustained 
competitive advantage are valuable, rare among current and potential competition, 
inimitable (or very costly to imitate), and non-substitutable. His resource test is called 
the VRIN test (Barney, 1991). When both resources are understood and the company 
value chain is defined, it is possible to understand the company’s competitive 
advantage. It is therefore necessary to define a company’s value chain to be able to 
compete in a particular industry (Porter, 1985).  
Park (2007) defines strategic convergence-divergence by change in a company’s 
strategic position as following: “Strategic convergence-divergence, i.e., the extent to 
which a focal firm draws closer to or further away from a competitor by changing its 
strategic position.” According to the definition, a change in the strategic position is a 
prerequisite to achieving strategic convergence or divergence. This study focused in 
particular on competitive positioning. Corporations regularly shift their focus on new 
areas and make conglomerate acquisitions and diversifications in waves. Comment & 
Jarrell (2005) found that conglomerate acquisitions rose from 1950 to 1972, but then fell 
from 1973 to 1989. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the economies of scope increased 
significantly, and thereafter companies started to become more focused. The measure 
was based on the number of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes assigned to 
companies and the percentage growth in revenues from one business segment. 
Comment & Jarrell (2005) concluded that one reason for increased focus was consistent 
with shareholder wealth maximization, implying that economies of scope were negative 
in balance during the 1980s. There was also no evidence that economies of scope were 
realized in their research. Additionally, diversified companies were much more active 
than focused firms as buyers and sellers of corporate assets. 
When a company is targeting to move to a new strategic position in its value chain, its 
management needs to find a way to accrue new competences and resources. There are 
several ways to accrue new competences, and “Make, Buy, Ally” (Geyskens et al., 
2006) is a common question asked when a certain technology or asset needs to be 
acquired to improve a company’s strategic position. The decision can be made on 
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several levels in the company, and, e.g., when a new product needs to be developed, 
some components, modules, and technologies can be acquired or developed in-house. If 
a company tries to move to a new position in the industry, it can also make a 
conglomerate acquisition to diversify more rapidly.  
Alternatively, make would on company level mean to establish a new unit to compete 
with the current vendor of the asset. The term buy signifies an acquisition, and the last 
alternative ally means either a joint venture between two corporations or a merger, in 
which corporations decide to continue as one unit. This study focused only on the 
company level buy aspect, which relates to acquisition or ally on its ultimate level of co-
operation, establishing a merger, and leaving joint-venture out of its scope. These items 
were chosen because in both cases one of the firms ceased to continue as an individual 
company.  
If a company starts to make a competitive offering, it is normally the slowest alternative 
to move to a new strategic position. This is a choice between acquisition and internal 
development (Trautwein, 1990; Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005), whereas Ally includes 
a wide variety of different alternatives for partnering and is not as clear an alternative as 
buy, when companies agree on a contract, which is rarely public information, at least 
the terms and conditions of the alliance.  
A corporation’s five major elements of strategy explain the product, market offering, 
and economic logic, and acquisitions and mergers become possible vehicles to improve 
its competitive position in different arenas, accelerate its staging, and explore new 
differentiators through expansion (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005).  
2.3. Mergers and acquisitions as an expansion method 
Merger and acquisition events first of all benefit shareholders in terms of increased 
value. This means that the investment made in acquisition is expected to have a positive 
return on the investment and increase either the company’s share price or ability to pay 
dividends, preferably both. Mergers and acquisitions are long-term strategic decisions 
whereby two companies continue as one legal entity. They are strategic because they 
come with a host of implementation requirements and are difficult to reverse (Smith et 
al., 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2001; Chen & Miller, 2012). 
Normally in this research, no clear distinction is made between a merger and an 
acquisition due to the many similarities between these corporate actions. In theory, they 
differ, but as the ways to make an acquisition have diversified, they are often 
categorized as merger and acquisition (M&A) actions. The following section briefly 
discusses the differences between the two. 
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2.3.1. Acquisition or merger 
A company makes an acquisition when it completes an action to buy most, if not all, of 
the target company's ownership stakes to assume control of the target. Sudarsanam 
(2010) defines an acquisition as one firm purchasing the assets or shares of another and 
the acquired firm’s shareholders ceasing to be owners of that firm. Acquisitions can be 
divided into two main categories. The first is stock acquisitions when a company 
acquires all the shares of the target company with all liabilities and assets. The second is 
when the acquiring company buys only assets and liabilities, and this is called an asset 
acquisition. In many cases, the acquiring company acquires part of the assets. The other 
main difference between the two categories is the legal entity that receives 
compensation for the acquisition. In a stock acquisition, the target company’s 
shareholders receive compensation, whereas in the latter case the company receives 
compensation. In this study, both categories were considered acquisitions, although 
most acquisitions were stock acquisitions. Normally, acquisitions occur in phases with 
the acquiring company acquiring a small part of a company to improve business 
understanding and as part of due diligence; thereafter, the acquiring company can 
increase its share in the target company and most probably receive a seat on the board of 
directors. Finally, the last hurdle is when a company reaches a certain threshold and 
must make a public offer to all remaining shareholders.  
In this study, an acquisition announcement occurred when the acquiring company 
declared its intention to buy at least 90% of the target company’s shares. The 90% 
threshold comes from the Finnish law on limited companies (Osakeyhtiölaki, 2006), 
which states in chapter 18, section 1, paragraph 1 the following: 
“A shareholder with more than nine tenths (9/10) of all shares and votes in the company 
(redeemer) shall have the right to redeem the shares of the other company at a fair 
price (right of squeeze-out). A shareholder whose shares may be redeemed (minority 
shareholder) shall have the corresponding right to demand that the shareholder’s 
shares be redeemed (right of sell-out).” The unofficial translation here comes from the 
Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
On the other hand, when a merger occurs, corporations join to pool and share their 
resources to achieve common objectives (Sudarsanam, 2010). The Finnish Law on 
Limited Liability Companies Act (Ministry of Justice, 2012) defines merger as follows: 
“A limited liability company (merging company) may merge into another limited 
liability company (acquiring company), in which event the assets and liabilities of the 
merging company are transferred to the acquiring company and the shareholders of the 
merging company receive shares in the acquiring company as merger consideration. 
The merger consideration may also consist of cash and future undertakings.”  
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Though the definition sounds accurate, it, in fact, makes no clear difference between a 
merger and an acquisition. Normally both are categorized as M&A events. It is difficult 
to differentiate the two. Several sources have tried by explaining that in a merger one of 
the companies ceases to exist, and its current shareholders become shareholders of the 
new company. The previous owners of the company remain as shareholders of the new 
company.  
An acquisition is implemented through a company security transfer to the acquiring 
company’s shareholders. Conversely, this means that the difference in an acquisition is 
that the target company’s shareholders do not remain shareholders of the merger 
company. This converse definition of acquisition does not apply as such, because often 
acquisitions are, in fact, mergers with the acquiring company using its securities as a 
payment method to target the company’s shareholders. Therefore, a friendly acquisition 
where both company managements agree on the terms, and where corporate securities 
are used to pay for the acquisition can be very close to a merger—especially when the 
acquired company ceases to exist and its operations are dissolved into the new extended 
company.  
To avoid the difficulty of defining merger or acquisition, it is common practice to 
combine the two categories and call it simply merger and acquisition (M&A). If a 
company refers to a merger in its release, then it could be categorized as one. Naturally, 
a problem arises if a company uses “merger” as a euphemistic term for an acquisition in 
its press or stock exchange release to make the acquisition sound less hostile. 
Euphemism is probably the main reason why the number of mergers is, in fact, greater 
than if they were defined strictly as mergers.  
It is difficult to differentiate between a merger and an acquisition, because the public 
interprets them differently. Consequently, the safest choice in research is not to make a 
difference between the two but simply categorized them as merger and acquisition 
(M&A), as is done in this study. 
2.3.2. Motives for mergers and acquisitions 
Previous studies have found many motives for mergers, and different classifications 
exist. Trautwein (1990) found seven theories behind a merger motive: Efficiency theory, 
Monopoly theory, Raider theory, Valuation theory, Empire-building theory, Process 
theory, and Disturbance theory. The first four target to increase acquiring companies’ 
shareholder value. The Efficiency theory targets to increase net gains from the synergies 
of two companies. The Monopoly theory aims to move wealth from customers to the 
company by reducing competition and increasing the company’s profits. The company 
is thus trying to maximize its market power, and it is well aligned with differentiator 
and economic logic elements as described in figure 9. These two theories are linked to 
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company strategic motives to increase profits and product offerings (Hambrick & 
Fredrickson, 2005). 
The next two theories focus more on a company’s business valuation and are, in fact, 
more about errors in the company’s current valuation. The Raider theory explains the 
target as value moving from the target company’s shareholders to the acquiring 
company’s shareholders. The Valuation theory explains the acquiring company’s 
management decisions as based on better information about the target company’s value 
than about its own management.  
The last three theories explain the motives not directly as company value or 
product/service offering, but more as the acquiring company’s personal motives and 
others. However, because this study targeted investor’s reactions, the last three theories 
can be ignored, since the driver there is not to increase value to the acquiring company’s 
shareholders. Trautwein (1990) also found little evidence for these theories. This was 
later supported by Brouthers et al. (1998), who studied merger motives and came up 
with a list of three main categories and 17 subcategories, as shown below. 
Economic Motives: 
 Marketing economies of scale 
 Increase profitability  
 Risk-spreading 
 Cost reduction 
 Technical economies of scale 
 Differential valuation of target 
 Defense mechanism 
 Response to market failures 
 Creation of shareholder value 
 
Personal Motives: 
 Increase sales 
 Managerial challenge 
 Acquisition of inefficient management 
 Enhance managerial prestige 
 
Strategic Motives: 
 Pursuit of market power 
 Acquisition of a competitor 
 Acquisition of raw materials 
 Creation of barriers to entry 
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In their research, the main motives indicated by company management fell in the 
category of economic motives and the lowest scores in the category of personal motives. 
Walter & Barney (1990) listed 20 different managerial goals for M&A and made five 
clusters as follows:  
1) Mergers are a way managers obtain and exploit economies of scale and 
scope. 
2) Mergers are a way managers deal with critical and ongoing 
interdependencies with others in a firm’s environment. 
3) Mergers are a way managers expand current product lines and markets. 
4) Mergers are a way managers enter new business. 
5) Mergers are a way managers maximize and utilize financial capability. 
Though these goals are similar to the motives of Trautwein (1990) and Brouthers et al. 
(1998), they differ in that the personal motives are not visible. The main and useful 
outcome of their study for this one is the mapping of motives to the type of acquisition. 
The main motive for a vertical acquisition was cluster 2, and for a concentric acquisition 
cluster 3. In conglomerate acquisitions, both 4 and 5 were the most common goals, but 
in horizontal acquisitions, no cluster dominated. Different types of mergers and 
acquisitions are explained in detail in section 2.3.3. 
The company’s previous experience about acquisitions affects its future acquisition 
behavior. Previous positive financial performance in acquisitions has a positive impact 
on management support of acquisitions. Although previous experience is reciprocal, 
positive past experience has a bigger impact than negative experience (Haleblian et al., 
2006). 
Though measuring M&A abnormal returns on daily level has been a popular topic, it 
was interesting to see if shortening the event window would bring new information on 
this topic. Most studies have been done on international stock exchanges and mostly in 
the United States. Similar studies have not been conducted on this scale.  
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) published a discussion paper on 
Mergers and Acquisitions, “Reasons and Results in 2002” (Ali-Yrkkö, 2002). It 
investigated the value and volume of Finnish acquisitions and the relation between 
GDP, market capitalization, and the number of listed companies in Finland. The 
research was done on the macroeconomic level rather than on the individual acquisition 
level. Elina Pyykkö (2011) wrote her dissertation on “Stock Market Response to 
Research and Development Expenditures of the Firm in the Context of Mergers and 
Acquisitions.”  
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2.3.3. Different types of mergers and acquisitions  
Rumelt (1974) introduced nine strategies for acquisitions and mergers based on product, 
market, and technology linkages that the firm’s businesses have with its core business. 
Later, Lubatkin et al. (1997) reduced this set to five categories, which were single 
business, vertical, constrained, linked, and unrelated acquisition. These definitions do 
not clearly explain a company’s move in their value chain or value network. Therefore, 
in this study, it was more appropriate to use Galbraith’s (2002) diversification types as 
the basis for categorizing different acquisitions. Galbraith defined his five categories of 
diversification as follows: 
 By-product diversification 
 Related diversification  
 Linked diversification 
 Unrelated diversification 
 Center of gravity change 
 
The company’s center of gravity depends on where in the industry’s supply chain 
(Figure 9) it started, and the center arises from the company’s initial success in the 
industry in which it grew up (Galbraith, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 9. Supply Stages in an industry chain (Galbraith, 2002, p. 227) 
By-product diversification represents a situation in which a vertically integrated 
company sells by-products along the industry chain. In this case, the company changes 
neither its industry nor its center of gravity. Hence this diversification does not represent 
an acquisition, or in case an acquisition is associated with it, we can say that the 
company is making a related acquisition or linked acquisition, as it is already in the 
business. Therefore, this diversification model was not included as a separate 
acquisition model in this study. 
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Linked diversification occurs when a company moves within the supply flow either 
backward or forward and makes acquisitions from its new position in the supply flow. 
This type of acquisition is also called vertical acquisition (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999). In their study, they defined vertical acquisition as the acquiring company selling 
its products (at least 5%) to the target company or the acquiring company at least 
buying 5% of its total purchases from the target company. In this study, an exact 
percentage was not used but rather a textual explanation of the release. In this study, 
linked diversification was split between backward and forward based on the direction in 
which the company was moving. Lubatkin et al. (1989) used the linked acquisition term 
when two companies were less closely related, but when their non-competing core 
businesses had some, but not many, synergistic interrelationships as constrained 
mergers but more interrelationships than unrelated mergers. This definition was not 
used in this study. In Lubatkin et al.’s (1989) terminology, a vertical acquisition 
describes a possible buyer-seller relationship, which was used for a vertical relationship 
in this study as well. Note here that the term “vertical forward” is used and, 
respectively, “vertical backward” to follow Galbraith’s (2002) definition of direction 
and Haleblian’s (2006) definition of vertical acquisition rather than “linked” as 
Galbraith did. The term backward is used when a company moves toward raw materials 
(toward becoming an upstream company), and the term forward describes moving 
toward customers (toward becoming a downstream company). 
Related diversification occurs when a company moves into new industries but in the 
same center of gravity (Galbraith, 2002). On the other hand, Rumelt et al. (1974) 
considered businesses to be related if they (1) served similar markets using similar 
distribution channels, (2) used similar production technologies, or (3) exploited similar 
scientific research. Salter & Weinhold (1979) had a similar description, and Andrews 
(1980) added the definition of operating at the same level of skills and resources. From 
the acquisition point of view, it means that a company acquires another company that 
operates in the same position in the supply flow, like a distributor acquires another 
distributor. In related acquisitions, companies are seeking economies of scale (Salter & 
Weinhold, 1979; Rumelt, 1974), economies of scope (Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1979), 
and market power (Shepherd, 1970). Barney (1988) defined related acquisition as based 
on the Net Present Value of acquiring company (A), target company (B), and their 
merger (A+B). Companies are related if their combined NPV is greater than their NPVs 
when they operate as independent companies. NPV(A+B) > NPV(A) + NPV(B). 
Un-related diversification takes place when a company moves into new industries but 
into a different center of gravity (Galbraith, 2002). From the acquisition point of view, 
this means that a company acquires another company that operates in a different 
position in the supply flow, like a producer acquires a distributor. In unrelated 
acquisitions, the relationship between target and bidder companies is not as apparent 
(Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Many researchers and the Federal Trade Commission 
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have used the term “conglomerate” to describe a merger or acquisition event between 
two non-competing businesses that possess different production, marketing, and 
research technologies (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 1997). 
Center of gravity change happens when an organization remains in the same industry 
but changes its center of gravity there. Hence this change to a new place represents no 
normal acquisition, because the company is already in the business. Unless there is an 
acquisition to strengthen the organization’s competitive position, it can be categorized 
as a vertical or related acquisition, depending on the center of gravity. This 
diversification was not included in this study as a separate acquisition category. 
Based on the above definitions, there are five basic types of acquisition: vertical 
forward, vertical backward, related, and unrelated acquisitions both forward and 
backward. In addition to these five types, related acquisition can be split into two: 
horizontal and non-horizontal, but still related. A horizontal acquisition signifies one 
whereby companies operate within the same industry in the same position of the 
industry (or value) chain, e.g., a grocery store acquiring another grocery store. 
Respectively, non-horizontal but related means an acquisition whereby a bank acquires 
an insurance company and moves to another industry. This type is related, because they 
operate in the same position in the value chain but in different value chains. 
The literature has been referring to the division between horizontal and non-horizontal 
(e.g., Oler et al., 2008), but in this study, non-horizontal was further divided into five 
smaller and different groups: vertical forward, vertical backward, related (non-
horizontal), unrelated forward, and unrelated backward. 
The final six acquisition classes are: 
A. horizontal acquisition – company acquires another company operating in the 
same industry and same center of gravity 
B. non-horizontal, but related – company acquires another company operating in a 
different industry and in the same center of gravity 
C. unrelated, vertical forward – company acquires another company operating in a 
different industry and moves closer to customers 
D. unrelated, vertical backward – company acquires another company operating in 
a different industry and moves closer to raw materials and suppliers 
E. non-horizontal, but vertical forward – company acquires another company 
operating in the same industry but in a different center of gravity, and by doing 
this the acquiring company moves toward customers 
F. non-horizontal, but vertical backward – company acquires another company 
operating in the same industry but in a different center of gravity, and by doing 
this the acquiring company moves toward its suppliers / raw materials 
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Figure 10. Six classes of acquisitions. 
Most existing studies have used the horizontal-non-horizontal dimension as well as 
related and unrelated categories. A second goal is to compare how moving in the value 
chain is rewarded, compared to staying in the same center of gravity.  
In the horizontal vs. non-horizontal category, comparison can be made between class A 
(horizontal) and the sum of classes B, C, D, E, and F to represent non-horizontal 
acquisitions. On the other hand, comparison between unrelated and related categories 
can be calculated in a similar way, because classes C and D are unrelated (unrelated 
forward and unrelated backward), and the sum of classes A, B, E, and F to represents 
related acquisitions. This justifies classes A and B to form classes of their own, but the 
justification for separating C, D, E, and F comes from the literature in that downstream 
and upstream companies face very different business problems and tasks, which may 
impact on how the acquisition is received on the stock market and how it is 
communicated by the organization (e.g., Galbraith, 2002).  
Downstream companies add value through advertising, product positioning, marketing, 
channels, and R&D. On the other hand, the purpose of upstream companies is to 
produce flexible, predictable raw materials, and intermediate products add value by 
reducing the variety of raw materials (Galbraith, 2002, pp. 227–228).  
These classes enable comparison between moving forward and backward in the value 
chain as well as staying on the same level. A corporation’s intention to move forward in 
the industry chain will then be represented by classes C and E, moving backward by 
classes D and F, and remaining on the same level by classes A and B.  
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Table 4. Traditional related vs. unrelated and horizontal vs. non-horizontal 
acquisition categories can be compared by summarizing findings from different 
classes. 
Category comparison as a sum of classes Category comparison as a sum of classes 
Horizontal (class A) Non-horizontal classes B,C,D,E,F) 
Related  
classes A,B,E,F) 
Unrelated  (classes C, D) 
Keeping the current center of gravity 
classes A, B) 
Moving in industry chain classes C,D,E,F) 
Moving forward in industry chain  
 (classes C,E) 
Moving backward in industry chain 
classes D, F) 
  
2.4. Efficient market hypothesis 
In his article, Eugene F. Fama (1970) explained the link between information and 
corporate stock price. He proved in its simplest form that the corporate security price 
fully reflects all available information. This theory is called the efficient-market 
hypothesis (EMH). In 1970, he introduced the following three test categories: 
1) weak-form tests – How well do past returns predict future returns?  
2) semi-strong-form tests – How quickly do security prices reflect public 
announcements? 
3) strong-form tests – Do any investors have private information that is not fully 
reflected in market prices? 
The first EMH categories were discussed very extensively, and in 1990 Fama published 
a sequel entitled “Efficient Capital Markets: II.”  The original three categories were 
replaced with new thinking, and the most interesting change was the semi-strong-form 
test category, which was reformed into event studies. He claimed that event studies give 
the most direct evidence of efficiency (in capital markets), and that the evidence is 
mostly supportive (Fama, 1990). 
Though Fama’s theories have also been criticized since their publication and, e.g., 
recently (Baker & Nofsinger, 2010; Shefrin, 2008; Shiller, 2003; Shleifer, 2000; and 
Schijven & Hitt, 2012), this relation is a fundament tenet in most event studies on 
implications of corporate share prices. In the management literature, the EMH was 
summarized by Bromiley et al. (1988). Although the EMH has been criticised, 
statements such as “stock markets can see through cosmetics” (Lee & Verbrugge, 
1996), and that investor reactions are a reliable indicator of efficiency benefits have also 
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been voiced (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Close attention is needed, because the event 
study method relies on the efficient market hypothesis. It establishes the needed 
connection between available information and stock prices. In short-term research, this 
has been shown to be a valid method to investigate corporate actions’ implications for 
corporate market value, simplified as share price. 
Because of the loads of criticism on EMH, we can start by analyzing some possible 
links between new information and stock price. If the EMH is not correct, the first 
analysis would show that there is no statistically significant abnormal return after an 
M&A event. If a link exists, the abnormal return would appear immediately after the 
announcement is released.  
There are two major theoretical components in this research. First, the efficient-market 
hypothesis (EMH) provides a link between information and share price. The current 
security price reflects the accumulated value of all historical information released by the 
company and other available information on the market. The new information can be 
investigated in more detail. Based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, as soon as new 
information is released, the impact can be measured in the stock price. 
The same principle was also well described by Rappaport (1998) as companies 
announcing and reporting their performance and plan outcomes in their stock exchange 
and news releases (Figure 11). This strategy works as input for stock market valuation 
to generate expectations about future performance as defined by the market price of the 
publicly traded shares—which again works as input to corporate managements as a new 
benchmark for future performance (Rappaport, 1998). Rappaport states simply that “A 
company’s stock price is the clearest measure of market expectations about its future 
performance.” 
 
Figure 11. The linkage between corporate reporting, stock market valuation, and 
market price (Rappaport, 1998) 
Rappaport extends “information” to cover also company reports of future performance. 
If past information is separated from currently unavailable new information that is not 
yet in the share price, it is possible to write that  
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Informationnow +  Information = Share pricenow +  Share price 
This study focused only on the delta ( ) part of information and its implication to the 
 Share price. The share price (or the difference in share price) is therefore a dependent 
variable (also known as explained variable or outcome variable), and information on 
mergers and acquisitions is an independent variable (a.k.a. explanatory variable or input 
variable). According to McWilliams & Siegel (1997), the new information should be 
instantaneously visible in the stock price, and with respect to firm-specific events, stock 
prices usually adjust to new information efficiently (Fama, 1990). In this study, the 
abnormal return was calculated from the company stock price by eliminating the market 
index and the company’s expected price evolution calculated using its past performance.  
2.5. Main hypotheses 
This section concludes the theory part and summarizes the theories discussed above. 
The hypotheses are examined further in the empirical section. 
2.5.1. Investor reactions to M&A announcement  
As discussed above, companies seeks to create value through mergers and acquisitions. 
Because by making acquisitions and mergers they are out for a new competitive 
advantage, companies can be categorized into different types to describe their strategic 
intentions to improve their current business.  
The purpose of a company is to generate profits to its shareholders, and subsequently all 
management actions should focus on creating shareholder value (Rappaport, 1998; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). When a corporation takes M&A action, its management 
makes a very expensive strategic decision (Rappaport, 2006) to improve the 
corporation’s strategic position (Brouthers et al., 1998), which may lower the 
corporation’s ability to pay dividends in a short term though it improves its resources 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). These actions are difficult to reverse (Smith et al., 1992; Chen et al., 
1992; Smith et al., 2001; Chen & Miller, 2012).  
Corporations do sometimes fail to communicate their reasons for acquisitions, or the 
reasons may be vaguely expressed in the announcement, which may then negatively 
affect the stock price and subsequently the shareholder value. Studies have shown that 
unrelated mergers or acquisitions have not caused as positive an impact as expected, and 
they have been divested shortly after the acquisition. In divested businesses, related 
acquisitions dominate in volume. For example, over 70% of assets acquired in hostile 
takeovers ended up managed by firms in related businesses, whereas only 4.5% were 
sold to unrelated acquirers (Bhagat et al., 1990). The reason was that divested 
businesses were more valuable to the related buyer than to the unrelated buyer 
(Lubatkin et al., 1997). On the other hand, there have been discussions of the real 
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motives for mergers and acquisitions that had no impact on the shareholder value—not 
even a negative one. In many cases, the stock market cannot use acquisition information 
for unbiased adjustments to stock values at the time of the announcement or shortly 
thereafter, and long-term positive abnormal returns are non-visible at the time of the 
announcement, which has been seen as the negative side of short window event studies 
(Oler et al., 2008). 
Though there may be management’s personal motives such as empire building 
(Trautwein 1990) behind an acquisition, investors can expect management to improve 
the company’s strategic position through acquisitions and hence create value in a way 
that the sum of the acquiring company and the target company is higher than the value 
of these companies individually (Singh & Montgomery, 1987). Lack of the real motive 
has been seen as one of the main challenges, because researchers cannot be sure if 
acquisitions are driven by a genuine profit motive (market power, efficiency, asset 
redeployment, market discipline) rather than managerial self-interest (hubris, empire 
building to justify increased compensation) (Haleblian et al. 2009). On the other hand, 
corporate executives have a strong incentive to show that their actions coincide with 
shareholders’ interests (Walter & Barney, 1990). 
Because the final motive or multiple motives are not released publically and can thus be 
only speculated afterwards, we can assume that the rational motive for corporate 
management is to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Although M&A strategic action is an 
expensive way to grow,  management can be expected to have evaluated the investment 
carefully, and investor reactions to the acquisition announcement can be assumed to be 
positive.  
Hypothesis 1. The abnormal return associated with the event of acquisition is expected 
to be positive. 
2.5.2. Related and unrelated acquisitions  
M&A actions can be categorized in multiple ways. One common way is relatedness 
between the acquiring and the target company. When the acquiring company has 
ongoing business with the target company, it can be said to be related. In some cases a 
vertical relation has been difficult to define, because especially large companies have 
relationships with multiple companies, and therefore some scholars have used a defined 
percentage to define a related connection between two companies. For example, 
Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) determined that 5% of existing business between 
companies made them related.  
Many studies have not used exact figures but defined relatedness generically (Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987). When a company remains in the same center of gravity and 
pursues its market power, it falls into the “related acquisition” category (Galbraith, 
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2002). Rumelt (1974) considered two companies to be related if they served similar 
markets through similar distribution channels or used similar production technologies or 
exploited similar scientific research. This means that a company remains in the same 
position also after an acquisition, because the acquired company is currently in the same 
position but in a different value chain. In this study, related diversification occurred 
when a company moved into new industries but within the same center of gravity 
(Galbraith, 2002). 
When a company does not move from its current center of gravity but rather improves 
its competitiveness in its current strategic position, the strategic motive is likely either to 
acquire its competitor or pursue its market power (Brouthers et al., 1998). Jaffe (1986) 
and Cartwright et al. (1987) found that related acquisitions do reduce competition. This 
was shortly after Eckbo (1985) had found that horizontal acquisitions did not lessen 
competition. Salter & Weinhold (1980) combined both product market positions and 
acquisitions of key skills. Penrose (1959) introduced a resource-based view of corporate 
operations and noticed that a firm never fully reaches a balance in its use of company 
resources. Teece (1980) and Williamson (1975) found that from five alternatives (status 
quo, sale of resources in factor markets, contractual sharing of resources with another 
firm, expansion in present product markets or diversification) expansion and 
diversification were the most attractive ones.  
In this study, all other acquisitions were categorized as unrelated, and in unrelated 
acquisitions, the relationship between the target and the acquiring company was not as 
apparent (Singh & Montgomery, 1987). These acquisitions can derive from many 
motives, because the definition is residual. However, the RBV increases the importance 
of an unrelated acquisition. An entry barrier without a resource position leaves the firm 
vulnerable to diversifying entrants, whereas a resource position barrier without an entry 
barrier leaves the firm unable to exploit the barrier (Wernerfelt, 1984). Therefore, a 
company may also create new barriers to entry when it limits a new technology to be 
used in the business and prevents competitors from pursuing it.  
In related acquisitions, synergistic benefits through transfer of core skills between a 
bidding firm and a target firm should result in greater wealth, i.e., a higher share price 
than in unrelated acquisitions. In addition, partially, research on technology and 
relationship has shown that broadcasting and telecommunications company acquisitions 
have generated higher CARs than normal M&A events in Korea (Lee et al., 2011). 
A vertical move can take place also in unrelated acquisition, when a company moves 
toward its customers or toward its suppliers and raw materials, but in a new value chain. 
Hence the company establishes a vertically integrated company to improve its position 
either in the market place or in the supply-chain network (Galbraith, 2002).  
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Although most studies have shown that related acquisitions produce a greater abnormal 
return, also contradictory results have been reported. Lubatkin (1987) found no 
significant difference in returns to bidding firm shareholders for strategically related and 
unrelated. 
In unrelated acquisitions, increased efficiencies in technological or product market 
activities are more variable. Gains in unrelated acquisitions are expected to be positive, 
because all acquisitions should be rewarded positively, but lower than in related 
acquisitions, because the same gains that are available in unrelated acquisitions are also 
available in related acquisitions, but not vice versa. 
Because there are both positive and no effects between a related and an unrelated 
abnormal return, the next research hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. The abnormal return associated with related acquisitions is 
higher than unrelated acquisitions. 
2.5.3. Horizontal and non-horizontal acquisitions  
The term related includes acquiring a company’s former suppliers as well as customers 
in addition to the companies being  in the same position, either in the same or in a 
different value chain. Lubatkin (1983) classified mergers into four categories and used 
the term global benefit score based on the expected performance outcome. His 
categories were vertical, conglomerate, horizontal and market conglomerate, and 
product concentric. These were classified based on their technical economies, pecuniary 
economies, and diversification economies. Product centric was rated highest due to 
technical and pecuniary economies (monopoly and monopsony economies), horizontal 
and market concentric were rated second highest due to technical economies, and both 
conglomerate and vertical received low scores. Although technical economies were seen 
as a superior merger type over the others, it was also noted that technical economies 
have never been proved empirically (Lubatkin, 1983). Also Rumelt (1974) found that 
horizontal and concentric mergers were more beneficial to shareholders than 
conglomerate mergers.  
To separate vertical from horizontal moves, many researchers have made separated 
horizontal acquisitions a topic of its own, although the horizontal merge type has often 
been combined with market concentric (Lubatkin, 1983, 1987). A horizontal acquisition 
takes place when the acquiring company acquires a direct competitor. This was studied, 
e.g., by Oler et al. (2008), and they stated that short-term abnormal returns are higher 
for horizontal acquisitions than for non-horizontal acquisitions. Similar results were 
found in a study of Internet company acquisitions by Internet companies (online-
online), which resulted in higher abnormal returns than online company acquisitions by 
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offline companies (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). This pattern has been shown also more 
widely in the world, e.g., in China (Gaur, et.al., 2013) and Korea (Lee et al., 2011).  
Clougherty & Duso (2009) argued that horizontal M&As result in reduced competition, 
which increases the market power for the acquirer. Although companies seek for an 
improved market share through horizontal acquisitions, this did not decrease 
competition in reality (Eckbo, 1985). 
In addition to the higher short-term abnormal return of horizontal acquisitions, Oler et 
al. (2008) proved the opposite to be true, but only with a long event window. They 
proved that non-horizontal acquisitions are valued more in the long term than horizontal 
acquisitions. They also found that positive reactions to horizontal acquisitions became 
more common as the number of horizontal acquisitions increased.  
Long-term impacts were also studied by Loughran & Vijh (1997), who found a lower 
return on horizontal acquisitions than on non-horizontal acquisition in the long term. 
They also observed a similar pattern among target shareholders: those who sold out 
their stock soon after the acquisition effective date gained from all acquisitions, whereas 
those who held on to the acquirer’s stock received as payment found their gains 
diminished over time. This could not be verified in this study, because the research time 
was very short, and because the target was neither to prove a long-term high return for 
non-horizontal acquisitions nor a low impact of several consecutive horizontal 
acquisitions but to focus on a short event window. Consequently, the third hypothesis 
reads as follows:  
Hypothesis 3. The abnormal return associated with horizontal acquisitions is 
higher than that associated with non-horizontal acquisitions. 
2.5.4. Moving to a new center of gravity  
The orthogonal direction to a horizontal move is a vertical move. In terms of vertical 
mergers, the Federal Trade Commission defines vertical as a merger in which a buyer-
seller relationship exists or could exist between two firms (Walter & Barney, 1990). In a 
vertical move toward customers, there is no single motive in their definition, but many 
economic motives can be associated with this category such as marketing, economies of 
scales, increase profitability, and respond to market failures, to name a few.  
Vertical integration has been studied widely and industrial organization economics 
suggests that firms in markets dominated by a few players have an incentive to integrate 
by moving into adjacent fragmented stages. The main motivation for vertical integration 
is market asymmetry (Chatterjee, 1991). Several examples can be found; e.g., since the 
late 80’s and early 90’s, both Intel and Motorola have moved forward to minicomputer 
markets, and many companies have moved from pure product centric markets to service 
markets. These include most of the largest technology companies such as Kone, Nokia, 
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and Wärtsilä in Finland, to name a few. Fan & Goyal’s (2006) vertical merger studies 
based on a three-day event window showed that a vertical acquisition created the same 
level of abnormal return than horizontal mergers. 
Lubatkin (1987) looked at the market value implications of vertical mergers, but his 
study covered a long-term event window of 18 months and no reactions in the short 
term. Chatterjee (1991) looked at daily returns and found a correlation between market 
power and production efficiency. A major benefit to the acquiring company was when 
its production stage had high market power and when the target firm was in a relatively 
competitive industry. On the other hand, a company’s move to a new position in the 
value chain indicates a change in its economic logic (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005), 
and the move benefits from the strong position before the acquisition. 
Previous hypotheses have been a combination of vertical move and horizontal move, 
and horizontal acquisition types have not captured acquisitions when an acquiring 
company acquires a target company from another value chain but in the same position. 
Therefore, it is necessary to cover all six acquisition classes so that related forward 
acquisitions are calculated with an unrelated forward move, such as a conglomerate 
acquisition, while moving closer to customers.  
The term conglomerate describes a merger or acquisition event between two non-
competing businesses, which  possess different production, marketing, and research 
technologies (Lubatkin et al., 1997). Conglomerate mergers have been studied since the 
1960s merger wave, the so-called conglomerate wave, when acquirers bought targets 
from outside their main industry (Oler et al. 2008). The performance of most 
conglomerates was poor and apparently divested into separate businesses (Gaughn 
2002).  
Alternatively, when companies remain in their current position, they do either 
horizontal acquisitions or acquire related companies from a different value chain, but in 
the same position. Then they normally seek economies of scale (Salter & Weinhold, 
1979; Rumelt, 1974), economies of scope (Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1979), and market 
power (Shepherd, 1970). Because all horizontal acquisitions represent remaining in the 
current center of gravity, they should be rewarded better than when they move to a new 
position in the value chain or value network. The same definition can be used, because 
unrelated acquisitions represent the company’s intention to move to a new center of 
gravity, but not vice versa.  
To conclude these definitions, the next hypothesis distinguishes between the company’s 
move in the value chain and its intention to remain in the value chain. 
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Hypothesis 4. The abnormal return associated with an acquisition indicating a 
move to a new center of gravity is lower than a company’s acquisition in the 
same center of gravity. 
2.5.5. Moving closer to customers or closer to raw materials  
In this study, a vertical merger was divided into two directions, vertical forward and 
vertical backward. When a company moves in its current value chain, i.e., acquires  its 
supplier or vendor with whom it is already in business, the acquisition category is 
vertical acquisition. A forward move occurs when a company moves closer to its 
customers, and, conversely, when a company moves closer to raw materials in the 
current value chain, the acquisition is categorized as vertical backward. Chen (2001) 
found that pricing incentives change in both types of acquisition when a downstream 
company makes a vertical acquisition and when an upstream company makes a vertical 
acquisition. Subsequently, the pricing incentive for competitors also changes. In the 
1950’s and 1970’s, vertical mergers were seen as harming competition, but in the 
1980’s, the Chicago-School offered a new view, in which vertical mergers were 
considered to be completely neutral or even procompetitive. The current view is that 
vertical mergers may a have significant effect on anti-trust cases. 
A vertical backward acquisition can be called a strategic motive to acquire, e.g., raw 
materials (Brouthers et al., 1998). When a company moves toward its suppliers, the 
move can be perceived as defensive to protect, e.g., its access to raw materials, 
components, and modules used in production or as gaining efficiency in the supply 
network. On the other hand, the purpose of upstream companies is to produce flexible, 
predictable raw materials, and intermediate products add value by reducing the variety 
of raw materials (Galbraith, 2002). Fan & Goyal (2006) estimated that vertical mergers 
are more likely when firms with relationship-specific assets face increasing demand or 
supply uncertainty, and when their market structures become more concentrated and 
therefore more prone to bilateral bargaining situations. Therefore,  vertical integration 
(backward) can be seen as an ownership arrangement, which allocates residual control 
rights over production decisions. A vertical acquisition backward could be categorized 
as a less risky move, because the company knows the customer requirements in its new 
position because it has been there. This move has another impact, because the old 
competitors may now become customers of the new extended company. This may also 
pose threats due to anti-trust legislation and existing commitments in delivering 
components to previous competitors even at the same price level. In the long term, a 
previous competitor may move to use other suppliers’ deliverables, and the value of the 
acquired company may thus decrease. Chatterjee (1991) combined the vertical industry 
move backward with Porter’s (1980) strategic forces by stating that if entry barriers are 
low, vertical integration does little to further reduce the threat of new entries, so a firm 
might as well not integrate. Instead, it can use its market power to decrease input prices 
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or raise output prices and avoid losing its strategic flexibility as a result of integration. 
Chen (2001) found that a firm can raise its rival’s cost through vertical integration if and 
only if its own cost is reduced through integration. Haleblian et. Al. (2009) called it an 
efficiency move when a company tries to reduce the cost side of value creation and to 
increase efficiency.  
Generally, a vertical move toward customers is seen as expansive, opportunistic, or 
offensive and as a trial to expand into a new market. Haleblian et al. (2009) called it a 
market power move when a company attempts to appropriate more value from 
customers. Chatterjee (1991) proved that if market power is the predominant motive 
behind vertical integration, gains to the acquiring firm and to other incumbents in its 
stage should correlate positively. Therefore, vertical integration toward customers 
benefits all firms in the market place. 
Currently, many companies are pushing to be more customer-oriented, and growth 
toward a services domain has been popular recently. Therefore, it is interesting to see if 
also moving toward company customers has been rewarded by a higher abnormal 
return. Becoming a more downstream company would require other types of resources, 
because they add value through advertising, product positioning, marketing, channels, 
and R&D (Galbraith 2002). A company’s move toward its customers should result in a 
higher abnormal return, because it can be considered an opportunistic move to expand 
into new markets and a possibility to control its own destiny and to become better in 
taking into account customer requirements. On the other hand, moving toward 
customers increases the uncertainty of understanding the needs of the new location in 
the industry chain, and it can thus be judged a riskier move than moving toward the 
company’s own suppliers. In some cases, when a company moves toward its customers, 
the previous customers become new competitors, and the market position may suffer—
at least in the short term. In the hypothesis no. 5 the upstream move is defined as an 
acquisition when a company is making an acquisition of a company closer to its current 
suppliers and raw materials. Similarly a downstream acquisition is defined as 
company’s move to its current customers. 
Hypothesis 5. The abnormal return associated with a downstream acquisition is higher 
than that associated with an upstream acquisition. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA  
The most common research format for studying the impact of corporate actions on a 
stock market is quantitative research, in which the dependent variable is the corporate 
stock market. Though also qualitative methods can be used to measure a perceived 
impact and the subjective behavior of investors, quantitative research is the more often 
used. A quantitative method is suitable in a context where the dependent variable is 
stock price, because it is an objective way to measure the impact directly in the stock 
price. Statistical methods are often used to support hypotheses in quantitative 
measurements of changes in the stock price. Hypothesis creation relies on previous 
research on the same topic or similar research on corporate actions’ market impact. In 
most cases, not only statistical methods are used, but changes in the stock price are 
measured on individual security level; therefore, the nomothetic approach is selected, 
whereby a typical response is based on the past research and hypotheses are created. 
After that, hypotheses are verified with empirical data. Such nomothetic study is called 
a hypothetico-deductive scientific method to either support of reject a hypothesis. This 
is most often used in these studies and was also selected for this dissertation. 
3.1. Research process 
This study made use of three main methods: content analysis, event study analysis, and 
statistical analysis to compare different merger types and day-level and transaction level 
methods. 
An announcement released by the corporation has two main parts. First, it includes a 
date, time, and information about the releasing company. This information can be called 
the header part (ID). The release has also its content (Data).  
Header Information ID is defined in a way that uniquely identifies this information from 
other available information. In this study, the ID had three parts, which were enough to 
identify an event uniquely: 
- Company stock identification  
(ISIN – International Security Identification Number) 
- Date 
- Time 
The content part of the information (press and stock exchange release) describes the 
action the corporation is taking or other information it wants to release. The content 
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analysis method was used to analyze this part (Neuendorff, 2002). It describes how to 
analyze release semantics in a scientifically reliable way. This is the first method in this 
study to describe analysis of content. 
The second method used in this study was event study analysis, commonly used to 
describe an announcement’s impact on corporate value, i.e., the stock price in this study. 
Both content analysis and event study are described in detail in the following sections. 
3.1.1. Content analysis method 
In this study, content analysis derived from Neuendorf’s (2002) guidebook on how to 
run a content analysis. Hers was a six-step definition of content analysis. To become a 
reliable analysis method in a scientific environment, content analysis must provide an 
objective approach. It offers a way to analyze information and a possibility to explain a 
phenomenon without observer bias. Because all human inquiry is inherently subjective, 
content analysis tries to remove the subjective part with an accurate coding of the 
studied phenomenon to give the researcher an intersubjective method for research. This 
criterion is called objectivity-intersubjectivity. The next criterion is A Priori Design (i.e., 
before the fact), which defines a method that requires all decisions on variables, their 
measurement, and coding rules to be prepared before observations begin. In human 
coding, the codebook and coding must be constructed in advance. For good reliability in 
content analysis, two or more human coders are required for intercoder reliability. In 
this study, corporate stock and press releases were collected from two independent 
sources, and M&A actions were filtered using three coders to achieve good reliability.  
Validity must be achieved to ensure that the measure represents the object the researcher 
wants to study and not something else. This was achieved by using only two channels of 
input, i.e., official corporate stock releases and official corporate press releases. A 
rumor about an acquisition or merger was ignored, if the company did not officially 
state the fact in their press release. Generalizability describes how well the research is 
able to represent a pattern, e.g., an outside Finnish stock release or in a time dimension 
outside its investigation window of five years (2006–2010). Replicability of the study 
ensures that the study can be repeated in another context or with another set of data to 
check if similar results can be reached. Each hypothesis was tested deductively, which 
required that both hypotheses and research questions be posed before data was 
collected.  
3.1.2. Event study method 
Because acquisitions and mergers are complex transactions, and because the causality 
between an acquisition event and corporate stock value is ambiguous, studies have 
questioned the suitability of event study as a method for merger and acquisition events 
(Zollo & Singh, 2004). In fact, Zollo & Singh  also wanted to investigate the qualitative 
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impacts of an acquisition and event study as a suitable method. On the other hand, other 
studies have shown a strong positive correlation between abnormal stock returns and 
post-merger increases in operative cash flows (Healy et al., 1992). Though Zollo & 
Singh (2004) explained that financial markets cannot anticipate and incorporate enough 
information at the time of acquisition announcements, an event study focusing on a 
cumulative abnormal return is not an appropriate method. Two years later, Haleblian et 
al. (2006) used an event study in their research of the same event, i.e., acquisitions and 
mergers in the US banking industry. Despite this debate and criticism, the event study 
method has been used to measure the abnormal return on strategic actions such as 
M&A. 
McWilliams & Siegel (1997) defined three basic prerequisites for a reliable event study: 
(1) markets are efficient, (2) the event was unanticipated, and (3) there were no 
confounding events during the event window. They also stated that this was not an 
exhaustive set of issues, as there may be industry- and size-related factors, but that the 
method was the best available at the time. The method has also been criticized in 
strategic actions such as M&A events (Bromiley et al., 1988), yet it is commonly used. 
In this study, the ten-step recommendation of conducting an event study was used 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997, p. 652). These steps are as follows: 
Step 1: Define an event that provides new information to the market. 
Step 2: Outline a theory that justifies a financial response to this new information. 
Step 3: Identify a set of firms that experience this event and identify the event dates. 
Step 4: Choose an appropriate event window and justify its length, if it exceeds two 
days. 
Step 5: Eliminate or adjust for firms that experience other relevant events during the 
event window. 
Step 6: Compute abnormal returns during the event window and test their significance. 
Step 7: Report the percentage of negative returns and the binomial value X or 
Wilcoxon test statistic. 
Step 8: For small samples, use bootstrap methods and discuss the impact of outliers. 
Step 9: Outline a theory that explains the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns 
and test this theory econometrically. 
Step 10: Report firm names and event dates in a data appendix. 
 
These steps are discussed one by one in the following 10 sections.  
 
Definition of an event that provides new information to the market  
The event chosen for this study was a corporation’s intention to acquire another 
company or an announcement of a merger between two companies. Official press and 
stock exchange releases were used as the source for announcement data.  
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This information was considered new; i.e., in the study, the first intention to acquire was 
used as the defining point. Because of their complexity, merger and acquisition events 
require many arrangements before their completion. As a result, the acquiring company 
often announces first its intention to merge or acquire and later the completion date. 
Theory that justifies a financial response to the event  
Numerous studies have shown that mergers and acquisitions create value, though others 
have shown the opposite. A positive relationship was found, e.g., by Salter & Weinhold, 
1978; Porter, 1980; Lubatkin, 1983; and a negative effect by Singh & Montgomery, 
1984; Elgers & Clark, 1980; and Kitching, 1967. Most studies admit that an M&A event 
is strategic, and that company management tries to achieve something with an action of 
this scale.  
Company event date identification 
In this study, all data between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010 was collected. 
Because an event study needs a pre-event period to estimate trend data, the first date 
was 20 trading days after the stock opened in 2006. In practice, this means that the first 
event to be approved in the study took place on February 3, 2006.  
Event window selection and its length justification  
This study embraced many times more data than in a normal event study, in which the 
abnormal return is calculated based on the security’s closing price. The database 
contains a total of 68,827,956 transactions, which would give over 55,000 transactions 
per day, i.e., enough data for each day. If the smallest number of days (3) used earlier in 
the literature, i.e., [-1, 1], had been selected for the event study, over 150,000 
transactions would have been recorded during that period. In comparison, less than 400 
(3 * the number of companies) transactions would have been recorded, if daily analysis 
had been employed. Three days are normally used in similar studies; hence it is justified 
to use even this narrow window, because otherwise the number of events would be 
reduced due to the confounding event definition. In daily analysis, which uses only the 
closing price, it is impossible to be 100% sure if an event affects its own date, because 
an announcement may occur after the stock market is closed, and because the impact 
would be visible in the next day’s closing price.  
In transaction level analysis, a 60-minute period was selected. The decision was based 
on research by Reboredo et al. (2012), who compared several non-linear models to 
study volatility dynamics in time intervals of 5, 10, 30, and 60 minutes. They studied 
both linear and non-linear models, and one finding was that a 60-min period yielded the 
best out-of-sample profitability for both high and low volatility sample periods. 
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Elimination and adjustment for firms experiencing other rele vant 
events during the event window 
The window for an event should be set carefully, because small windows may miss 
early market reactions, whereas wider windows may have too many confounding events 
to influence the results (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). A confounding event is another 
event that has an overlapping event window, i.e., these two events occur at the same 
time and have a temporal proximity that distorts pure event study results (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 1997). A confounding event is also called a contaminating event. McWilliams 
& Siegel also used certain criteria to categorize a confounding event to avoid too loose 
announcements limiting the number of study events. Only events such as declaration of 
dividends, announcement of an impending merger, signing of a major government 
contract, announcement of a new product, filing of a large damage suit, announcement 
of unexpected earnings, and change of a key executive are categorized as confounding 
events. On the other hand, events that have a direct impact on the stock value such as 
stock splits, releasing new shares, or invalidation of shares are not categorized as 
confounding events by McWilliams & Siegel. The definition is then questionable 
because some obvious events are excluded from research. Apparently, removing the 
impact of confounding events is necessary to ensure good reliability; research should 
take into account all types of events, but the number of samples would decrease. 
Therefore, in a study where it is possible to measure with high accuracy and by 
shortening the event window, the possibility of contamination from confounding events 
can be reduced. This leads to an increment in the number of events over the research 
period. The increased number of events should then increase the statistical reliability of 
the event study. 
In this study, a confounding event followed Haleblian et al.’s (1999) definition within 
the event window as described in section 3.2.4. In practice, an event is rejected if one or 
more of the rules below are true (note that in this case a confounding event is not related 
to an M&A event): 
a. When an M&A event occurs during the stock closing time, there is no other 
confounding event after the previous closing time and before the next opening time. 
b. When an M&A event occurs during the stock opening time, there is no other 
confounding event before the M&A event during the same day. 
c. When an M&A event occurs during the stock opening time, there is no other event 
after the M&A event during the same day. 
When this study used tick data values, it was possible to alter the final rule c) so that 
there was a certain time period before the following confounding event. This increased 
the sample size, because the impact from a confounding event appeared after the initial 
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event could be well isolated. On the other hand, one target of this study was to compare 
the findings between the daily analysis method and the transaction-based method, and 
that is why the same confounding event definition was used with both methods.  
When the observed M&A event occurs during the trading day, the case is simple, 
because all events that occur before the next stock exchange closing time will be 
contaminated. The same contamination applies to those events that have taken place 
after the previous closing time even in previous day. An M&A event taking place 
during the trading day is illustrated in Figure 12. In the figure 12 the M&A event is 
shown with a letter “E”, confounding events with “C” and non-confounding events with 
“NC”. 
 
Figure 12. When an M&A event occurs during the stock trading hours, a 
confounding event C may occur either before the event day t0-1 or during the same 
day t0 but not after the event day t0-1. 
There are two possibilities when an M&A event occurs outside the trading day. Figure 
13 shows rule a), where an M&A event occurs during the closing time either before the 
stock exchange is open a1 or after the exchange has closed a2.  
In the first case a1, the contamination happens to events taking place after the previous 
closing date, even if the observed event happened during the next day.  
In the latter case a2, contamination happens to the events during the same day or the 
following day. 
Both of these cases a1 and a2 are shown in figure 13. The M&A event is shown with a 
letter “E”, confounding events with “C” and non-confounding events with “NC”. 
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Figure 13. Confounding events C may occur either during the event day t0 or after the 
event date t0+1. In addition, non-confounding NC events may exist during the same 
day either before the event E or after the event E. 
As can be seen, the definition of confounding event depends on the event time and the 
confounding event date and time. In case of longer periods such as public holidays and 
weekends, the rules are the same, but the stock closing time is extended to cover 
multiple days. 
Abnormal return computation during the event window and test ing 
its significance 
As identified earlier, an event is either an acquisition or a merger initiated by a company 
listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange OMX. This price change is studied around an 
event window, as explained in the previous section, and calculation is based on the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), developed by William Sharpe and John Lintner 
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). In the dissertation, calculations were based on 
Campbell’s formulas on CAPM (Campbell, 1997).  
A stock price change is also called an abnormal return of an event, and it is calculated as 
the difference between the observed return of the stock and the predicted or normal 
return of the stock. Return is considered the price of the stock on the market. Hence the 
impact of an acquisition or merger event is measured by the part of the return that is 
unanticipated by an economic model of anticipated, normal returns. This can be 
formulated as follows (Campbell et al., 1971, p.155): 
                    
where  
   = the rate of return on the share price of firm i on day (time) t  
   = the rate of return on a market portfolio of stock (such as OMXH or a 
market index) on day t 
i = intercept term 
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i = the systematic risk of stock i 
    = the error term, with E(   ) = 0 
Estimating the above equation, we can derive an estimate of daily abnormal returns 
(AR) for the firm i using the following equation: 
ARit = Rit – (ai + biRmt) 
where ai and bi are the ordinary least square (OLS) parameter estimates calculated from 
the regression Rit on Rmt over an estimation period of t preceding the event (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997). We can assume that i and i are stable and calculated during an 
arbitrary estimation period. The length of the estimation window varies from a couple of 
days to even a couple of hundred days (-300,-61) (Haleblian, 1999). 
Abnormal return is the basis of event study analysis, but to draw conclusions on the 
overall impact of events, we must calculate aggregated results over time and securities. 
Thus, in addition to abnormal return, other returns are calculated based on the abnormal 
return. First, the aggregation through time is calculated by Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR). CAR is calculated over the event window as a cumulative result of the 
sample period abnormal result. The sample period during this study varied between 1 
minute and 1 day, but results were finally calculated based on a 5-min sample. 
Standardized Abnormal Return (SAR) and Standardized Compounded Abnormal Return 
(SCAR) were used, because they are standardized in terms of standard deviation. All of 
them were calculated based on the AR, and their relations are explained below. 
Many researchers calculate the standardized abnormal return (SAR), where the return is 
standardized by its standard deviation (Dodd & Warner, 1983):  
SARit = ARit / SDit 
where  
        
√
  
      
 
         )    
)
∑         ) 
 
   
 
where   
  is residual variance from the market model as computed for firm i, and    is 
the mean return on the market portfolio calculated during the estimation period.  
Then the Standardized Abnormal Return (SAR) is used to calculate the Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR) over a time period k, which is called an event window. Hence 
the cumulative abnormal return for each firm i can be defined as 
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and finally, the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return (SCAR) is 
        
     
    
 
The null hypothesis can be tested using J2, which is calculated from the SCAR as 
follows: 
   √ (
       )
    
)         
where N is the number of securities,                    length of the estimation window 
T1 - T0. Using J2 assumes that the distribution of abnormal returns follows normal 
distribution. If they are not distributed normally, the non-parametric tests of J3 and J4 
are used. 
Report the percentage of negative returns and the binomial value X 
or the Wilcoxon test statistic  
The seventh step in the event study process is to report the percentage of negative 
returns in order to understand how well the distribution follows the normal distribution 
model. The Wilcoxon test statistics were selected, because they take into account the 
size of the abnormal return (Burton et al., 1999; Tsetsekos & Gombola, 1992). During 
the test, absolute abnormal returns are ranked from the lowest to the highest. The 
highest abnormal return gets the rank of the sample size. After ranking the whole 
sample, the original value of the abnormal return is attached to the rank, and the sum of 
all ranks is calculated to produce the Wilcoxon W. After that, the Wilcoxon W is 
converted to a Z-value and finally to the significance level of the abnormal return 
sample (Lowry, 2011).  
Use bootstrap methods and discuss the impact of outliers  
Using bootstrap methods and finding the impact of outliers are necessary if the sample 
size is 30 or less (McWilliams & Siegel, 1987). In this study, the sample size was 362, 
which is much larger than 30, so this step was not necessary. 
Outlining a theory that explains the cross-sectional variation in 
abnormal returns and testing this theory econometrically.  
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The ninth and second-to-last step is to outline the theory that explains the cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns. This step was covered in section 2.8 main 
hypotheses and theories linked to different abnormal returns. The basic theory relies on 
testing different strategic moves in the corporate value chain and on acquiring new 
technologies or market presence from other value chains (Galbraith, 2002). 
Report firm names and event dates in data appendix  
Official press and stock exchange releases from all companies were listed on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010. Companies 
listed during these five years were considered in this study; consequently, if a company 
appeared or disappeared during the period, it was counted in if it had an M&A event, 
and if its evaluation period and estimation period were within the five-year period. All 
the studied companies (122) launched their press and stock exchange releases in Finnish 
(and in English, except 22). Because the content study was based on Finnish releases, 
all Finnish releases were studied, plus some additional English releases from companies 
that publish theirs mostly in English. 
A total of 101 companies made at least one merger or acquisition during the period, 
some with an English translation embedded in their annual report. Some companies 
disappeared from the stock exchange during the period and were taken into account if 
they had an M&A event before disappearing. 
This study used event study theory for M&A events and compared previous articles on 
related and unrelated acquisitions, horizontal and non-horizontal acquisitions, and 
empirical studies on the Helsinki Stock Exchange.  
Corporation stock releases record the exact date and time of the event τ, which was used 
as a basis for defining the event windows. Definitions of the estimation window, pre-
event window, event window, and post-event windows vary, and at least two definitions 
are often used. One covers an estimation window and three parts of event windows 
(MacKinlay, 1997) and the other an estimation window, an event-, and a post-event 
window (Campbell et al., 1997). 
 estimation window (T0 – T1) 
 pre-event window (T1 – T2) 
 event window (T2 – T3) 
 post-event window (T3 – T4) 
 
Because this study focused mainly on a short event window and to increasing the 
accuracy of measuring M&A events’ τ impact around a corporate announcement, a 
decision was made to use Campbell’s definition (Campbell et al., 1997). He used only 
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three steps and removed the pre-event window (or combined the estimation window and 
pre-event window) to produce  
 estimation window (T0 – T1) 
 event window (T1 – T2) 
 post-event window (T2 – T3) 
 
In both definitions, an event τ takes place in an event window, but in MacKinlay’s 
(1997) definition it occurs between T2 and T3, and in Campbell’s (1997) definition 
between T1 and T2. All event studies have two mandatory components—estimation 
window and event window—which were also used in this study as well as Campbell’s 
(1997) definition (Figure 14.). The post-event window was not included. 
 
Figure 14. Campbell’s definition of the estimation window and event window was 
used in this research (Campbell, 1997). 
The two definitions are similar in two ways. First, estimation and event windows do not 
overlap, and, second, an event window is symmetrical in such a way that τ - T1  = T2 - τ. 
Many other types of event combinations are also used, whereas symmetrical event 
windows are rare. 
3.1.3. Statistical models 
When compounded abnormal returns have been calculated for different classes and 
categories, the next step is to compare the results for statistical significance. The J2 
calculation is used for only an individual group, but when groups are compared, the 
basic statistical analysis model is ANOVA (Scheffe, 1952).  
ANOVA, short for Analysis of Variance, compares two or more groups’ means to find a 
statistical significance between the groups. Originally, it was developed by analyzing 
results in experiments on a scale of 7 or more points, but it can be used also to compare 
the means of two sample groups. If only two groups are compared, ANOVA can be 
replaced with the paired-samples T test. Both tests are parametric tests, and since the 
samples are independent, they are normally distributed and share an equal variance. For 
the last requirement, it is possible to use the SCAR instead of the CAR, because the 
former is scaled in terms of standard deviation. 
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If the distribution is not normal, non-parametric versions are used. The non-parametric 
version of ANOVA is the Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952), and the 
similarly non-parametric version of paired samples T test is the Mann-Whitney U Test 
(Mann & Whitney, 1947). The Kruskal-Wallis is used for more than two samples and 
the Mann-Whitney U Test for two samples only. 
3.2. Research data 
The research data consisted of press and stock exchange releases and company security 
transactions on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. Additional information related to the 
companies’ background was collected from published annual reports and used mainly as 
control variables of company size, turnover, and profitability figures, if they were not 
explicitly mentioned in the press and stock exchange release. 
3.2.1. Firms under study 
There were 122 publicly listed companies on the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki (previously 
known as OMX Helsinki) during the study period between January 1, 2006 and 
December 31, 2010 (see Table 5). All changes in company names, acquisitions and 
ISINs are described in Appendix B. An interesting detail is that also during the study 
period, the Helsinki Stock Exchange was acquired by NASDAQ on February 27, 2008, 
and the OMX Helsinki became the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki. Because the stock 
exchange itself was not listed on the stock exchange, it remained outside this study. 
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Table 5. All companies included in the study. 
 
3.2.2. Content (Releases) 
In this study, all data between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010 was collected. 
The company event date is the date (and time) indicated in the press or stock exchange 
release. Normally, the time was indicated as local Helsinki time (either Eastern 
European Time, EET, or Eastern European Summer Time, EEST). If the release 
announcement was shown in Greenwich Mean Time, GMT, or Coordinated Universal 
Time, UTC, it was corrected to the local time zone according to either UTC+2 (standard 
time) or UTC+3, when daylight saving time was used. This correction was necessary 
because stock transaction data always uses local time, i.e., EEST or EET. 
Previous studies have standardly defined the event date as the date when the 
announcement was released. This may, however, cause an error because the event may 
occur before the stock closing time or after it. In the latter case, the possible abnormal 
return is first visible on the following trading day. Consequently in this study, the time 
was taken into account, and it is thus possible to pinpoint the event more accurately on 
the correct date, or, more precisely, the aim was to monitor the right abnormal return if 
the event took place after the stock closing time. Additionally, public holidays and 
Affecto (LP) Fortum Nurminen Logistics (LP) SRV Yhtiöt 
Ahlstrom F-Secure Okmetic SSK S.Sääst.Kiint. (LP) 
Aktia GeoSentric Olvi A Stockmann
Aldata Solution Glaston Oral Hammaslääkärit Stonesoft 
Alma Media HKScan (LP) Oriola-KD Suominen
Amer Sports A Honkarakenne B (LP) Orion Takoma (LP) 
Aspo (LP) Huhtamäki Outokumpu Talentum (LP) 
Aspocomp Group Ilkka-Yhtymä II Outotec Talvivaara 
Atria (LP) Incap Panostaja (LP) Technopolis 
Basware Innofactor PKC Group Tecnotree 
Biohit Interavanti Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino Tectia 
Biotie Therapies (LP) Ixonos Pohjola Pankki A Tekla
CapMan Kemira Ponsse Teleste 
Cargotec Keskisuomalainen Pöyry TeliaSonera
Cencorp (LP) Kesko QPR Software Tieto 
Citycon Kesla A Raisio V Tiimari 
Componenta (LP) Kone Ramirent Tikkurila 
Comptel Konecranes Rapala VMC (LP) Trainers' House (LP)
Cramo Lassila & Tikanoja Rautaruukki Tulikivi A 
Digia Lemminkäinen (LP) Raute (LP) Turvatiimi 
Dovre Group Lännen Tehtaat (LP) Revenio Group UPM-Kymmene
Efore (LP) Marimekko Ruukki Group Uponor 
ELCOTEQ Martela A (LP) Saga Furs Vaahto Group (LP) 
Elecster Metso Sampo A Vacon 
Elektrobit Metsä Board Sanoma Vaisala A 
Elisa Neo Industrial Sievi Capital Viking Line
eQ Neste Oil Solteq (LP) Wulff 
Etteplan (LP) Nokia Soprano Wärtsilä 
Exel Composites Nokian Renkaat Sponda YIT 
Finnair Nordea Bank Solteq (LP) Yleiselektroniikka E
Finnlines Nordic Aluminium Soprano Ålandsbanken
Fiskars Norvestia Sponda 
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weekends were taken into account in a similar manner as the nighttime between two 
stock trading days. 
In practice, the stock trading clock is continuous time that consists of stock trading days 
in such a way that right after stock trading is closed, a new stock trading day begins. All 
events happening within the stock trading day carry the announcement’s original date 
and time. Events that occur outside the stock trading day time are postponed until 
trading starts again; hence their observation date is the next trading day and the 
observation time 10:00:00 AM, when the stock market opens. The next trading day can 
be the same day if an announcement comes before the stock market opens, or the next 
day if the stock market opens the following day or some other day due to a long stock 
closing time at weekends or public holidays. For these reasons, the announcement date 
alone does not suffice for event studies but needs the event time as well. 
During the study period, the number of valid press and stock exchange releases was a 
total of 548. First, all 65 confounding events were deducted from this number, as 
described in section 3.1.2. (confounding events are listed in Appendix A). Confounding 
events amounted to over 10%. Unfortunately, the long event window of 3 days 
accounted for a significant share of rejections. With the new method, confounding 
events could be decreased, as described in Figure 15. The table shows a calculation of 
confounding events that would have been lost had they been counted only in a narrow 
window. For example, with an event window of a total of 4 hours (+/-2 hours), it is 
possible to investigate 19 more events. If the event window is reduced to 2 hours (+/- 1 
hour), 25 more events could be added to a study. 
The above comparison gives us a new approach to research, to reducing the number of 
rejected events because of contamination. This is important with small samples of 
relatively rare event types as well as in studying actions of large companies that publish 
several releases per day. 
 
0
10
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50
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Total 65 
10 minutes 41 
20 minutes 39 
30 minutes 34 
60 minutes 28 
120 minutes 25 
240 minutes 19 
Figure 15. Illustration of how the number of confounding releases drops when the 
event window is shortened from days to hours. 
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After confounding releases have been removed from the data set, the next step is to 
delete the events that have no time information but only a date. Altogether, there were 
73 such announcements. Although these could have been studied as part of daily 
analysis, they were useless for comparison. Hence they were rejected, because daily 
analysis was not a core element in this study. 
The third issue that affects the number of releases is historical data during the estimation 
window. In this study, the 20-day estimation window was used; hence the first possible 
time to announce a release was February 3, 2006. Consequently, 13 events dropped out 
of the count.  
Two more reasons caused events to be rejected. First, some had to be removed because 
the event time overlapped with another event and, second, because low stock trade 
numbers (very low volumes) interfered with satisfactory forecasting in abnormal return 
analysis. In summary, of 548 merger or acquisition announcements 362 events were 
valid for both analyses, and 33.9% of original releases were removed because of  one or 
another of the above reasons. 
 All M&A events:    548 
 Confounding events:    65 
 All events:     483 
 Null time in event time:    73  
 Date during weekend or holiday:   3 events (all null times) 
 Valid date & time:    410 M&A events 
 Time before the stock market opens:  139 events 
o They were moved to 10:00:00  
 Time after stock market closes:   3 events 
o They were moved to the next stock date (one from Friday to Monday). 
 
When daily closing values were used, there were three alternatives to interpret the 
events:  
1) Before the stock market opened, i.e., 00:00 AM–09:59 AM 
2) During the stock market, 10:00 AM–6:30PM 
3) After the stock market closed, after 6:30 PM 
 
Three different closing prices can be used, and their results differ if an abnormal return 
is observed. They are   
 event days closing price at T0  
(This was the normal case in previous studies.)  
 previous closing price from day T0-1 
 next closing value at T0+1.  
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Price information is continuous in such a way that all weekends and banking holidays 
are deducted from the observation period. This means that if an event takes place on a 
Monday or the day after a banking holiday, the previous closing value before the 
weekend and banking holiday is used. If the event occurs right before a holiday or 
weekend, the next market day closing value is used in a similar manner. In practice, this 
means that in case 1, when an event takes place before the stock market opens, the 
abnormal return is visible already in T0, in a similar manner as if the event occurred 
during a stock market day, if the time of the event were “early enough” before the 
closing time. If an event occurs after the stock market closes, the abnormal return (AR) 
is visible in T0+1.  
Thus another parameter enables observation of either the previous day’s or the next 
day’s closing price. Observation of the next day’s closing price postpones all events to 
the next day’s stock price, regardless of the time of day, i.e., cases 1, 2, and 3. On the 
other hand, this may give misleading information in that if the next day’s closing price 
is used, the AR is not observed on the date the event takes place, but on the next day. 
This can be avoided by using the previous day’s closing price, when the event has its 
AR on the right day. In this study, the event day’s closing price was used, which in 
some cases gave misleading information but, on the other hand, also a reference to 
previous studies on the very subject. These alternatives are described in detail in Figure 
16, where X, Y, and Z indicate the share price at the time the stock market was closed. 
Share price X stands for the event day-1 (t0-1), Y for the event day (t0), and Z is the 
closing price for the event day+1 (t0+1).   
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Figure 16. Daily closing events may pose challenges in abnormal return calculation. 
3.3. Summary of the methods  
First, all events were collected from both press and stock exchange releases, categorized 
into merger and acquisition actions, and triangulated with another source of information 
to ensure that all M&A events had been collected. Confounding releases, null time 
events, and irregularities were filtered to ensure that all events were valid. 
When filtering was completed, all events were classified into six classes. In addition to 
this classification, events were evaluated based on three different parameters, i.e., if the 
target company was listed or not, if there was previous ownership in such a way that the 
acquiring company owned a part of the target company, or if the transaction was for the 
whole company or just for business.  
Table 6. Initial results after triangulation 
 
Business
Previous 
ownership Listed Value chain Moving
Px - Py 87,9% 93,6% 96,1% 85,8% 84,0%
Px - Pz 96,4% 97,9% 96,4% 97,2% 92,0%
Pz - Py 89,4% 95,1% 96,1% 85,3% 83,8%
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Three persons compared the results, described with letters Px, Py and Pz. During the first 
round of triangulation, they agreed on 91.8% of classes, as shown in Table 6. After a 
short discussion and further instructions for evaluation, full agreement was achieved on 
classification. The value chain in Table 6 represents a horizontal move. It has two 
alternative value steps, same, which describes the same value chain and different, which 
describes another value chain. The moving parameter has three alternatives, as it 
represents a vertical move. Hence, it had three alternative positions, forward, backward, 
and same position, which were coded into classes as follows (explained in detail in 
2.5.3):  
A. Same value chain same position  horizontal   Class A. 
B. Different value chain same position  related    Class B. 
C. Different value chain forward move  unrelated forward  Class C. 
D. Different value chain backward move  unrelated backward  Class D. 
E. Same value chain forward move  vertical forward  Class E. 
F. Same value chain backward move  vertical backward  Class F. 
 
Company security prices were collected from the transaction database using the ID part 
of the release (ISIN, Date, and Time), and the abnormal return was calculated with the 
estimated values of the security’s evolution, which comprised the intercept term i and 
the systematic risk of security i. Compounded abnormal returns for different classes 
were compared, and analysis of variance was made based on their standardized 
compounded abnormal return (SCAR). 
 
Abnormal return was measured in two ways: by daily analysis using closing stock 
prices, which indicated changes on a day level, and by transaction-based analysis using 
tick data, which was summarized every minute during the stock day. Most literature 
references are to daily closing rates and only a few to transaction-based or even minute-
level summary data research. 
In the above procedure, two parallel tracks compare the hypotheses with both methods. 
Finally, the two methods are compared using statistical analysis to find out if any new 
information was revealed by using tick data analysis.  
As described in 1.2., the research questions were as follows: 
1. Does moving to transaction-level analysis reveal new information compared to 
day-level analysis in measuring investor reactions to M&A announcements? 
2. Do announcements of different M&A types create different investor reactions? 
a. related – unrelated 
b. horizontal – non-horizontal 
c. moving forward – moving backward 
d. moving vs. staying in the current center of gravity 
65 
 
3. What other independent factors influence investor reactions to M&A 
announcements? 
 
Research steps are summarized in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 47. Research steps and final comparison of daily analysis and transaction-
based analysis data. 
3.4. Variables used in the study 
3.4.1. Variables 
This study had one main independent variable, a corporate release on merger and 
acquisition action. Such actions can be categorized into merger / acquisition or press / 
stock releases, but in this context, they represent only one variable, because mergers and 
acquisitions are very difficult, even impossible, to differentiate. A media selection press 
or stock exchange is often redundant, because the same release appears in both the press 
and stock exchange. Therefore, we can say that there is one independent variable: a 
corporate release on its acquisition. 
The compounded abnormal return is a dependent variable, and it was calculated as 
defined in section 3.1.2. It is also quite straightforward to define, because the basic 
dependent variable is the abnormal return. On the other hand, the abnormal return is the 
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seed or origin of various other variables explained in the methods section. The company 
security’s compounded abnormal return (CAR) is a dependent variable. 
3.4.2. Control variables  
As mentioned above, mergers and acquisitions have been a very popular research topic 
over time, and many studies have examined the possible positive contributors to 
abnormal returns in mergers and acquisitions. Many studies have also focused on the 
outcome and reasons for the failure of mergers. At least the following control variables 
have been studied: 
- Payment method (e.g. Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Hayward, 2002, Chakrabarti et. 
al., 2009; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) 
- Acquirer performance (Haleblian et.al., 2006; Haleblian&Finkelstein, 1999) 
- Acquirer acquisition experience (e.g. Hayward, 2002; Oler et. al., 2008; Zollo & 
Singh, 2004; Haleblian et.al.; 2006) 
- Acquirer debt-to-equity (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) 
- Defense tactics (Shijven & Hitt, 2012) 
- Acquisition premium (Shijven & Hitt, 2012; Laamanen, 2007) 
- Industry similarity (Hayward, 2002; Oler et. al., 2008; Shijven & Hitt, 2012; 
Gaur et.al., 2013) 
- Trend data (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) 
- Involvement of the acquirer advisors (Shijven & Hitt, 2012) 
- Pre-existing partial ownership position (Shijven & Hitt, 2012) 
 
Based on previous studies (Shijven & Hitt, 2012; Oler et. al., 2008; Hayward, 2002; 
Haleblian, et.al., 2006; Dikova & Sahib, 2013; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & 
Jayaraman, 2009; Laamanen, 2007; Haleblian et.al., 2006; Laamanen, 2009), this study 
used the following variables: 
- Trend data in the stock market 
- Relative size between acquiring company and target company 
- Relative size class between acquiring company and target company  
- Cultural proximity 
- Domestic vs. International acquisition  
- Publicly listed company 
- Acquisition premium 
- Acquisition price paid 
- Target company’s profitability 
- Pre-existing partial ownership position 
- Business acquisition vs. company acquisition 
- Acquiring company’s turnover class  
- Announcement type press release vs. stock exchange release 
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The selected control variables represent a sample of the most commonly used variables, 
however some of the previously studied control variables like payment method were not 
chosen. This is mainly due to the missing information in press and stock exchange 
releases. Additionally several payment mechanisms and their combinations have been 
used M&A actions and they are not always visible at the time of an action. In this study, 
collected were those parameters that are normally easily available and mentioned in a 
company-initiated release.  
3.4.2.1 Trend data  
Trend data is a control variable, because it is itself a variable of the results of the 
process. This means that the current market trend is to understand the implications of 
stock prices, which affect the index and the trend itself (Shijven & Hitt, 2012). 
Bear and bull market definitions 
Normally, in the study of stock prices one major factor that has affected the return is the 
existing market trend. A rising market cycle is called the bull market and a declining 
trend is called the bear market. Normally, bull market impacts on the stock market have 
been positive and those of the bear market negative. Despite its popularity and the 
importance of a bull market, no consensus has been reached on its definition (nor that of 
the bear market) (Gonzalez et al., 2004). Many researchers disagree on the bull market 
definition and consider it an ex-post categorization of random data. 
This study used the definition of Bry & Boschan (1971), according to which analysis 
starts by defining the turning points in the business cycle (peaks and troughs). Their 
quantitative definition was formulated to follow closely the qualitative definition of the 
NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research). In this definition, the peak signifies 
the highest market index value defined as a period of at least 6 months prior and 6 
months after the point. Respectively, a trough is defined as the lowest value in a 
minimum period of twelve months (+/- 6 months).  
The period between two peaks (or two troughs) is called a cycle. The minimum time for 
a cycle is 15 months calculated from peak – trough – peak or trough – peak – trough. 
This definition has an additional construct called phase. A phase is calculated as the 
time between two consecutive cycles of trough and peak (expansion) or peak and trough 
(contraction). The minimum duration of a phase is 5 months, defined such because 
cycle phases lasting for less than 5 months are generally of little economic or statistical 
value (Gonzalez et al., 2004). 
There are also alternative and more complex methods to define bear and bull market 
cycles. For example, Maheu & McCurdy (2000) applied a Markov regime-switching 
model with duration dependence. In this instance, bull and bear markets are defined as 
high-return stable states and low-return volatile states, respectively. Turner et al. (1989) 
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found that excess returns can be modeled using a mixture of normal densities with 
different means and variances. Hamilton & Lin (1996) examined the joint behavior of 
stock returns and industrial production and found that economic recessions are the 
primary factor driving volatile stock returns.  
NASDAQ OMX Helsinki cycles between 2006 and 2010 
By the above definition, the period between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010 
consisted of 1,257 trading days, out of which 430 (34.21%) were in the bear market 
cycle and 827 in the bull market cycle (65.79%). Though this study shows roughly a 
65%/35% division, the bull market cycle, in fact, started before January 1, 2006 and 
continued past December 31, 2010. If we study the two full cycles (June 13, 2006-
March 6, 2009) and (October 31, 2007 to April 7, 2010) closely, we can observe that the 
market was in the bull cycle 51% and 45% and in the bear market 49% and 55%. Hence 
we can say that the long and steep bear market cycle between October 31, 2007 and 
March 6, 2009 differed significantly from average cycles. For comparison, the New 
York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) average length (1800-2000) of a bull market cycle was 
close to 21 months and that of the bear market 15 months (Gonzalez, 2005), yielding a 
40% to 60% ratio for the two. 
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Table 7. The Helsinki stock exchange has been more volatile in bear and bull market 
periods than the NYSE DJI (Nasdaq, Yahoo). 
 
Unlike, in the NYSE DJI index, a long period of contraction occurred after this study 
period. Because of a difference in banking holidays, this comparison used local US and 
Finnish trading days. 
A steep fall in the stock market similar to that in the NYSE and the NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki could also be observed between October 2007 and March 2009. The NYSE 
recovered almost completely, because its today’s index is 96.0% of the DJI peak on 
October 9, 2007, but the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki’s current OMXHPI is only 43.8% of 
its peak on October 31, 2007.  
OMX (OMXHI) NYSE (DJI)
From To From To
BEAR 9853,03 8032,03 -1821,00 
peak - trough 21.4.2006 13.6.2006 53
BULL 8032,03 12525,87 4493,84 10667,39 14164,53 3497,14
trough - peak 13.6.2006 31.10.2007 505 20.1.2006 9.10.2007 627
BEAR 12525,87 4110,31 -8415,56 14164,53 6547,05 -7617,48 
peak - trough 31.10.2007 6.3.2009 492 9.10.2007 9.3.2009 517
BULL 4110,31 7452,62 3342,31 6547,05 11205,03 4657,98
trough - peak 6.3.2009 7.4.2010 397 9.3.2009 26.4.2010 413
BEAR 7452,62 6134,78 -1317,84 11205,03 9686,48 -1518,55 
peak - trough 7.4.2010 1.7.2010 85 26.4.2010 2.7.2010 67
BULL 6134,78 7897,95 1763,17 9686,48 12810,54 3124,06
trough - peak 1.7.2010 12.1.2011 195 2.7.2010 29.4.2011 301
AFTER RESEARCH PERIOD
BEAR 7897,95 5367,04 -2530,91 12810,54 10655,3 -2155,24 
peak - trough 12.1.2011 19.9.2011 250 29.4.2011 3.10.2011 157
BULL 5367,04 6291,35 924,31
trough - peak 19.9.2011 20.2.2012 154
BEAR 6291,35 4802,12 -1489,23 
peak - trough 20.2.2012 4.6.2012 105
BULL  (TODAY) 4802,12 5465,55 663,43 10655,3 13596,93 2941,63
trough - peak 4.6.2012 28.9.2012 116 3.10.2011 28.9.2012 361
RESEARCH PERIOD
BULL SUM 63,5 % 1097 69,7 % 1341
BEAR SUM 36,5 % 630 30,3 % 584
AFTER RESEARCH PERIOD
BULL SUM 43,2 % 270 69,7 % 361
BEAR SUM 56,8 % 355 30,3 % 157
TOTAL
BULL SUM 58,1 % 1367 69,7 % 1702
BEAR SUM 41,9 % 985 30,3 % 741
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As shown in Table 7, a major difference between the NYSE and the NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki was that though they hit a trough almost at the same time, the NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki has not recovered to its previous level, but the NYSE even surpassed the all-
time high of 2007 in 2013. In the NYSE, the average ratio of bear to bull markets has 
been almost constant, but in the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, the bear market cycles have 
lasted longer with bull market cycles extending close to 21 months and an average bear 
market to 15 months. 
 
Figure 18. Peaks and troughs according to Bry & Broschan’s definition (OMXH 
Kauppalehti) 
Pagan & Sossounov (2003) adapted the original Bry & Boschan (1971) algorithm and 
made two major improvements: the smoothing algorithm was not used, and the local 
peak and trough period was extended to 8 months, instead of 6 months used by Bry & 
Boschan. Though these changes sound minimal, they appear to have changed the 
number of peaks from 3 to 2 and the number of troughs from 3 to 2. Canova (1994) 
stated that a cycle should last at least 16 months instead of 15, and he shortened the 
minimum phase from 5 to 4 months. An additional definition was added so that if the 
index change was larger than 20% in a month, then the 4-month cycle definition was 
ignored and the phase was defined. This was because of rapid short-term changes during 
the 1990s, and because the total number of cycles dropped from 2 to 1 in the period. 
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Figure 19. Peaks and troughs according to Pagan & Sossounov (OMXH 
Kauppalehti). 
3.4.2.2 Relative size 
Several studies have found that when an acquisition reaches a certain size, the 
performance of the acquiring company slackens; therefore, it is interesting to see if the 
relational size both in terms of employees and turnover has any impact on the market’s 
reaction time to an acquisition announcement (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Normally, one of 
these three cases can be measured based on the announcement if either the relative size 
of employees, turnovers, or profits is mentioned (e.g. Oler et. al., 2008; Hayward, 2002; 
Haleblian, et.al., 2006). 
Relative size can be illustrated according to the following formula: 
        ( 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
)  
where  
Srel is the relative size between the target company t and the acquiring company a 
E is the number of employees at the time of a release 
T is the turnover at the time of a release  
P is the profit at the time of a release 
 
The time of a press or stock exchange release is the time when the release is published 
and when the parameter is written in the release; however, if the release does not 
include a size definition, the size parameter of the acquiring company is taken from the 
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previous annual (or quarterly, if available) report. If the target company’s size 
information is not released, it is taken from the next annual report, if the acquisition 
details are explained. The difference here is justified because in most cases the 
acquiring—publicly listed company—announces its current size, turnover, and profit 
based on the previous public announcement, i.e., often on the previous quarterly or 
annual release. 
If the relation is <100%, it means that the target company is smaller than the acquiring 
company, and when the relation >100%, the acquiring company is smaller than the 
target company.  
3.4.2.3 Relative size class 
When we analyze the relational size by one number defining the relative size, the next 
step is to build size classes. This category is divided into size classes as follows: 
1) 0% size class not measurable     [N=61] 
2) 1% size is between 0% but less than equal to 1%   [N=109] 
3) 2% size is larger than 1% but less than or equal to 2% [N=27] 
4) 3% size is larger than 2% but less than or equal to 3%  [N=23] 
5) 5% size is larger than 3% but less than or equal to 5%  [N=22] 
6) 10% size is larger than 5% but less than or equal to 10%  [N=30] 
7) 50% size is larger than 10% but less than or equal to 50%  [N=44] 
8) >50% size is larger than 50%     [N=13] 
3.4.2.4 Cultural proximity 
In 2007, mergers and acquisitions represented a total global value of USD 4.5 trillion, 
and roughly 47% of them involved cross-border deals (Reus & Lamont, 2009). Cross-
border acquisitions are becoming more common, and the impact of different cultural 
backgrounds has been studied as a major challenge to merger and acquisition success 
(Dikova & Sahib, 2013). Companies are normally seeking to improve economies of 
scale, access scarce resources embedded in organizational cultures, teams, and 
individuals, generate tax advantages, and eliminate inefficiencies (Chakrabarti et al. , 
2009). Cultural differences have been listed as one major challenge in acquisition 
failures. Thus it is interesting to see if this has any bearing on the measurement of an 
acquisition event when a press release or stock exchange release is published. 
Proximity can be measured in many different ways, the easiest and most undisputable 
being to measure the physical distance between the acquiring company and the target 
company. The geographical distance measure does not necessarily take into account 
cultural and political differences between countries. Imagine, e.g., the similar cultural 
backgrounds of two very different countries where the political systems have produced 
very different business environments, such as Seoul and Pyongyang, which are located 
only 195 kilometers apart yet are very different politically. Therefore, physical distance 
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may not suffice as a proximity measure. The literature mentions several measures of 
cultural proximity that cover human aspects such as language, religion, as well as 
political aspects.  
Dow and Karumatra (2006) used altogether eleven dimensions: language, religion, 
education, industrial development, degree of democracy, socialism, and, additionally, 
Hofstede’s four most commonly used indicators of natural cultural distance (Hofstede, 
1980). These indicators comprise four original dimensions to measure proximity: power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, masculinity, and one additional, long-
term orientation. Because of the more exact and recent research by Dow & Larimo 
(2011) on the same subject, a decision was made to use their study with only the first 
five dimensions: language, religion, education, industrial development, and degree of 
democracy and Hofstede’s original four dimensions. 
Some of the above are not uni-dimensional such as language, which is a combination of 
similarities or close relations (Norwegian, Swedish, or Sweden and Finland, where 
Swedish is the second language, and Sweden with a large Finnish-speaking minority). 
As an example, Dow & Karunaratna (2009) used a five-level definition of the two 
closest languages used in a particular country (1–being the same language; 2–the same 
sub-branch on the first level, but different on the second level; 3–the same branch but 
different on the first sub-branch level; 4–the same family, but different branches; 5–
different families). Branch and level refer to a language classification according to 
which, e.g., Finnish and Hungarian are related on the branch level but not on the first 
level sub-branch, i.e., class 3—exactly on the same level as Swedish and English.  In 
this language dimension, Finland and the United Kingdom are more closely related, 
because Finland has Swedish as the second language—otherwise Finland would be as 
far related in the language dimension with the United Kingdom as with China. Similar 
multidimensional parameters are also among the other four parameters. This five-
dimensional division is one of many trials of clustering some 200 countries into smaller 
and similar groups.  
Because of no single way to cluster, and because cultural proximity was not the main 
research topic here, a decision was made to select one recent clustering, that of Dow & 
Larimo (2011), which is based on Dow & Karumatra’s (2009) original proximity 
dimensions with a certain simplification of Hofstede’s dimensions. They combined 
countries into 25 clusters, as shown in Table 8. 
Dikova & Sahib (2013) combined previous studies on cross-border acquisition 
performance and previous experience from international acquisitions and found that 
experienced acquirers are more likely to avoid pitfalls and fully benefit from cultural 
diversity (Dikova & Sahib, 2013). Though they did not use event study, they found that 
experience with international acquisitions increased performance in both low cultural 
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distance and high cultural distance cases. The measure was a one-month stock price 
increase compared to one at the time of an acquisition announcement. 
Table 8. Countries categorized into 25 clusters based on religion, language, industrial 
development, education, and degree of democracy (Dow & Larimo, 2011). 
  
Dow & Larimo (2011) tested their hypotheses of cultural dissimilarities driving a need 
to make an acquisition, because the acquiring company could not leverage its previous 
acquisition experience from other countries.  
Afghanistan Australia Cook Islands
Bangladesh Guam Jamaica
Indonesia Ireland Nauru
Iran New Zealand Papua New Guinea
Malaysia UK Philippines
Pakistan USA Samoa
Sierra Leone Belgium Solomon Islands
Turkey Canada Trinidad and Tobago
Uzbekistan France Denmark
Algeria Luxembourg Finland
Bahrain Switzerland Iceland
Egypt Bulgaria Norway
Iraq Croatia Sweden
Jordan Czech Republic Estonia
Kuwait Greece Kazakhstan
Libya Lithuania Latvia
Morocco Poland Russia
Oman Romania Ukraine
Qatar Serbia Ethiopia
Saudi Arabia Slovakia Ghana
Sudan Slovenia Kenya
Syria I Hungary Nigeria
UAE J Malta Tanzania
Yemen Brazil Uganda
Argentina Mozambique Zambia
Chile Portugal Zimbabwe
Colombia Austria T China
Costa Rica Germany HongKong
Ecuador Cameroon Singapore
El Salvador Congo Taiwan
Guatemala DR of Cote d'Ivoire India
Mexico French Polynesia Nepal
Panama Lebanon X North Korea
Peru Madagaskar Y South Korea
Puerto Rico New Caledonia Japan
Spain Vanuatu Laos
Uruguay N Fiji Myanmar
Venezuela Netherlands Sri Lanka
D Israel South Africa Thailand
E Italy Suriname Vietnam
K
C
O
M
L
U
Z
V
A
B
F
P
Q
G
H
R
S
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If a country was not listed in the clusters defined by Dow & Larimo (2011), the closest 
cluster was selected based on the neighboring country. The neighboring country is one 
with the longest common border with the country that was not found in any cluster. In 
the data sample, only one country, Georgia, was then categorized with Russia and 
Kazakhstan and not with Turkey, though Georgia has a common border with both. This 
is not necessarily correct, because it has a different language than Russia but the same 
major Orthodox Christianity as Russia and was part of both the Russian empire and the 
Soviet Union during the 19th and 20th centuries. Since only one acquisition was made 
in Georgia during the study period, a possible error in this categorization has no great 
impact. 
If two simultaneous acquisition announcements were made, and if they were from 
different clusters, the cluster with the larger acquisition in the acquired company’s 
turnover was selected. The reason was that the bigger acquisition was assumed to have a 
greater impact on the stock market than the smaller acquisition. If the investment value 
of one acquisition was missing in one of them, but the value was mentioned in the other, 
the mentioned one was assumed to have a greater impact. In case of two or more 
acquisitions in countries that were not all clustered, the clustered one was chosen.  
Two announcements ended up in the above category; the first included an 80% 
acquisition in Nepal and a 100% acquisition in Cambodia. Categorization should have 
gone according to Cambodia, but because it was not clustered, categorization was made 
according to Nepal. Another case came when an announcement had two acquisitions: 
one in Estonia (cluster R) and the other in Lithuania (cluster H), but because no 
monetary value was indicated in the Lithuanian acquisition, categorization was made 
according to the Estonian cluster R.  
3.4.2.5 Domestic vs. international acquisition 
Hayward (2002) noted that foreign acquisitions may generate lower returns to the extent 
that the acquirer is less familiar with such targets. He did not find any support for this 
hypothesis. Though proximity already measures cultural proximity, another variable 
was added to determine if an international acquisition had a higher abnormal return than 
a domestic acquisition. Furthermore, in this category, the target company was 
considered domestic if its headquarters was based in Finland. If a Finnish company was 
active abroad, it was still considered a domestic acquisition. 
3.4.2.6 Publicly listed company 
Publicly listed companies were included as a control variable because there may be a 
link between available information and reaction on the stock exchange. Normally, 
publicly listed companies are required to publish more detailed information on their 
financial performance than privately held companies. We can assume that reactions are 
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stronger to the acquisition announcements of publicly listed companies than to those of 
lesser known companies. 
If the target company was a subsidiary to a publicly listed company, it was not 
considered a publicly listed company, because the paid premium cannot be calculated. 
Another reason is that even if the whole company is listed publicly, the information it 
provides of its subsidiary is not necessarily on the same level. 
3.4.2.7 Premium paid 
Acquisition premium is commonly defined as the acquirer’s bid minus the target’s pre-
announcement market value divided by the target’s pre-announcement market value. 
Many studies have shown that a high acquisition premium is value destroying for the 
acquirer’s shareholders (Laamanen, 2009). The stock price of a publicly listed company 
reflects all available information, as defined by the Efficient Market Hypothesis  (Fama, 
1970). The premium paid by the acquirer thus indicates that not all information 
available reflects the price correctly, and that the acquiring company has more 
information on the subject, or that the EMH is not correct. Laamanen (2009) sees that 
the premium paid reflects the former alternative, where the premium indicates a value 
that is difficult for the market to value. Rappaport (1998) expresses this value in the 
following formula: 
Acquisition price = Stand-alone value of seller + Value of synergies 
which leads to the simpler definition of  
Premium paid = Value of synergies 
(Rappaport, 1998). Though there are many reasons why premiums must be paid, some 
researchers see the premium as an indication of low-quality decision making. In this 
study, the premium was used for listed companies only, and a correlation was sought 
between premiums and an abnormal return. 
3.4.2.8 Price paid  
In most cases, the announcement did not include the exact price paid, but in a few cases, 
the amount of cash payment or stock transactions were mentioned in the press release. 
Scholars have studied also the payment method and its effect on the abnormal return; 
however, the limitation here is that in most cases the payment method is not announced 
and would need thorough investigation of the company’s annual reports. This was not 
made because the scope was immediate response based on the information available 
before the event and in the press or stock exchange release.  
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3.4.2.9 Profitability announced  
Some acquisition announcements mentioned the profitability of the target company, and 
the impact of the announced profitability was studied. If announcing the profitability 
had no effect, it was ignored in the press release. One target of the study was to improve 
company announcements, and the scope of the announcement was one interesting 
factor. 
3.4.2.10 Previous ownership 
Many times, an acquisition takes place in phases. The acquiring company starts by 
announcing a minority share acquisition, which normally takes place after the threshold 
of the announcement obligation. If the acquiring company sees a benefit in increasing 
its investment in the company, it announces another stake and so on until the 90% 
threshold is reached. When the 90% threshold was crossed, the acquisition became part 
of this study. However, it is possible to use the previous ownership as a control variable 
and study what positive impact it may have on the abnormal return. Unfortunately, one 
cannot be 100% sure if the previous ownership is mentioned in the press or stock 
exchange release, though in many cases it is, or there is an earlier announcement about 
an acquisition that has not reached the 90% limit. 
3.4.2.11 Business acquisition vs. company acquisition 
A company can be acquired in two ways. The first is to buy all its shares, and the 
second to acquire its business. The main difference between the two is that when a 
business is acquired, the company receives a payment, not the owners of the company, 
but when all company shares are acquired, the target company’s shareholders receive a 
payment. When a conglomerate divests one of its businesses, it is a business acquisition 
for the acquiring company, but when a publicly listed company is acquired, it is always 
a company share acquisition. 
3.4.2.12 Turnover class  
The next step in further study of this phenomenon was to divide the acquiring 
company’s size into its components (i.e., profit, turnover, personnel), because relative 
size is a combination of three variables from both the acquiring company and the target 
company.  
To better understand the origin of the difference, also the turnover of an acquiring 
company was analyzed. Acquiring companies were grouped based on their turnover 
(either stated in the press release or based on the company’s previous annual report) into 
six groups. This was partially based on the EU classification of micro-sized in category 
1, small enterprises in class 2, and mid-sized enterprises in class 3. In this study, no 
micro-size companies were listed on the stock exchange, or they did not make 
acquisitions. 
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The definition only partially follows the EU classification, which takes into account also 
personnel and the balance sheet. The EU 2003 states that “The category of micro, small, 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer 
than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 Million, 
and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million.” Based on this 
definition, small enterprises are between 2M€ and 10M€ and mid-sized enterprises 
between 10M€ and 50M€. The following classes, derived from the EU categorization, 
were used in the comparison: 
1) acquiring company’s turnover under 2M€  
2) acquiring company’s turnover from 2M€, but under 10M€  
3) acquiring company’s turnover from 10M€, but under 50M€ 
4) acquiring company’s turnover from 50M€, but under 100M€ 
5) acquiring company’s turnover from 100M€, but under 500M€ 
6) acquiring company’s turnover from 500M€, but under 1bn€ 
7) acquiring company’s turnover from 1bn€, but under 2bn€ 
8) acquiring company’s turnover from 2bn€, but under 5bn€ 
9) acquiring company’s turnover 5bn€ or over  
3.4.2.13 Announcement type press release or stock exchange release 
The next control variable was comparison between press and stock exchange releases. 
Press releases are not necessarily followed as intensively as stock exchange releases. 
The requirements to announce merger and acquisition activities are described in 
Standard 5.2b, where the Financial Supervision Authority (FSA) describes the 
regulations and guidelines for companies listed on the Finnish stock exchange. This 
recommendation is based on the Finnish Securities Market Act (SMA) (495/1989). The 
standard states that “In publishing information, special attention must be paid to 
timeliness, equitability and consistency, so that investors operating in the markets will 
have equal and simultaneous opportunities to access information.” The same standard 
also allows companies some flexibility to choose their publishing principles, though 
practices should be coherent and based on company policy. The issuers should disclose 
as soon as possible and without undue delay the information that is likely to have a 
material effect on the value of the company security. For M&A, the standard states 
explicitly in section 5.10 that “The issuer´s acquisitions and divestments of companies 
and businesses and other corporate restructurings likely to have a material effect on the 
value of the issuer’s security shall be disclosed.”  
Because the standard allows flexibility to publish releases also in the media (press), 
companies may prefer media to stock exchange releases. Therefore, this is an interesting 
area to study. 
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4. RESULTS  
Before moving to detailed analysis, we must examine how well the distribution follows 
the normal distribution. This is necessary because ANOVA requires a normal 
distribution, samples must be independent, and variances of the population should be 
equal. Distributions for daily analysis and transaction-based analysis are shown in 
Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. In daily analysis (left,) the distribution is closer to a normal distribution 
than in transaction-based analysis (right). 
The transaction-based analysis data is more skewed (4,806) to the right, being more 
positively skewed than the daily analysis data (1,344). In a normal distribution, the 
skewness should be = 0, and because it is already based on skewness, the distribution 
does not follow a normal distribution. The difference to a normal distribution becomes 
even clearer when the kurtosis values are compared. The distribution is expected to 
showsignificantly higher kurtosis in transaction-based analysis (44,540) than in daily 
analysis (7,308), because compounded values reduce the differences between securities 
over time. Evidently, both distribution values are far from the kurtosis of the normal 
distribution, which is equal to 0.  
Based on McWilliams’ (1997) steps, the seventh step in the event study process was to 
report the percentage of negative returns. In daily analysis, the distribution model 
follows the normal distribution more closely, but not enough to be treated as a normal 
distribution. The positive and negative values are well distributed, because 48.8% of 
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abnormal returns are negative and 51.2% are positive. In transaction-based analysis, the 
distribution is less balanced between negative and positive returns, because 34.0% of 
compounded abnormal returns are negative values and 66.0% positive. The Wilcoxon 
test statistics were selected, because they take into account the size of the abnormal 
return (Burton et al., 1999; Tsetsekos & Gombola, 1992). During the test, absolute 
abnormal returns were ranked from the lowest to the highest. The highest abnormal 
return received the rank of sample size. After ranking the whole sample, the original 
value of the abnormal return was attached to the rank, and the sum of all ranks was 
calculated to produce the Wilcoxon W. This Wilcoxon W was thereafter converted to a 
Z-value and finally to the significance level of the abnormal return sample (Lowry, 
2011). The 1-day analysis had a Z-value of -2,245 with an asymptotic significance (2-
tailed) of 0,025, and the transaction-based new method had a Z-value of -3,589 with an 
asymptotic significance (2-tailed) of 0,000. Because the absolute Z-value was over 2.0 
in both studies, and because the p-value was less than 0,1,  the normal distribution 
hypothesis could be rejected also based on this test. Two criteria were used: the 
Wilcoxon test statistics and the distribution of negative and positive values. Based on 
both these tests, it could be concluded that the compounded abnormal return values did 
not follow a normal distribution. 
Based on these results, ANOVA could not be used for analysis, and non-parametric 
tests such as the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used instead. 
The following sections report the results of the study, as shown in Figure 17 above. The 
basic principle is that the first results are from the daily analysis method, in which daily 
closing stock prices were used, and after each result, transaction-based data is given on 
the same topic.  
The following sections cover different acquisition categories, and first compared are the 
daily compounded abnormal returns and then the transaction level results. 
4.1. Comparison of different classes  
In section 4.3, categories representing the hypothesis structure are compared. Values 
were measured using the CAR over the whole event window, though comparison was 
made based on one value only. For all independent variables, only one CAR value was 
used. In this section, the intention is to compare differences between all classes. In 
section 4.1, the J2 figures show a standardized compounded abnormal return with a high 
probability of moving directly to comparing the groups. 
4.1.1. Daily closing price comparison 
When daily values were analyzed with the Kruskal-Wallis test, the classes were not 
statistically significantly different with p<0.1; therefore, the distribution was the same 
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across all classes. The difference between this class comparison and category 
comparison was that in categories multiple classes were combined into one category, as 
shown in Table 4.  
4.1.2. Transaction level comparison 
In transaction-based analysis, using the Kruskal-Wallis, the non-parametric test gave the 
same result as daily analysis, i.e., there was no statistically significant difference 
between classes with p<0.1.  
Based on both analyses periods (daily closing prices and transaction-based analysis), no 
clearly significant differences could be detected in class level comparison. 
4.2. All variables  
4.2.1. Correlation table and multicollinearity analysis 
The correlation of all independent and control variables can be seen in Table 9, which 
shows the correlation matrix. Both daily and transaction-based analyses (dependent 
variables) are shown in the same table, and, clearly, when statistical significance was set 
at p<0.1, four control variables significantly affected both analyses (daily and 
transaction level), namely relative size, size class, turnover class, and stock vs. press 
release. Additionally, one control variable—publicly listed companies—was significant 
for daily analysis.   
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Table 9. Independent and control variable results on both daily and transaction level 
Multicollinearity analysis is done to ensure that no variable correlates with the other 
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variables. The normal value for not correlating variables was for tolerance higher than 
0,2 and for VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) less than 5. The VIF is, in fact, the 
reciprocal for tolerance, i.e., VIF = 1 / tolerance. 
No significant collinearity was found between variables in the analysis, and even the 
biggest collinearity VIF was less than 2,0 (tolerance >0,5).  
4.2.2. Multiple Regression Model 
The next step in the analysis is multiregression tests for both daily analysis (Table 10) 
and transaction level analysis (Table 11). 
Table 10. Results of regression models for the daily analysis CAR as a dependent 
variable (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
Table 10 shows daily analysis regression results. Clearly, the control variables had no 
significant impact on the linear regression results. R
2
 reached a maximum of 0,178, 
which for that model well explains the compounded abnormal return for merger and 
acquisition events. 
Table 11 embraces exactly the same models and shows transaction level-analysis 
regression results. In this comparison, one control variable, size class, had an effect on 
Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant
0,006  
(0,13)
0,025* 
(0,15)
0,025* 
(0,15)
0,030* 
(0,16)
0,103*** 
(0,27)
0,030   
(0,29)
-0,001 
(0,12)
-0,003 
(0,003)
Horizontal
-0,023** 
(0,009)
-0,023** 
(0,009)
-0,029** 
(0,011)
-0,102*** 
(0,024)
-0,030  
(0,027)
Vertical FWD
-0,021 
(0,014)
-0,026* 
(0,015)
-0,099*** 
(0,026)
-0,027 
(0,028)
0,030   
(0,010)
0,060   
(0,010)
Vertical BWD
-0,016 
(0,018)
-0,089*** 
(0,028)
-0,017 
(0,030)
0,013 
(0,014)
0,013 
(0,014)
Related
-0,090*** 
(0,027)
-0,017 
(0,029)
0,013 
(0,012)
0,019 
(0,012)
Unrelated FWD
0,293*** 
(0,053)
0,324*** 
(0,047)
0,343*** 
(0,046)
Unrelated BWD
0,030 
(0,027)
0,037 
(0,027)
Relative Size
0,005 
(0,003)
0,005 
(0,003)
0,005 
(0,003)
0,005 
(0,003)
0,004 
(0,003)
0,003 
(0,003)
0,003 
(0,003)
Size Class
0,002 
(0,001)
0,002 
(0,001)
0,002 
(0,001)
0,002 
(0,001)
0,002 
(0,001)
0,001 
(0,001)
0,001 
(0,001)
Turnover Class
-0,002 
(0,002)
-0,002 
(0,002)
-0,002 
(0,002)
-0,001 
(0,002)
-0,001 
(0,002)
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
Stock release
0,007 
(0,006)
0,008 
(0,006)
0,008 
(0,006)
0,008 
(0,006)
0,007 
(0,006)
0,008 
(0,006)
0,008 
(0,006)
F-Statistic 4,089*** 3,767*** 3,767*** 3,339*** 4,442*** 7,673*** 7,673*** 11,962***
R
2 0,048 0,066 0,066 0,068 0,100 0,178 0,178 0,143
N 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
Standardized beta coefficients. Significance levels:  * p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Coefficients
Dependent variable CAR 1day
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the linear regression results. R
2
 reached a significantly high maximum value of 0,427, 
which very significantly explains the compounded abnormal return for merger and 
acquisition events. 
Table 11. Results on regression models for the transaction-level analysis CAR as a 
dependent variable (standard errors in parentheses). 
 
The first three of the four control variables are related to the acquiring company’s size 
in terms of turnover. Two control variables are directly related to turnover, and the 
third—relative size—is indirectly related to turnover, as it compares both the acquiring 
company’s size to the target company’s size. In addition to these three, it is interesting 
to observe the fourth control variable, stock, which is related to stock exchange releases. 
4.2.3. Independent Variables 
Trend data 
The trend data control variable has two possible values based on the definition. The 
market is either in the declining trend (bear) or in the improving trend (bull). During the 
bear market cycle, 209 acquisitions and mergers took place, and during the bull market 
cycle 327. This means in practice about 1 acquisition in two days during the bear cycle 
and 1 acquisition event every 2.5 days during the bull market cycle. Interestingly, 
acquisitions take place more often during a contraction than an expansion.  
Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant
0,005 
(0,008)
0,015* 
(0,008)
0,017* 
(0,009)
0,025*** 
(0,009)
0,100*** 
(0,015)
0,028* 
(0,015)
0,000 
(0,006)
0,006 
(0,001)
Horizontal
-0,012*** 
(0,004)
-0,014** 
(0,006)
-0,0123*** 
(0,007)
-0,098*** 
(0,014)
-0,028** 
(0,014)
Vertical FWD
-0,005 
(0,008)
-0,014 
(0,009)
-0,089 
(0,015)
-0,018 
(0,015)
0,010* 
(0,005)
0,011** 
(0,005)
Vertical BWD
-0,026** 
(0,011)
-0,101*** 
(0,016)
-0,030** 
(0,015)
-0,002 
(0,007)
-0,001 
(0,007)
Related
-0,092*** 
(0,015)
-0,020 
(0,015)
0,007 
(0,006)
0,013** 
(0,006)
Unrelated FWD
0,289*** 
(0,027)
0,317*** 
(0,024)
0,333*** 
(0,024)
Unrelated BWD
0,028** 
(0,014)
0,034** 
(0,014)
Relative Size
0,004* 
(0,002)
0,003 
(0,002)
0,003* 
(0,002)
0,003 
(0,002)
0,003 
(0,002)
0,001 
(0,002)
0,001 
(0,002)
Size Class
0,003*** 
(0,001)
0,002*** 
(0,001)
0,002*** 
(0,001)
0,002*** 
(0,001)
0,002*** 
(0,001)
0,002*** 
(0,001)
0,002*** 
(0,001)
Turnover Class
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
-0,001 
(0,001)
Stock release
0,004 
(0,004)
0,004 
(0,004)
0,005 
(0,004)
0,005 
(0,004)
0,003 
(0,003)
0,004 
(0,003)
0,004 
(0,003)
F-Statistic 9,348*** 9,013*** 7,554*** 7,413*** 11,801*** 26,445*** 26,445*** 39,842***
R
2 0,103 0,122 0,123 0,139 0,228 0,427 0,427 0,381
N 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 328
Standardized beta coefficients. Significance levels:  * p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Coefficients
Dependent variable CAR 60 minutes
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Both daily and transaction-level analyses showed clearly that the trend control variable 
bear had no statistical bearing on the results (p<0.1); therefore, we can say that 
regardless of the market trend, abnormal returns behave similarly. 
Relative_size 
The next control variable studied further was relative size. It is a combination of 
turnover, profit, and number of employees in such a way that the target company’s size 
was divided by the acquiring company’s size.  
Relative size had values from 0 to over 14, which describe the relative size between the 
acquiring company and the target company. A big value indicates that a large target 
company is acquired by a small acquiring company. In most cases, the target company 
was small with a value between 0 and 1. The median value was 0,01, which means that 
the acquiring company was 100 times larger than the target company. In the Kruskal-
Wallis test, the relative size had a statistically significant impact (p<0.1), which was 
valid for both daily (Sig.=0,018) and transaction-level analysis (Sig.=0,000). 
Relative size class 
In this size category, correlation was significant when the data was analyzed with the 
Kruskal-Wallis test (p<0.1) and valid for both daily (Sig.=0,018) and transaction-level 
analysis (Sig.=0,000). It was also statistically significant between groups, and when the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was plotted, a large difference appeared when a 
relatively small company made an acquisition significant to its size (Figure 21). This is 
an interesting outcome and somewhat easy to understand; on the other hand, the 
literature maintains that digesting a large company (over 5%) is more difficult than 
digesting a small one. The difficulties normally occur when the merged company starts 
to operate as one company. Therefore, the initial very positive reaction was, on average, 
almost 4.9% in the biggest category. 
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Figure 21. A clear correlation occurs between relative size and cumulative abnormal 
return. 
Cultural proximity 
Cultural proximity was shown as a nominal value and for each cluster defined in 
3.4.2.3, where one value represented each cluster. Cultural proximity as described in 
this study reached no statistically significant level (p<0.1). It was tested with the 
Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test. 
Altogether, acquisitions were made in 17 clusters out of a total of 25. The number of 
foreign acquisitions was slightly higher, 290, than that of domestic acquisitions, 199. 
Most acquisitions, 87, were made in the same cluster Q (Denmark, Sweden, and 
Norway), but also cluster F was popular with 50 acquisitions (Australia, New Zealand, 
United States, and United Kingdom). These two clusters represent almost half the total 
number, 47%, of acquisitions. Figure 22 shows the absolute number of acquisitions in 
each cluster (bar) and the cumulative share of international acquisitions in clusters. The 
graph shows well that eight most common clusters represent roughly 90% of the total 
number of acquisitions.  
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Figure 5. Number of international acquisitions in each cluster (blue bars) and their 
cumulative share (in %) of the total number of international acquisitions (red line). 
Domestic acquisitions 
Another dimension closely related to cultural proximity was the role of domestic 
acquisitions vs. international acquisitions. In this case, cultural differences stemming 
from geographic proximity were minimal, because the acquiring and the target company 
were both Finnish, or at least had their headquarters in Finland. Domestic acquisition 
had no  statistical significance (p<0.1) in the Mann-Whitney non-parametric U Test. 
Listed vs. unlisted target company 
The next control variable analyzed was the listed company’s impact on the study. This 
variable was set to “1” if the target company was listed and traded publicly. This means 
that when the correlation is positive, the compounded abnormal return is higher for 
listed companies. Interestingly, when the target company was listed, daily analysis 
showed a higher statistical significance than transaction-level analysis. Again the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric U test was used, and it gave statistical significant results p<0.1 
in both daily (Sig.=0,048) and transaction-level analysis (Sig.=0,035). In conclusion, 
listed company acquisitions take longer to achieve an abnormal return, a result that 
marks a difference between the two methods. 
Premium paid 
When the acquiring company buys a publicly traded company, the premium compared 
to the current share price can be calculated. In most cases, the premium is mentioned 
explicitly and the method on how it has been calculated, because normally the premium 
is calculated as an average over a certain period before the announcement to avoid 
errors in pricing, if information has leaked on the acquisition. Only 15 companies 
mentioned the premium paid, and the value varied from 8% to 82.5% with a median 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Q* F R H L G O C T V K B E I U A Z D J M N P S X Y
88 
 
value of 22.5% and an average of 28.1%. The paid premium parameter had no statistical 
significance in this study (p<0.1). 
Price announced 
In many studies, the price and how it has been paid has played a significant role; 
however, in this study, the price paid was not mentioned in 60% of acquisitions. When 
the price was mentioned in a press or stock exchange release, it produced no statistically 
significant compounded abnormal return (p<0.1). 
Profit announced 
The target company’s profitability was not mentioned in most cases; only 12.2% of 
them mentioned it. And even if it was mentioned, it had no statistical impact on the 
results (p<0.1).  
Previous ownership 
In many acquisition cases, the target company makes its acquisition in phases. The last 
phase when the target company must make an offer to the remaining shareholders has 
been defined by law, and this was the main topic in this study. In many cases, especially 
in large acquisitions, previous ownership has been in place prior to the last step of 
acquiring the remaining shares. In this study, previous ownership was mentioned in 
16.4% of all acquisitions, and based on statistical analysis, it had no statistical 
significance in the compounded abnormal return (p<0.1) tested with the Mann-Whitney 
non-parametric U test. 
Acquiring business vs. company shares 
The acquiring company buying company shares is more common than acquiring only 
the business. In this study, business acquisitions represented 19.8% of all acquisitions, 
whereas buying company shares constituted a large majority of 80.2% of acquisitions. 
Statistically, this was of no significance (p<0.1), as tested with the Mann-Whitney non-
parametric U test. 
Turnover class 
The outcome of this study was that the main impact comes especially from the size of 
the acquiring company. Thus the size of the target company plays no big role in creating 
a high abnormal return. Figure 23, shows the CAR in different turnover classes. 
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Figure 23. A small company making an acquisition has a big abnormal return to a 
corporate security. 
In Figure 23, acquiring companies are divided according to turnover (either stated in a 
press release or in a previous annual report) into nine groups. In this study, no micro-
size companies were listed on the stock exchange, or they made no acquisitions. Figure 
23, shows the following turnover classes: 
1) acquiring company’s turnover under 2M€    [N=0] 
2) acquiring company’s turnover from 2M€, but under 10M€  [N=9] 
3) acquiring company’s turnover from 10M€, but under 50M€ [N=27] 
4) acquiring company’s turnover from 50M€, but under 100M€ [N=35] 
5) acquiring company’s turnover from 100M€, but under 500M€ [N=58] 
6) acquiring company’s turnover from 500M€, but under 1bn€ [N=43] 
7) acquiring company’s turnover from 1bn€, but under 2bn€  [N=52] 
8) acquiring company’s turnover from 2bn€, but under 5bn€  [N=67] 
9) acquiring company’s turnover 5bn€ or over   [N=38] 
Other categories were distributed evenly over 50M€, but, interestingly, increase in the 
acquiring company size did not significantly increase the average compounded 
abnormal return. In comparison, SMEs’ and large companies’ (turnover over 50M€) 
cumulative abnormal return was 3.4% vs. 0.48% respectively. This represents roughly a 
seven times higher abnormal return for SMEs than for large companies. 
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The final outcome from this control variable was that correlation was clearly visible in 
companies with a turnover of less than 50M€ and making acquisitions—especially if 
they correlated significantly with their size. Though the impact was clear, the Kruskal-
Wallis non-parametric test showed no statistical significance (p<0.1). 
Press release vs. stock exchange release 
The next control variable was comparison between press and stock exchange releases. 
In both cases, statistical significance was high. In daily analysis, it was over 95% 
(p<0,05) and in transactionlevel analysis even higher, 99% (p=0,01). The stock variable 
was set to “1” for a stock exchange release and to “0” for a press release. According to 
the results, stock exchange releases cause a higher compounded abnormal return on 
average than press releases. The tests were made with the Mann-Whitney non-
parametric U Test. Comparisons were made so that press releases were compared with 
stock exchange releases, and statistical significance was measured. 
Since the difference was clear, it was interesting to compare the CAR results. In daily 
analysis, the return was even negative for press releases, -0.21%, whereas for stock 
exchange releases it was +0.98%. Similar results came from transaction-level analysis, 
but both CAR results were positive, 0.08% and 1.2%, respectively. In conclusion, the 
investor community is more keen on stock exchange releases, or that a company’s stock 
exchange release is more valuable than its press releases. In the study, 126 press 
releases and 216 stock exchange releases qualified for daily analysis, whereas in 
transaction-based analysis the figures were 126 press releases and 203 stock exchange 
releases. 
4.3. Results of the hypotheses 
To test all hypotheses, J2 analysis was first used, as described in section 3.2.6. It gave 
for probability p=0.01, p=0.05 and p=0.1 and for the confidence interval  99%, 95%, 
and 90%. The percentages were shown in each figure. The confidence levels 99% and 
95% are only for illustration purposes, and only 90% (p<0.1) was used to define the 
statistical significance of the compounded abnormal return. 
4.3.1. Hypothesis 1 - Investor reactions to M&A announcements  
Hypothesis 1. The abnormal return associated with the event of acquisition 
is expected to be positive. 
4.3.1.1 Daily closing price comparison 
Daily values used closing prices on a daily level, as in previous studies. The null 
hypothesis test showed that significantly high confidence (>99%) could be reached, and 
that it could be rejected on a daily level. Hence the data from the Finnish stock 
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exchange follows the previous event studies on the compounded abnormal return caused 
by merger and acquisition releases.  
As shown in Figure 24, the abnormal return was visible already at the time of the event 
T0. This is caused by the definition in that when the closing price is used, an event 
occurring during and before the trading day causes an abnormal return at T0, as 
explained in detail in section 3.5 in Research Process. However, we cannot see how fast 
M&A events cause a high probability of null hypothesis rejection, because the method 
uses only one value per day for analysis. 
 
Figure 24. J2 test shows over a 99% confidence interval to reject the null hypothesis 
on a daily closing price level. 
Figure 24 shows the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis, but it gives no 
information on how large the abnormal return is. The compounded abnormal return for 
the whole set of data was 0.5412% at the end of the following trading day T1. This 
means in practice that corporate securities are 0.5412% higher at the end of the 
following day after an announcement was made.  
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Figure 25. Compounded abnormal return is 0.5412% on the following day. 
The above is shown in Figure 25, and it represents an average return to corporate 
securities after an announcement about all different types of mergers and acquisitions. 
In daily analysis, the compounded abnormal return remained almost the same even at T0 
and T1. At T0, not all announcements were recorded, because corporations gave press 
releases also after stock trading had closed. 
4.3.1.2 Transaction-level comparison  
In transaction-level comparison, a five-minute sampling rate was used. This means that 
the compounded abnormal return was calculated after each five-minute period, and the 
first return was available at five minutes after T0 and thereafter at 10 minutes after T0 
and so on. The procedure was otherwise the same as in daily analysis; i.e., first, the null 
hypothesis was tested for the significance of the compounded abnormal return. Results 
show that the null hypothesis was rejected already in the first sample period, i.e., five 
minutes after the event. A rapid increase in the probability of null hypothesis rejection 
could be measured with the probability reaching 99% already in 10 minutes and 90% as 
soon as the first sample had been measured five minutes after the event. The J2 measure 
remained above the 99% limit for the whole 10-hour measurement period (Figure 24).  
In this study, the studied sample size was 329 M&A events. The number differs from 
daily analysis because of the low number of stock trades that was used to estimate the 
security trend, as explained in the theory section. Because the trading volume is related 
to the estimation window, a short window gives fewer stock trades to estimate. 
As in daily analysis, J2 gave no information about the level of the compounded 
abnormal return. Therefore, the CAR was calculated as in daily analysis, and 
comparison was made one hour after a release. The interval came as the longest period 
used in earlier studies on high-speed stock trading (Reboredo et. al., 2012).   
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Figure 26. J2 test shows a very rapid increase in testing H0 rejection. The maximum 
value was reached one hour after the event. 
The compounded abnormal return for the whole data set reached 0.8217%, as calculated 
one hour after the issuance of a press or stock exchange release. Apparently, the one-
hour time stamp after an M&A event already included the fastest growth. 
 
Figure 27. Compounded abnormal return is 0.8217% one hour after the release. 
The first hypothesis was to measure the abnormal return for all M&A events during 
2006–2010. The results clearly support the hypothesis.  After one hour, the cumulative 
abnormal return was 0.82% with p<0.001. This means that with a probability of 99.9%, 
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an M&A event produces a positive abnormal return with a 0.8% compounded average 
return. This result was achieved with a sample size of 329. Apparently, the merger and 
acquisition event impacted the company’s security price.  
Though these percentages sound small, it is worthwhile estimating the real value of the 
abnormal return. One way to calculate the potential is first to calculate the total market 
capitalization and divide it by the number of companies that produce it for one publicly 
listed company. This value can then be used to estimate the change in the stock market. 
This calculation helped estimate the total market capitalization of the NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki as being between 120 and 250 bn€ during the study period of 2006 - 2010. On 
average, 122 companies were then listed on the stock exchange, as explained in 3.2.1. 
Division of the total market capitalization by the number of companies gave an estimate 
of the average market cap of a publicly listed company as being between 1bn€ and 
2bn€. Now the average abnormal return could be calculated for one company, which led 
from 8,2 M€ to 16,4M€ of abnormal return on average per an M&A announcement. 
Finally, this could be multiplied by the number of M&A events, 548, to yield a total 
value of M&A events of between 4,5bn€ and 9,0bn€. In this calculation, the multiplier 
was the total number of M&A events, 548, regardless of their time stamp and of any 
confounding releases, for the expectation was that, on average, an acquisition 
announcement creates a 0.8% abnormal return. 
The above proved the fact that even a rather small percentage could represent a 
significant sum of money when multiplied by the total value traded on the Helsinki 
NASDAQ OMX stock exchange. This with the high probability of 99.9% constitutes a 
meaningful result in this study. 
4.3.1.3 Result for hypothesis 1 
All in all, it is obvious that hypothesis no.1 is supported, because the results show a 
positive abnormal return on merger and acquisition events with significantly high 
probability. 
Based on theory, we can say that corporations intend to manage their value, and that 
management increases the shareholder value through acquisition decisions (Rappaport, 
1998; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). This claim is justified at least in the very short time 
window of one hour and even one day, as seen in Figure 28. The abnormal return was 
positive for at least three days; however, long-term benefits could not be investigated 
using event analysis with short event windows.  
Though a company final motive or multiple motives were not released, investors react 
positively to acquisition announcements. They cannot find the real motives such as 
empire building (Trautwein 1990) behind mergers, but a company can formulate its 
announcement so as to make plain its strategic reasons behind an M&A action, because 
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corporate executives have a strong incentive to make their actions coincide with 
shareholder interests (Walter & Barney, 1990). 
4.3.2. Hypothesis 2 - Related acquisitions  
The next hypothesis focused on a common research topic, namely, that researchers have 
tried to determine if some acquisitions types generate a higher abnormal return than 
others. 
Hypothesis 2. The abnormal return associated with related acquisitions is higher 
than that associated with unrelated acquisitions. 
4.3.2.1 Daily closing price comparison 
 
 
Figure 28. J2 test shows very high probability for both related compounded abnormal 
return (left) and unrelated compounded abnormal return (right). 
As shown in Figure 28, statistically significant compounded abnormal returns occur in 
both related and unrelated acquisition events with a probability of over 99% when they 
were tested individually. The next step was to compare these two groups’ compounded 
abnormal returns (CAR) to see if they differed statistically significantly. ANOVA could 
not be used, because the unrelated acquisitions sample was too small  (N<20); 
consequently, the Mann-Whitney nonparametric U test was used instead. It showed only 
a 0.146 significance level, indicating a statistical difference between the two groups on 
the following day after the acquisition event had been announced.  
Although the Mann-Whitney non-parametric U test did not show a statistical difference 
between the groups, compounded abnormal returns were calculated. Unrelated 
acquisitions created an almost 30 times higher (28,5x) abnormal return than the related 
group. The compounded abnormal return for unrelated acquisitions was 11.67% on 
average and for related acquisitions only an average of 0.4%. The comparison showed 
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that the sample size was significantly bigger for related (N=338) than for unrelated 
acquisitions (N=4). 
4.3.2.2 Transaction level comparison 
The next comparison was transaction-level analysis. As in daily analysis, statistical 
significance was first tested individually with the J2 test, then results were compared 
with ANOVA or its non-parametric equivalents, and finally, if a statistical difference 
emerged, values were calculated for both acquisition types. 
 
Figure 29. J2 test shows a very high probability for null hypothesis rejection for both 
related acquisition abnormal return (left) and unrelated abnormal return (right). 
The J2 tests in Figure 29 show a statistically significant abnormal return in both the 
unrelated and related acquisition category. The difference between the groups could 
now be studied for statistical significance. ANOVA could not be used in this 
comparison, because the unrelated class sample was too small; consequently, the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric U test was employed. It showed only a 0.283 significance 
between the groups, a difference that cannot be reliably measured. 
Unrelated acquisitions generated an average compounded abnormal return of 11.43%, 
and related acquisitions a CAR of 0.6912%; that is, an unrelated acquisition generated 
on average about a 16 times higher abnormal return than a related acquisition. Though 
the difference is very clear, we should remember that the unrelated acquisition category 
differed greatly in size, containing only four acquisitions, compared to the related 
category, which consisted of 325 acquisitions. Therefore, these results are not 
statistically significant. 
4.3.2.3 Result for hypothesis 2 
The unrelated category was a combination of acquisitions by direct competitors, 
suppliers, customers, or companies working in the same position in another value chain. 
This classification was interesting in that only few acquisitions were left out. The 
unrelated acquisitions were strategically important companies but currently outside their 
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own competitive environment. Such acquisitions are normally made when a company 
acquires a new technology or new market channels it or its competitors do not yet have. 
Therefore, acquisitions may bring along new innovations to the company. Though the 
number of unrelated acquisitions was very small, it indicated that an abnormal return 
was more commonly visible in acquisitions, when the company was either seeking 
growth in another value chain or new technologies or new markets to compete in.  
The results are clear but opposite to previous studies, because with a very high 
probability of p<0.001 (over 99.9%), an unrelated acquisition is expected to generate an 
over sixteen times higher abnormal return (11.43%) than related acquisitions 
(0.6912%). There were only 4 unrelated acquisitions but 325 related ones. ANOVA 
could not be used because of too few unrelated acquisitions (N<20); hence the Mann-
Whitney nonparametric U test was used instead.  The results show that hypothesis 2 is 
not supported due to the small sample size. 
Calculated in monetary value, an unrelated acquisition generates an average of 100 to 
200M€. In this case, the average is not a proper multiplier, because very large 
enterprises seldom make unrelated acquisitions. Large conglomerates are already 
involved in many businesses, and they may cover a larger part of their own value chain 
than smaller companies. A possible explanation for this great difference (apart from 
statistical sample size) can be found in RBV, which explains the importance of an 
unrelated acquisition. Wernerfelt states that “Entry barrier without a resource position 
leaves the firm vulnerable to diversifying entrants, whereas a resource position barrier 
without an entry barrier leaves the firm unable to exploit the barrier” (Wernerfelt, 
1984). Therefore, a company making an unrelated acquisition can create new barriers to 
entry when one company corners a new technology in its business and prevents 
competitors from adopting it. In previous studies, also Lubatkin (1987) found no 
difference between unrelated and related acquisitions, but in this study the difference 
was huge, but in a different direction than before. 
4.3.3. Hypothesis 3 - Horizontal acquisitions  
The third hypothesis was a comparison between horizontal and non-horizontal 
acquisitions. In theory, horizontal acquisitions are valued more in the short than in the 
long term; hence, the third hypothesis focused on a short-term impact only. 
Hypothesis 3. The abnormal return associated with horizontal acquisitions 
is higher than that associated with non-horizontal acquisitions. 
Previous studies have reported also an opposite hypothesis on long-term abnormal 
returns, one which could not be tested in this study, because announcements were 
limited to  2006–2010. Reportedly, non-horizontal acquisitions have a higher abnormal 
return in the long term than horizontal acquisitions. 
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In a horizontal acquisition, the acquiring company buys its competitor. This comparison 
was described in detail in section 2.4. 
4.3.3.1 Daily closing price comparison 
In the first analysis, calculation was about the probability of null hypothesis rejection, in 
which both horizontal and non-horizontal acquisitions showed a significant over 90% 
probability of null hypothesis rejection. Since both were already statistically significant, 
it made sense to compare the abnormal returns. The J2 measure only validated the null 
hypothesis rejection and gave no information for category comparison. Therefore, the 
compounded abnormal return was used for comparison, and the Mann-Whitney U test 
was valid if the possible difference between the two categories was statistically 
significant. 
 
Figure 60. J2 test shows very a high probability for both a horizontal acquisition (left) 
and a non-horizontal acquisition (right). 
The next step was to compare the two groups’ compounded abnormal returns with the 
Mann-Whitney U test, which is non-parametric and can be used for samples lacking 
normal distribution and when samples differ greatly in size. The horizontal acquisitions 
sample was 283 and the non-horizontals’ 59. A significant enough statistical difference 
emerged in the CAR between the two acquisition types (p<0.1). Because in the Mann-
Whitney U test, abnormal returns did not need to be standardized, the CAR was used 
instead of the SCAR. Compared to the following date’s closing prices, the difference 
was p=0.07, a high-enough confidence level to proceed to the next step of calculating 
the CAR for the horizontal and non-horizontal acquisition categories. 
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Figure 31. Horizontal acquisitions create a CAR of 0.24% one day after the M&A 
release. 
 
Figure 32. Non-horizontal acquisitions create a CAR of 1.99% one day after the 
M&A release. 
The results show that non-horizontal acquisitions generated a significantly higher 
abnormal return, 1.99%, than horizontal acquisitions, 0.24%. After one day, the CAR 
was over eight times higher for non-horizontal acquisitions. 
4.3.3.2 Transaction-level comparison 
The next step was to compare non-horizontal and horizontal acquisition announcements 
on the transaction level. The first test was to ensure statistically significant confidence 
in the J2 test, which shows a high enough confidence to determine that both horizontal 
and non-horizontal acquisitions create CAR.  
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Figure 33. J2 test shows a very high probability for both horizontal and non-
horizontal acquisitions (p < 0,1). 
Also in transaction-based analysis, the Mann-Whitney U Test was used to compare the 
difference between horizontal and non-horizontal acquisitions. This result showed a 
significant CAR difference of p=0,039 (p<0.05) between horizontal (N=274) and non-
horizontal acquisitions (N=55). A statistically significant difference could be claimed 
for the two types of acquisition release. Based on CAR calculation, it was possible to 
determine that a non-horizontal acquisition generates a 2.167% (Figure 35) 
compounded abnormal return and a horizontal acquisition only a 0.5516% (Figure 34) 
compounded abnormal return, an almost four times higher (3,92x) return than horizontal 
acquisitions.  
 
 
Figure 34. Horizontal acquisitions create a very rapid response to the M&A release, 
but the CAR level remains lower than in non-horizontal acquisitions. 
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Figure 35. Non-horizontal acquisitions create a 2.17% CAR in one hour after the 
M&A release. 
Another result was that a horizontal acquisition reacted faster to an announcement and 
reached its peak faster, but the stock price continued to oscillate more than with non-
horizontal announcements, which increased steadily over time, even beyond the 60-
minute event window. Therefore, the volatility of the stock price may be higher in 
horizontal acquisitions. However, volatility was not a target in this study. 
4.3.3.3 Result for hypothesis 3 
With horizontal acquisitions, press and stock exchange releases generated a 
compounded abnormal return of 0.56% and non-horizontal acquisition releases 2.17% 
with a probability of 99%. The sample size of horizontal acquisitions was N=274 and 
that of non-horizontal acquisitions N=55. In comparison, the Mann-Whitney U test 
showed a probability of p<0.1, indicating a statistically significant difference between 
the two classes. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is rejected; i.e., horizontal acquisitions do not 
create a higher abnormal return than non-horizontal acquisitions. Rather, the reverse is 
true.  
The above result is interesting, because it contradicts previous results on other stock 
exchanges (Oler et al., 2008). Oler’s group had a sample size of 2,500 acquisitions, out 
of which  35.7% were horizontal, but the share did not increase from 14.1% in 1975 to 
1979; from 27.8% in the 1980s; and finally from 43.8% in the 1990s. In the NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki, horizontal acquisitions constituted 64.9%, so at least based on this 
trend, horizontal acquisitions are becoming more common. This study differs in three 
main aspects from that of Oler’s group: different stock markets (NYSE vs. NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki); they used SIC (Standard Industrial Classification); and the method 
(daily closing price vs. transaction based). There are also other differences such as 
sample size, study period, and control  variables. On the other hand, it is interesting to 
see that in Oler’s research, the long-term (three years) performance of horizontal 
acquisitions was negative. Similar results were found by Loughran & Vijh (1997), who 
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found a lower return on horizontal acquisitions than on non-horizontal acquisition in the 
long term. In three years, companies, of course, take multiple actions that have either a 
positive or negative effect on their stock price 
4.3.4. Hypothesis 4 - Staying in the current center of gravity  
When a company makes an acquisition in the same center of gravity, it is either a 
horizontal or a related acquisition whereby it acquires a company similar in terms of 
value creation; e.g., a distributor acquires another distributor. This section seeks to 
compare moves (either forward or backward) in acquisitions with the company 
remaining in the same center of gravity. 
Hypothesis 4.  The abnormal return associated with an acquisition 
indicating a move to a new center of gravity is lower than a 
company’s acquisition of the same center of gravity.  
4.3.4.1 Daily closing price comparison 
Daily analysis had first to ascertain if these groups had a high enough probability 
individually. In both groups, the statistical significance was high enough, and these 
types of acquisitions generated a statistically significant abnormal return (p<0.05). 
 
Figure 36. J2 test shows high probabilities (p<0.05) for both categories, i.e., staying in 
the same center of gravity (left) and moving to a new center of gravity (right). 
The next step was to compare average compounded abnormal releases with the Mann-
Whitney U test. With the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test, it is not necessary to 
use standardized value SCARs, but CARs can be used. The test showed no high enough 
statistical significance (p<0.1) when the two categories were compared. This means that 
there is no significant difference in the compounded abnormal return when a company 
makes an acquisition, which means moving to a new center of gravity or staying in the 
same center of gravity. The sample size was 41 for moving to a new center of gravity 
and 301 for staying in the same center of gravity. 
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When a company moves to a new center of gravity, it brings an average of 1.98% 
compounded abnormal return, which is roughly six times higher than when it remains in 
its current center of gravity, 0.345%. This CAR was calculated one day after a press or 
stock exchange release was published.  
4.3.4.2 Transaction-level comparison 
In this comparison, transaction-based analysis showed an interesting pattern, because 
staying in the same center of gravity reached a high probability already before the event 
took place, i.e., faster than moving to a new center of gravity. There was movement 
already before the event, and already at the event, the standardized abnormal return 
reached a high enough probability, and  99% probability was reached. It took about 10 
minutes to reach the same confidence level, when a company moved to a new center of 
gravity. Apparently, while companies move to a new center of gravity, investor 
activities start before the event is actually announced on the stock exchange. If a 
company acquires a competitor or another company operating in the same position in 
the value chain, reactions start clearly after the event. In J2 analysis, the absolute level 
of the impact could not be seen, but only its speed and probability level. 
 
Figure 37. J2 test shows similar reactions for both staying in the same center of 
gravity (left) and for moving to a new center of gravity (right). 
In both cases, analysis showed a significant abnormal return, for a company making an 
acquisition to move to a new center of gravity and for remaining in the same position in 
the value chain. It was interesting to see a very rapid reaction to a company’s remaining 
in the center of gravity. The statistical significance reached 99% probability faster than 
with an acquisition to move to a new position. In the latter case, the probability also 
fluctuated more than in the former case.  
It was interesting to note while analyzing the statistical difference for the CAR with the 
Mann-Whitney U test between the groups that no significant difference occurred in the 
compounded abnormal return in the two cases. This led to rejecting the hypothesis that 
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movement in the value chain creates a lower abnormal return than staying in the current 
position. Hence the difference between the two groups needed no further study. 
The final step in this analysis was to compare average compounded returns between the 
two moves in the value chain. When a company remained in the same center of gravity, 
it produced a 0.63% compounded return on average, but when it moved to a new center 
of gravity, it created a significantly higher compounded abnormal return of 2.3% on 
average. This represents about a 3.6 times higher CAR than when a company announces 
to remain in its current position in the value chain.  
4.3.4.3 Result for hypothesis 4 
Results for hypothesis 4 show that when a company moves from its existing center of 
gravity to a new one, no statistically significant difference shows in the Mann-Whitney 
U test. On the other hand, a move in the value chain generates a higher abnormal return 
than staying in the current center of gravity, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Based on the theory by Fan & Goyal (2006), a vertical acquisition created the same 
level of abnormal return as horizontal mergers. These two dimensions are also in 
different parts of this hypothesis, because a horizontal merger belongs to staying in the 
same center of gravity and a vertical one to moving to a new center of gravity. 
Therefore, it is normal that abnormal returns are on the same level and have no 
statistical significance. 
On the other hand, a company moving to a new position in the value chain indicates a 
change its economic logic (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005), and the move benefits from 
the strong position before the acquisition. This promotes a higher abnormal return when 
the company moves to a new center of gravity.  
4.3.5. Hypothesis 5 - Moving closer to customers 
With the next hypothesis, it was interesting to realize, first, that companies moved 
within their value chain and became more like downstream companies or transformed 
from product-oriented to service-domain-oriented. Becoming service-dominant is a 
popular current trend as companies seek additional growth from services. 
Hypothesis 5. The abnormal return associated with a downstream 
acquisition is higher than that associ ated with an upstream 
acquisition.  
In the previous section, movement was rewarded with a higher abnormal return than 
staying in the same center of gravity. The next step was to analyze the direction that 
generates a high abnormal return. 
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4.3.5.1 Daily closing price comparison 
 
Figure 38. J2 test shows a higher probability for moving forward (left) than moving 
backward (right). 
Already the J2 test, which seeks to to determine if daily analysis brings a statistically 
significant abnormal return, showed that when a company announced an acquisition to 
move backward, the abnormal return did not reach a high enough probability to measure 
it. Therefore, a company’s intention to move forward closer to its customers is rewarded 
with a statistically significant abnormal return, whereas its move backward closer to its 
suppliers is not. Though comparison is not necessary here, it is interesting to see the 
average compounded abnormal return for moving forward. The CAR for this acquisition 
category was 1.23% on the following day after an acquisition was announced. 
4.3.5.2 Transaction-level comparison 
In this comparison, a company’s intention to move closer to its vendors and raw 
materials showed higher probabilities than the opposite movement to its customers and 
delivery chain. In fact, for the forward move the probability reached 95% within the 
first hour of measurement. It was significant that the difference between transaction-
level analysis and daily closing price analysis differ in results, because in daily analysis 
J2 did not reach even p<0.1 in one day. Comparison of the different CARs in 
transaction-level analysis revealed that investors reacted very differently to a forward 
move as opposed to a move toward raw materials. A company’s acquisition toward its 
customers was quickly responded to on the stock market, but when the move was 
toward suppliers, the response was slower and remained so longer, though it reached the 
same probability level in over an hour (75 mins). 
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Figure 39. J2 test shows a high enough probability (p<0.01) for moving forward (left) 
and a high enough probability (p<0.05) for moving backward (right). 
In conclusion, we can say that daily analysis does not yield a statistically significant 
abnormal return to a vertical move toward company suppliers and raw materials; 
however, a statistical significance was found when a compounded abnormal return was 
calculated for a vertical move toward company customers. A transaction-level CAR 
could be calculated, and it was 3.073% for an acquisition toward customers and 1.14% 
for a vertical move toward suppliers. 
4.3.5.3 Result for hypothesis 5 
Results for hypothesis 5 show that a move toward customers generated a statistically 
significant compounded abnormal return with p<0.01, which means 99% probability. 
On the other hand, when comparison, i.e., a move backward in the value chain, does not 
create statistically significant results in compounded abnormal return measurements, we 
can say that hypothesis 5 is partially supported, because a strategic move toward the 
company’s customers creates an abnormal return, but one closer to customers’ suppliers 
creates no value. The samples of these strategic moves were small: for a forward move, 
N=23 and for a backward move even less, N=15.  
Theoretically, strategic moves either toward company customers or raw materials 
should differ significantly. A company moving toward raw materials and suppliers is 
trying to optimize its supplier side to increase efficiency and to gain cost reduction from 
its purchases. Chen (2001) found that a firm can raise its rival’s cost through vertical 
integration if and only if its own cost is reduced through the integration. Chatterjee 
(1991) combined a vertical industry move backward with Porter’s (1980) strategic 
forces by stating that if entry barriers are low, vertical integration does little to further 
reduce the threat of new entries, so a firm might as well not integrate. 
On the other hand, a company move toward its customers is an expansive, opportunistic 
or offensive move, when it tries to enter new markets or gain a larger share of the 
markets. Haleblian et al. (2009) called it a market power move when a company 
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attempts to appropriate more value from customers. Chatterjee (1991) proved that if 
market power is the predominant motive behind vertical integration, gains to the 
acquiring firm and to other incumbents in its stage should correlate positively. A 
vertical move forward can therefore be seen as increasing the total size of the market 
and therefore also that of other companies in the market place. 
It is also exceptional in vertical integration that pre-event moves are negative in both 
cases. Another exceptional finding is that analysis takes longer and reaches its peak 
eight to ten hours after the event is published. It could be an interesting future research 
topic to study how differently stock markets react to these different acquisition classes. 
4.3.6. Summary of all hypotheses results  
Summing up the above hypotheses, it became apparent that the information available 
increases the abnormal return. This is valid also for surprises in the strategic moves 
when a company makes an unrelated acquisition. Horizontal acquisitions have become 
very common, and investors react positively to them, but in comparison to all other 
types of acquisitions, they do not create much shareholder value. This is a natural 
evolution, and studies (Loughran & Vijh, 1997, Oler et al., 2008, etc.) show that 
horizontal acquisitions are not very successful in the long term, though they generate an 
abnormal return.  
The two analysis methods differed decisively in that daily analysis could not detect a 
statistical difference when a company moved toward its customers, but transaction-level 
analysis could. This enables more accurate comparison of actions that differ 
significantly in rapid responses but are not significant in longer event window analysis – 
not even on one day level. 
4.4. Summary of the results 
This section compares the one day daily analysis method after a press or stock exchange 
release with the new transaction-based method at one hour after a press or stock 
exchange release. 
Table 12 shows the difference between the daily analysis method of using the daily 
closing price compared to transaction-level information. In addition to giving more 
detailed information on timing comparison, the transaction-level method also gives 
more reliable information on certain areas. Table 13 shows the difference between the 
two methods for different acquisition classes and all control variables. These two tables 
(Table 12 and Table 13) show three different types of differences in these methods. 
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Different control variables 
For example, the daily analysis method does not give high enough probability of null 
hypothesis rejection in the M&A event when a company is moving backward and the 
acquisition is unrelated (unrelated backward), but the transaction-based method shows a 
clear difference in this control variable. Another control variable where the difference is 
evident is publicly listed company, where the transaction-based method gives 
statistically significant results, but the daily analysis method does not. 
Transaction level analysis produces a higher CAR in all M&A events 
The transaction-level analysis also shows over a 50% higher CAR than daily-level 
analysis, because the transaction level CAR is 0.82% after one hour and 0.54% after one 
day. We can see that the response is rapid immediately after one hour and the CAR 
drops during the first day. 
Transaction-level analysis produces detailed differences in all categories 
For different hypotheses, transaction-level analysis produces more detailed differences 
between the categories than daily-level analysis. Based on the previous finding, the 
CAR decreases over time, but a lower CAR drops more in relation to a higher CAR. For 
example, in Hypothesis 2, the difference is over 16 times higher in transaction-level 
analysis, but it increases to 29 times higher in daily analysis. The same pattern is visible 
in all comparisons, as Hypothesis 3 produces less than a 4 times higher CAR in 
transaction-level analysis, but over 8 times higher in daily analysis. For Hypothesis 4, 
the relation is 3.6 on transaction-level and 5.7 in daily analysis.  
Table 12. Results comparison of the daily analysis and transaction-based analysis. 
 Day-level CAR (1 day) Transaction level CAR (1h) 
Hypothesis 1:  
Investor reaction 
0.5412% (p<0.01) 0.8217% (p<0.01) 
Hypothesis 2:  
Related vs. unrelated 
NS; 0.4% (p<0.01) vs. 
11.67% (p<0.01) 
NS; 0.6912% (p<0.01) vs. 
11.43% (p<0.01) 
Hypothesis 3:  
Horizontal vs. non-horizontal 
p<0.1; 0.24% (p<0.1) vs. 
1.99% (p<0.01) 
p<0.1; 0.55% (p<0.01) vs. 
2.17% (p<0.01) 
Hypothesis 4:  
Moving vs. staying 
NS; 1.98% (p<0.05) vs. 
0.345% (p<0.01) 
NS; 2.3% (p<0.01) vs. 0.63% 
(p<0.01) 
Hypothesis 5:  
Downstream vs. upstream 
NS; 1.23% (p<0.05) vs. NS NS; 3.07% (p<0.01) vs. 1.14% 
(p<0.05) 
NS = Not significant   
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Table 13. Classes and control variables comparison between the daily analysis and 
transaction-based analysis. 
Classes & Controls (independent var.): Day-level correlation Transaction level correlation 
Horizontal -0.144 (p<0.01) -0.197 (p<0.01) 
Vertical forward NS 
 
NS 
 
Vertical backward NS 
 
NS 
 
Related  NS 
 
NS 
 
Unrelated Forward 0.377 (p<0.01) 0.596 (p<0.01) 
Unrelated Backward NS 
 
0.098 (p<0.1) 
Bear / Bull trend NS 
 
NS 
 
Relative size 0.13 (p<0.05) 0.181 (p<0.01) 
Size class 0.175 (p<0.01) 0.281 (p<0.01) 
Cultural proximity NS 
 
NS 
 
Domestic acquisition NS 
 
NS 
 
Publicly listed company 0.104 (p<0.1) NS 
 
Premium paid NS 
 
NS 
 
Price announced NS 
 
NS 
 
Profit announced NS 
 
NS 
 
Previous ownership NS 
 
NS 
 
Turnover class -0.145 (p<0.01) -0.199 (p<0.01) 
Press vs. Stock exchange release 0.132 (p<0.01) 0.175 (p<0.01) 
NS = Not significant 
 
The new method of using more accurate time data for event definition poses more 
challenges with taking into account the events that have no time information associated 
with their date. This is a small challenge though, because the sample data is not the 
same; new sample data cannot directly be compared with old daily sample data. Thus 
the sample size will differ in these studies. The same events can be used in both 
methods, but then the sample does not represent the whole population as accurately as it 
could. This is the first limiting factor.  
Another factor limiting the sample size is the definition of confounding events. In the 
new way of doing research, it is possible to shorten the confounding event definition, 
especially after an event has been published. Because the researcher can monitor the 
event and its impact much more accurately, artifacts stemming from confounding events 
can be avoided. Additionally, he can in a similar fashion shorten the time before an 
observed event, because there is basically over 500 times (60 minutes * 8.5 hours) more 
information available in using minute-based data for event definition and transaction-
based data  for measuring the abnormal return. 
Thus before studying the results, we can say that there are more events uncontaminated 
by confounding events than were we to use the daily analysis method. This compensates 
partly for the reduction in events due to missing time information required by the 
transaction-based method.  
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Finally, linear regression was calculated between the transaction-level analysis CAR60 
and the daily analysis CAR1d. This showed how well the first-hour CAR estimated the 
daily analysis CAR for the following trading day. The linear regression between the 
one-hour CAR and the one-day CAR was not significant; therefore, these two methods 
of studying the abnormal return complement for each other. 
When plotted to the same graph in Figure 40, no clear linear regression appeared in 
daily analysis between the CAR after one hour and that after one full trading day. The 
R
2
 value that is the coefficient of determination is normally used to measure how well a 
stock follows the market portfolio index. In this case, the measure was used for how 
well the one-hour abnormal return explained the one-day abnormal return; the R
2
value 
was 0,2585, which means a reasonably good level of explanation. Because individual 
results differed, we can say that the two measures measure different things although 
they derive from the same origin, i.e., corporate releases on M&A action. 
 
Figure 40. Plot diagram on how well one-hour CAR estimates the next day’s CAR. 
In conclusion, transaction-based analysis gives more accurate data right after an event is 
published, and new findings can be discovered, but there is little correlation between 
quick reaction in CAR and how long the abnormality remains in the security price. This 
is interesting, because according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the 
information available should reflect the security price directly and remain constant if 
new information is not released. Because confounding releases have been removed, 
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there should be no other information from the corporation itself, though new 
information may come from other sources and validate the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, event studies have been criticized as a method 
for measuring the success of strategic actions, and a consensus has been reached that it 
is a good tool for measuring investors’ collective opinions about complex events (Oler 
et.al, 2008). 
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5. DISCUSSION 
Stock trading has become very fast-paced as corporations keep issuing an increasing 
number of press and stock exchange releases. Thus it is more difficult to isolate a 
certain type of announcement from other announcements. It is fair to ask if it is even 
necessary, but there is also a growing demand for transparency, and more and more 
people are investing in publicly listed stocks. In September 2012, the number of 
households investing in publicly listed shares reached its record of 824,900 
(Pörssisäätiö, 2013). A corporation would benefit from using this publicity also in a 
positive way—especially in terms of its stock price.  
The first goal was to study merger and acquisition announcements’ impact on corporate 
stock price and verify the results of the earlier literature on the topic. The second goal 
was to compare results between additional daily analysis research based on the daily 
closing price and a new method of using more minute-level time information and real 
trade prices after the event.  
5.1. Methodological contribution 
At the beginning of this study, the two goals were almost equally weighted, but as the 
study progressed, the new method and its more accurate findings became of more 
interest, partly because little information was available on such research, and secondly, 
because the impact of the event was so clearly visible. Both methods showed positive 
abnormal returns on corporate announcements, which was also somewhat surprising, 
because we know that many acquisitions do not create as much value as expected, at 
least in the long term. On the stock market, such announcements are rewarded with an 
abnormal return. Another finding was that large companies’ acquisition announcements 
have a smaller effect on their stock prices than smaller companies’ announcements. This 
is, however, easy to understand, as the impact may be more significant on small 
companies than on large enterprises; on the other hand, investors trade more in large 
company shares, and the potential audience buying shares is bigger there. 
Zollo & Singh (2004) found that financial markets are not able to anticipate and 
incorporate enough information at the time of an acquisition announcement, and 
claimed that event study focusing on a cumulative abnormal return is not an appropriate 
method. Thus the new method of using real trade information offers a new approach to 
analyzing the reaction and is supplementary to the current use of event analysis. On the 
other hand the current way to make research using closing prices of securities may 
include erroneous event time information as illustrated in figure 16. Therefore it is 
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questionable if the traditional methods should be used at all in short time CAR analyses, 
but rather use the transaction level data. This transaction level method is opening a large 
number of additional research topics as the speed of investor reaction, order book 
reactions, as well as possible information leakages and illegal actions on price 
manipulation can be observed by using transaction level data.  Previous studies have 
discussed this, as it offers, e.g., a particularly relevant tool for finance practitioners, i.e., 
shareholders to gain high returns in daily trading (Reboredo et al., 2012).  
Linear regression is a good start for very short-term analysis, yet also non-linear 
modeling and more complex mechanisms can be used to capture some new information 
from very short event windows for analysis of company announcements (Kyoung-Jae, 
2002; Reboredo et al., 2012). It provides new and more accurate information for event 
analysis and reduces the number of confounding releases. Additionally, some pre-event 
information related to M&A announcements can be measured using a very short event 
window, which may not be possible to measure equally accurately with only day level 
analysis (Rodrigues et al., 2012). Rodrigues et al. found that intraday trading behavior 
of takeover targets was affected by traders who held private information at least three 
months before the official announcement. We can justifiably say that event studies 
should not be used to measure the success of a strategic action such as M&A, because it 
has been proved earlier (Zollo & Meier, 2008). Zollo & Meier, 2008 concluded that 
event studies show no significant connection with the other metrics used, and that event 
studies do gauge something different than actual acquisition performance. Short event 
study windows are for measuring market expectations only; however, that has become 
more important, because, e.g., algorithmic trading covers most stock markets today 
(e.g., Clark, 2010; Erola, 2007). 
Research question 1: Does moving to transaction-level analysis reveal new 
information compared to day-level analysis in measuring investor reactions to 
M&A announcements? 
As seen in the study, moving to a short event window reveals new information and can 
predict the compounded abnormal return (CAR) more accurately than traditional daily 
analysis. In the regression models, the maximum R
2
 value is 0,427 for transaction-level 
analysis compared to 0,178 for daily-level analysis. Additionally, transaction-level 
analysis indicates how rapidly investors react to different type acquisitions. It thus 
enables study of both reaction speed and volatility. Reboredo et al. (2012) studied 
volatility and time intervals of 5, 10, 30, and 60 minutes. They studied both linear and 
non-linear models, and one finding was that a 60-min period yielded the best out-of-
sample profitability for both high and low volatility sample periods. This was the reason 
why a 60-min time interval was selected also for this dissertation.  
The first hypothesis supports the Efficient Market Hypothesis that builds a link between 
information and the stock price (Fama, 1970). In this study, new information affected 
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the stock price, and strategic announcements on M&A presumably had a positive 
impact on the acquirer’s share price. The change in share price was fast and reasonably 
high compared to previous studies that showed no or very little increase in the 
acquirer’s share price.  
5.2. Merger and acquisition categories 
The next conclusion is that the direction of a strategic move matters as long as it is away 
from the existing strategy. If the company makes an unrelated move, it create a more 
abnormal return than a horizontal or related move. In this type of study, it is interesting 
to see how fast the stock market reacts to different types of announcements. In a normal 
horizontal move where a company acquires its direct competitor, the reaction is fast, but 
the absolute abnormal return is lower than in an acquisition where the company moves 
either toward its customers or penetrates totally new markets. Such moves can be 
symptomatic of moving to a service domain or extending the business away from the 
current center of gravity. They are interesting, but the stock market takes somewhat 
longer to analyze them. 
Research question 2: Do announcements of different M&A types create 
investor reactions and do these reactions differ? 
The questions were answered in the affirmative, because different types of acquisitions 
do differ in both M&A type and analysis type. The highest compounded abnormal 
return was for unrelated acquisitions, in which the target company’s business was not 
close to the acquirer’s current business. The challenge was that there were only a few 
acquisitions of this type. Both day-level and transaction-level analyses showed over an 
11% CAR for these acquisitions. The smallest CAR measured was for the horizontal 
acquisition type, which was also the most common M&A type during the study period. 
Most previous studies have reported a difference between types of acquisitions (e.g. 
Lubatkin, 1983; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Oler et al., 2008; Loughran & Vijh,1997; 
Gaur, et.al., 2013; Lee et al., 2011), but they used only one method to compare their 
results. 
Daily analysis and transaction-level analysis produced similar results; however, in the 
unrelated backward type the difference was significant only in transaction-level analysis 
(p<0.1). This acquisition type reflects a move toward company suppliers and raw 
materials (Brouthers et al., 1998). The vertical acquisition backward could be 
categorized as a less risky move, because the company knows its customer requirements 
for the new position, because it has been there. This move has another impact, because 
the old competitors may now become customers of the new extended company. Briefly, 
the investors value efficiency gains over market opportunities.  
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Earlier research has not proved a difference between daily and transaction-level results, 
that the length of the event window affects the results on day level vs. transaction level. 
On the other hand, some scholars have compared daily results with very long event 
windows and seen a similar pattern of contradictory results (Oler et al., 2008). 
Therefore, different-length event windows measure different topics. 
The second hypothesis on related and unrelated was not supported, but this was partially 
due to the very small samples of unrelated acquisitions. The abnormal return of 
unrelated acquisitions was markedly high, but as stated earlier in unrelated acquisitions, 
increased efficiencies vary in technological or product market activities. High 
variability creates more variance also in returns. Perhaps the unrelated acquisition 
samples in this study were too small to include also very low returns. The results may 
also indicate that unrelated acquisition announcements included surprising strategic 
moves, and that investors reacted to them more positively than to traditional related 
acquisitions. This was also seen in the third hypothesis, in which a horizontal 
acquisition release created a smaller abnormal return than a release on a non-horizontal 
acquisition. Both findings indicate that the low long term benefits of horizontal 
acquisitions were already taken into account in the short-term investor reactions. 
Similarly, related acquisitions were rewarded with lower returns than unrelated 
acquisitions. Strategic moves that differ from expected strategic moves had higher 
abnormal returns than traditional acquisition announcements.  
The above may show past experience and investors learning from horizontal 
acquisitions, where market shares are difficult to keep for a merged company. Though 
companies may seek a monopolistic position, they may find it difficult to reach due to 
anti-trust legislation. Additionally, in the small Finnish (and EU) markets, monopolistic 
goals may show more easily than in global markets. Though some companies listed on 
the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki operate in global markets, not all of them do. The 
theoretical implication why the second and third hypotheses did not follow previous 
studies is possibly a combination of investor experience with horizontal acquisitions not 
being profitable in the long term and a low probability of reaching a monopoly position 
in the global economy.  
Hypothesis 4 supports the same view that staying in the traditional business 
environment is rewarded with lower abnormal returns than a move to a new place in the 
industry chain. 
When a move toward customers produces a high abnormal return, it rewards the more 
expansive strategy to, e.g., grow in the services domain or take a larger share of the 
delivery part and possibly become more customer oriented. These are very typical 
moves in 21
st
-century strategies, as many companies, first, seek revenue growth from 
services and, second, a possibility to distinguish themselves from their competitors with 
services. 
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Another theoretical outcome of this study is another view to the traditional “horizontal 
vs. non-horizontal acquisition” debate, because there are many other alternatives to 
divide M&A announcements. This study added to the categories based on Galbraith’s 
diversifications (Galbraith, 2002) types to cover both directions (forward and backward) 
and made it simultaneously possible to reserve the comparison of more traditional 
categories for both horizontal vs. non-horizontal and related vs. unrelated categories. 
The difference between a horizontal and a related acquisition may be somewhat 
unclear—especially in larger companies—and hide their exact relationship. The same 
applies to unrelated vs. related; i.e., is it feasible and enough to divide acquisition 
categories in this way or would another categorization make more sense to pinpoint the 
company’s strategies more accurately? This study has shown one way to categorize, but 
others may be justified as well. 
5.3. Other variables 
The third research question covered all control variables, and the M&A type proved to 
be the most important variable in estimating the abnormal return.  
Research question 3: What other independent factors influence investor 
reactions to M&A announcements? 
As proved above, the answer to the third research question is true, and the results differ 
because of one major difference in the independent factors. As explained in Research 
Question 2, a vertical move toward company suppliers was significant only in 
transaction-level analysis (p<0.1). For all other independent factors, both analyses 
showed similar investor reactions. 
Additionally, cultural proximity had no impact, though it has been a popular topic, and 
many researchers have found difficulties with integration. One statistically significant 
variable was the relational size and closely related control variable of turnover. 
Interestingly, when a large enterprise makes an acquisition, it does not really have an 
impact on the share price, but in smaller companies the abnormal return can amount to a 
few percentage points (on average 3.5%). 
A final general conclusion is that corporations vary a lot in their announcements of 
events of this scale. Though mergers and acquisitions often have a direct bearing on 
shareholder value, the announcements do not always explain the reasons behind the 
acquisition, and the level of the announcement may vary considerably. Some 
corporations are clear about their reasons, but others sometimes even forget their 
announcement or only briefly mention the acquired company and the reason for the 
acquisition. Obviously, a large investment made in an acquisition would benefit a 
company more if its announcement clearly described its strategic goals. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Mergers and acquisitions have been very popular means for corporations to acquire new 
technologies, increase market share, offer new services, or other noble goals to increase 
corporate market value. As many researchers have shown, management has also other 
goals that are not easily linked to increasing a corporation’s share price even in the long 
term. This study shows that an increase in the share price is visible in the short term. 
Though investors also use means other than corporate official announcements for their 
investment decisions, the total number of M&A events is significant enough to conclude 
that press and stock exchange releases are essential to decision-making. Even though 
the average abnormal return is only 0.8%, it represents an average of about 7.5M€ per 
acquisition announcement. This is a significant amount of money available for short-
term investors looking for fast revenues in daily trading. This study shows that M&A 
events generated a significant abnormal return in the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki during 
2006–2010. 
6.1. Key findings 
The main objective was to achieve a positive compounded abnormal return (CAR) for 
all M&A actions. This was realized, and the abnormal return was positive in all M&A 
categories.  
The next major result was that transaction-level analysis was able to find CAR in 
unrelated M&A action toward raw materials when day-level analysis produced no CAR.  
Finally the multiple regression model using transaction-level analysis improved the 
coefficient of determination R
2
 from 0.178 to 0.427 when compared to daily-analysis.  
One contribution to the literature is to improve the current definition of related and 
horizontal categories. More detailed categories are needed to focus on company 
strategic moves and their impact on the share price. All unrelated acquisitions create a 
high abnormal return, but they occur seldom to make a sufficiently large sample for 
research. They represent rather an unexpected change in the strategy that is rewarded 
very positively. 
Faster pace, an increased number of shareholders, and increasing demand for 
transparency—these all support the more advanced analysis methods and the calculating 
power of computers that make them easier and more accurate. By analyzing all types, 
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we can easily identify a valuable share that is worth investing in, also in the long term. 
Therefore, transaction level analysis should be a good supplement for daily analysis. 
Another reason why the event analysis method should be further developed is the 
inaccuracy of timing, as described earlier in the document. Because corporate 
announcements are published around the world basically all day long, it is not good 
enough that their first impacts are observed the following day; event study does not take 
this into account. Though the incorrect dates represent only about 1% of all events in 
this study, this error is yet easy to correct with a more accurate analysis method. 
The third reason for the new event analysis is that the number of “correct” releases 
increases with a narrow event window, because the number of confounding releases 
decreases. This makes possible a larger number of releases and perhaps also enables 
study of the more rare releases and their impacts. 
A possible topic to discuss is how well a company could increase its share price at the 
time it announces an M&A event. This could lead to better communication and 
increased transparency with the shareholders and, furthermore, give a direct incentive to 
executives responsible for planning strategy and/or corporate investor relations. 
The most obvious implication to management is to ensure that the content of the press 
and stock exchange releases reflects the management’s intended strategic message. 
There are many ways to clarify releases, but the way a stock exchange or press release 
is written may directly impact the stock price. The merger and acquisition categories 
introduced in this study are just one way of making categories reflect a company’s move 
in its competitive environment. 
The next managerial implication is to ensure that the acquisition decision is formulated 
in line with the legislative guidelines on the corporate  mission to generate profit for its 
shareholders, and that management honours its obligation to promote the company’s 
benefit. 
6.2. Validity 
Validity is a term that describes how well a measure measures the concept it represents. 
The literature contains several different validity types such as internal validity, 
statistical validity, construct validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity, cross-
validation, face validity, concurrent validity, external validity, content validity, 
sampling validity, criterion validity, predictive validity, and empirical validity. Some of 
them are subtypes of others, or they partially describe similar types with different 
names. The definition of research validity from Carmines & Woods (2005) was used in 
this study. They divided validity into three categories: content validity, which focuses 
on the extent to which a particular empirical measure reflects a specific domain of 
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content; criterion-related validity, which concerns the correlation between a measure 
and some criterion variable interest; and construct validity, which focuses on the 
relationship between the measure and theoretical expectations of other measures. 
Content validity 
One main question related to content validity is “How well does the measurement 
represent what it is supposed to measure?” First, the entire domain of relevant content 
must be able to be specified in the measurement situation. It is easy to say about this 
requirement that all stock exchange releases were found from the database available in 
Kauppalehti. However, a comprehensive set of press releases is practically impossible 
to find, because companies, especially those active abroad, issue press releases in 
various languages, but merger and acquisition releases are normally published as stock 
exchange releases. Though it is a challenge to triangulate content, it can be done with 
M&A, because a database is available there for storing all acquisitions. Two listed 
companies (Talentum Oyj and Pohjola-pankki Oyj) keep track of all merger and 
acquisition announcements made in Finland, whereas stock exchange releases are stored 
in the Kauppalehti database (part of Alma-Media Oyj). Thus it is fair to say that the first 
prerequisite of content validation is achieved by using two sources of information. The 
second step is to select or construct specific indicators to be used in the measure. In this 
study, it meant in practice a guidebook on how to semantically analyze a press or stock 
exchange release that indicates an M&A event is imminent. Here the event is quite easy 
to analyze, because in most cases the announcement explicitly mentioned the share that 
was acquired of the company. It is a bigger challenge to analyze a different class of 
M&A; that was tackled using triangulation with three different people using with the 
same content analysis guidebook. This leaves, of course, the question of how well the 
guidebook represented the class. This was also triangulated with the same three people 
to avoid misinterpretation. Though triangulation is not a 100% sure way to analyze a 
text semantically correctly, it yet gives a solid basis for improving validity. Gray & 
Densten (1998) explain this by saying that “triangulation of methods strengthens the 
researcher’s claims for the validity of the conclusions drawn where mutual confirmation 
of results can be demonstrated.” Though the method is the same, analysis is done by 
multiple researchers; hence it is fair to say that triangulation improves the accuracy of 
analysis. 
Content validity was achieved by using only two channels of input, i.e., official 
corporate stock releases and official corporate press releases. An official press release is 
one that the company has released on its Web pages or directly to the press. Rumors 
about acquisitions or mergers were ignored if the company did not officially state the 
fact in their press or stock exchange release with a recorded date and time. 
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Criterion related validity  
Criterion validity concerns the relationship between a measure and some criterion 
variable of interest. It is determined by the measure and its criterion. In this study, it was 
easy to see how well  merger and acquisition announcements impacted the abnormal 
return. Criterion validity is predictive to some extent, because when a merger and 
acquisition event occur, their abnormal return could be estimated; however, because the 
time window is very narrow, criterion validity can here be defined as concurrent 
estimation. A correlation between the abnormal return and control variables is shown in 
Table 9. 
Also small companies—as defined by the EU in 2003—are listed on the NASDAQ 
OMX with a small security turnover in the stock market. We can question if their daily 
volumes for all securities were high enough to warrant the criterion of efficient markets, 
which is a prerequisite with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
To find the right set of control variables correlating with an abnormal return, previous 
event studies on mergers and acquisitions were used with a particular focus on 
announcement content. This was because extensive analysis of both the acquiring 
company and the target takes time. Also because the scope of the study was fast 
response rather than long-term analysis, it was questionable how extensive studies 
should be to be required to have good control variable coverage. These were the main 
reasons why for example payment method was left out as it has been one common 
control variable. Similarly the difference between an acquisition and a merger was 
interesting, however it was not clearly stated in the release. These could have been 
found from other sources or analyses afterwards, but the intention of this research was 
to study immediate and short-term impacts. The correct selection of control variables is 
always a challenge that may decrease the criterion related validity. 
Construct validity 
With construct validity, researchers are interested in the relationship between the 
measure and theoretical expectations of other measures. Carmine & Woods divided 
construct validity into three distinct steps (Carmines & Woods, 2005): 
1) Theoretical relationship between the concepts must be specified. 
2) Empirical evidence must be examined. 
3) Empirical evidence must be interpreted in terms of how it clarifies the 
construct validity of the particular measure. 
In the first step, the theoretical relationship between an action and an abnormal return 
has been widely investigated with event studies over the past 20 years. Event studies 
have been criticized for reflecting too much value creation. Used in such a way, an 
event study does not give comprehensive results; however, if the intention is to measure 
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how investors have evaluated the company’s recent action, then event study is  probably 
the best if not the only measure. Event studies show well how comprehensively a 
company has been able to inform its investors about its strategic decisions and 
investments made to achieve these goals. In this respect, the theoretical results 
admirably fulfilled the criteria of construct validity. On the other hand, the study did not 
yield valid results for the long-term profitability impact due to merger and acquisition 
events.  
When empirical evidence was sought for the theory, the main level hypothesis was 
proved valid. The next level empirical results on different classes and categories were 
not proved in previous studies. One reason may have been their small number of 
samples in each class or their different classification of related and unrelated. In many 
previous studies, the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code was used to define 
this relatedness; in this study, the relatedness was more subjective, because it relied on 
semantic analysis of press or stock exchange releases. The SIC code is not always the 
best method to indicate relatedness, because a conglomerate may have one unit closely 
co-operating with a smaller player; however, the small section does not have the same 
SIC, as it is part of the conglomerate. In addition, within the same value chain, SIC 
coding is not 100% sure either. For example, a metal mining services company has a 
SIC code of 1081 and a company manufacturing fluid power cylinders 3593, and they 
can have an intensive customer-supplier relationship. Therefore, SIC codes alone are 
not enough to measure relatedness. 
The length of the event window must be defined, because it affects results, as proved 
also in this study. Only a few event studies use intraday data, a decision based on a 
study by Reboredo et al. (2012). They used several lengths for event windows and 
finally settled for a one-hour window, because it yielded the best out-of-sample 
profitability for both low and high volatility sample periods. 
6.3. Reliability 
Reliability describes how well a test, measurement, or experiment produces the same 
results if repeated.  
Content analysis reliability  
Content analysis reliability was ensured by triangulating first the sources of the press 
and stock exchange releases on the Kauppalehti web site, all M&A data stored by 
Talentum & OP-Pohjola, and companies’ own web sites. This step was taken to make 
sure that the press and stock release content was interpreted correctly to represent an 
M&A event. 
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An M&A release was triangulated by three individuals, who used a code book to 
categorize the event into pre-defined acquisition classes. The process followed the six 
steps defined in Neuendorf’s (2002) guidebook. One topic that reduces reliability in 
content analysis is the fact that especially large companies may have overlapping 
functions or areas where the acquiring and target company relatedness is estimated. 
Therefore, many companies may be categorized as related though they may have clearly 
competitive divisions. Also Fan & Goyal (2006) found this reliability risk. 
Event study reliability 
In this study, all press and stock exchange announcements without a time stamp were 
rejected. This is one major difference if daily closing price analysis uses all the data. If a 
study is conducted only with daily data, the number of samples would be 73 events 
more, which represents about 20% more data. In a normal event study, these would be 
taken into account, though the possibility of an error of an event being observed on the 
following day would decrease reliability. Therefore, the method used in this study 
limited the size of the sample too much, though in contrast increased the accuracy of 
analyzing the events with the correct date and time. 
Another aspect is that in this study the event window was the same in both cases, which 
reduced the number of events in transaction-based analysis by 65 instead of 28. 
According to the event window definition, the number of rejected M&A announcements 
would have been 28, because the event window would have been only one hour and not 
one day. On the other hand, using the same  event window enables comparison of two 
methods using the events.  
In this respect, both the absence of time stamps in daily and the too wide event window 
in transaction-based analysis reduced data samples by as much as 30%, yet both 
increased the validity of the data, but decreased reliability if other researchers do not 
treat them similarly. 
One factor that may reduce reliability is a leak of preliminary information on an 
acquisition; it may affect the acquiring company’s stock price behavior prior to the 
acquisition and result in a higher than expected abnormal return, but it could be avoided 
with a very long estimation period. In this study, the estimation period was 20 days. 
However, an acquisition is usually a long process, and a possible information leak may 
then affect the estimated price. 
The daily analysis method shows the fact that most value is created during the first hour 
after an event, and if the event window is extended to multiple days, the compounded 
abnormal return, in fact, drops over time. Figure 28 shows a downward trend after the 
event date and the following date. In this type of daily analysis, it is good to remember 
that some events appear on the following day and not exactly on the day the event was 
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released. The figure also shows clearly that over 50% of gained value is lost on the third 
day after the event. Because for seven consecutive days, confounding releases were not 
taken into account here, the trend gives only a basic idea of what normally happens after 
M&A events. Figure 41 shows seven consecutive trading days consisting of three days 
before the event, event date, and three days after the event. 
 
Figure 41. Compounded abnormal return for three days before and three days after 
the event. 
Because the main goal of this study was to find a more accurate method for studying 
company actions and their impact on security prices, naturally some improvements were 
made to event study methods. The right comparison method would be discussed, 
because in previous studies, analysis was always the CAR. With a short event window, 
it is worth studying if the right measure is abnormal return rather than the CAR.   
The comparison in Figure 42 shows that an abnormal return reaches a sharp peak at the 
time of an event, because the compounded abnormal return is not as volatile to timing, 
because it summarizes abnormal releases over the event period. When a compounded 
abnormal return and an abnormal return are compared, the latter is very sensitive to 
timing, which means that one event can be highly positive at the time of the event and 
zero or even negative shortly after the peak. To promote trading, both buy order and sell 
order must meet, and timing may vary significantly if the traded volume is low. 
Therefore, it is justifiable to compare compounded abnormal returns, because they are 
more robust against these errors—especially in this study, which aimed to measure 
differences in the compounded abnormal return between the groups. 
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Figure 42. Comparison between a compounded abnormal return (above) and an 
abnormal return (below). 
If the research topic is volatility or reaction time or some other measure related to 
investigating speed or change in speed, then the abnormal return may give a better 
resolution. In this study, which focused on value change, it made more sense to use the 
compounded abnormal return. In addition, the difference between the daily analysis 
method and the transaction-based method was compared.  
On the other hand, in the comparison of the daily closing price in Figure 43, the AR 
would make more sense, because it reduces sensitivity to timing errors and increases the 
visibility of the event date’s and the following date’s abnormal return. The challenge in 
cumulative abnormal return analysis is that most events are visible at the event time, but 
some events cannot reliably be expected to appear on the following day (i.e., those 
released after the stock closing time). 
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Figure 43. In daily closing price comparison, the abnormal return (below) gives clear 
indication on the event day compared to the compounded abnormal return (above). 
One discussion topic is the length of the observation window. Stock trading companies 
are now boasting about their capabilities in benchmarking their efficiency in 
microseconds, as shown by the following quotation from the NASDAQ OMX 
Executive Vice President Adena Friedman: "With Market Replay Europe, users can 
discover exactly how orders interacted with the market down to the millisecond at 
which the trade occurred, all in an easy-to-use visual tool.” (Nasdaq 2009) 
Because the daily analysis method very slowly observes reactions to a certain event 
type, a new way is needed to capture the fastest market reactions. Since some strategic 
moves have a very long-term effect on corporate success, a longer-term study is needed. 
The new, faster method should complement more than substitute for the old one and 
provide a new angle to event studies. Simultaneously, traditional event studies could 
benefit from an even longer event window. 
Tools reliability 
Statistical abnormal returns were first calculated with the Matlab™ computer program, 
and the results were further analyzed with SPSS™ statistical tools, which calculated 
correlations and multiregressions. The Matlab™ program used the calculation methods 
introduced in Campbell’s book on econometrics (Campbell et al., 1997). The calculation 
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of the program was verified for correctness by an external specialist, not only by the 
Matlab™ programmer. 
6.4. Limitations of the study 
This study, made on the Finnish stock exchange, the NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, 
represents an eventful period in stock exchange history. Because some of the companies 
were listed also abroad, their stock price impacted also overseas trading. In addition, the 
few companies listed abroad had it in common that they launched press releases abroad 
with a possible impact on their stock price. The releases in foreign countries may have 
skewed this study to some extent, because most listed companies are active also abroad 
and do not list all press releases on their websites. 
The efficient market hypothesis has often been criticized, but in general it makes the 
rather straightforward assumption that a new piece of information may affect the 
corporate stock price. This is the only part that was used in this study, and the positive 
impact of new information has been shown very reliably in this study. The next 
questions are: What does this mean in practice; what conclusions can be drawn from 
this behavior; and in what circumstances can these conclusions be used? Recently, there 
have been studies on how much (Shijven & Hitt, 2012) the stock markets are impacted 
by the behavioral mechanisms of investors. However, they have not taken into account 
the current method of using a short event window that would give more visibility to the 
trading counterparts and possible group behavior. On the other hand, thorough research 
on buy and sell orders and their issuers would help trace this information.  
Furthermore, event studies have been criticized as a research method that analyzes the 
implications of strategic actions, but as has been shown, there is a clear and measurable 
response to these actions. In this case, the method is useful, but what it really measures 
is debatable. It indicates at least how investors react to a strategic company move, but it 
does not predict the success of an acquisition in the long run. Therefore, the warnings 
about not making false conclusions are valid but also point to the history of event 
studies. The literature contains only a few studies that draw direct conclusions from 
event studies and their reliable analyses on certain events, and in most articles, 
researchers have been cautious to make fast conclusions.  
Investors use, of course, other methods than corporate official announcements to make 
their investment decisions, but the total number of M&A events is significant enough to 
conclude that press and stock exchange releases are essential to decision-making. This 
brings one negative implication to short-event window analysis in that its long-term 
impact cannot be monitored. This is also one of the most commonly criticized areas of 
event analysis as a method. 
127 
 
Selection of control variables, and their impact, or rather lack of impact on the abnormal 
return can be similarly subjected to criticism. Surprisingly, trend data has no statistically 
significant impact on the abnormal return.  
6.5. Research topics for further study 
If not yet, then at least future algorithmic trading, a.k.a. automated trading, may well 
take into account historical information on certain types of events. At least the accuracy 
of predicting market moves may improve when all classes are studied. This also 
requires good algorithms for semantic analysis, which react faster than humans in 
analyzing corporate announcements. And finally, faster moves are even more reason for 
companies to improve their communications for desired ends. Algorithmic trading 
varies on different stock exchanges and over time, but it has been popular in American 
markets and has been growing globally in the 21st century. In 2007, algorithmic trading 
was 38% of all transactions on the NYSE, and in 2009 about 70% in the whole United 
States (Clark, 2010), whereas on the OMX Helsinki, it was about one-third (Erola, 
2007). In 2007 in Finland, the response time (or latency) between a buy order and a sell 
order was estimated at about 15 milliseconds, though according to Clark, the latency 
was measured in microseconds rather than milliseconds. As trading is becoming 
dependent on time, stock exchanges are already offering co-location with their main 
order book computers, at least on the NYSE, Euronext, Eurex, Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE), and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
There is also a good reason for high frequency trading becoming so popular, and it is 
simply profits. In 2008, companies involved in high frequency trading made profits of 
USD 21 billion, many of them based in Chicago and staffed with former floor traders 
(Clark, 2010). 
As the time window got shorter, other implications became apparent. One was an 
increased oscillation around the time of an event. This was not within the scope of this 
study, but in addition to studying “only” the abnormal return, it would be interesting to 
study increased oscillation as well. Therefore, i in the abnormal return equation, which 
describes the volatility of a security I, would also be interesting to study together with 
its changes at the time of an event. 
This study focused on different strategic moves and their comparison on the stock 
market level. This meant that the company level short-term impact was not calculated, 
and as explained in section 4.10, no statistical correlation was found between the 
number of acquisitions and long-term stock price evolution. However, they would be 
interesting to study on company level and classify, e.g., as was done in this study. The 
study should then also consider dividends paid to shareholders. Of course, in this 
respect, causality may be difficult to measure, if a company has already succeeded in 
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strengthening its position even further, or if it is successful because of management 
skills to implement its expansion strategy. 
The dilemma originated from different sizes of companies and the number of securities 
traded in a day. In practice, when we compare a large company making an 
announcement and a small company with markedly fewer shareholders and hence 
possible sellers doing the same, we have an interesting situation for further research. For 
a trade to happen, there should be a sell order and a buy order, and they should meet. If 
an acquisition positively increases a company’s valuation, it should be interesting to see 
how new buy orders change the stock price. We could face a new scenario if buyers like 
to buy shares at a higher price, but buy orders do not meet sell orders and no trades are 
made. Also with shares with very small volumes, the order book would add new 
information—possibly.  
In case analysis were changed from transactions to offering-level data, data would 
multiply, because the sell and buy orders that do not meet are much more numerous 
than realized transactions. Because a finalized trade is the result of a transaction, the buy 
and sell order would describe better the demand and mental valuation of a security. 
Hence if an announcement creates more demand for securities than are available, i.e., 
buy orders are higher than sell orders, securities would not be traded, yet the response to 
the announcement is significantly positive. The same works also in the opposite 
direction, when a negative announcement curtails the buy orders, but there are no sell 
orders to the lowered price transactions that do not occur. Because a trade is the end 
result where two intentions have already met, sell and buy orders could directly measure 
intentions. This would directly link a subjective (or algorithmic) response to the stock or 
press release of a certain event, even though it would lead to a stock transaction. This 
can be further developed to see if some intentions affect algorithmic analysis more 
directly and, hence, open a possibility for arbitrage. Two main ways can be monitored: 
spoofing and layering. Spoofing is the term for unreasonably high buy order or sell 
order input in the order book. This raises too high expectations and creates pressure in 
the market. The order level is set very close to the best offer, but the trade is cancelled 
or re-entered prior to one that takes place. Another way to manipulate stock prices is 
layering, where one big buy or sell order is manipulated by multiple small orders in the 
opposite direction. In practice, this means that when a trader wants to sell a large 
number of shares, he/she puts in several small-size buy orders. This is done in the hope 
of increasing the virtual demand of the shares, which would lead to a higher selling 
price. After the initial sell order is sold, the seller cancels all small buy orders. 
Another interesting observation would be a leak of insider information, especially in 
securities whose normal trade volumes are low. When we observe trades in which a 
handful of people are listed as insiders and when order books prior to the event undergo 
a big change, insider information is difficult to detect without combining all data and 
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summarizing it over a long period. This would help point out a few sporadic events, 
because transaction-level analysis takes into account even the announcement of an 
individual event. 
Manipulation of a stock price is always punishable—also in high frequency trading—as 
is the use of insider information (Finanssivalvonta, 2012). When stock transaction 
latencies go down first to milliseconds and then to microseconds, and when the 
abnormal return is measured on a daily level, the new method should be used in the 
future. Currently, research conducted on a daily level can be compared to traffic lights 
being monitored with an annual calendar. Therefore, abnormal return research could 
justifiably be developed closer to today’s real trade transactions. 
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8. APPENDICES (2 pieces)  
 
Table A1. Confounding events based on one day event window 
Event Date Company Affected Acquired company Confounding date Confounding event type
2.2.2007 Ahlström Fabriano Filter Media SpA 2.2.2007 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
1.2.2008 Ahlström Friend Group Inc 1.2.2008 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
11.8.2010 Ahlström Shandong Puri Filter & Paper Products 11.8.2010 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
6.5.2010 Aldata Cosmic Solutions Ltd. 6.5.2010 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
1.10.2008 AlmaMedia Vuodatus.net-blogipalvelu osaksi Alma Mediaa 1.10.2008 Major Executive Change
1.11.2010 Aspo KSM-Lämpötekniikka Oy 1.11.2010 Debt or Equity Related Event
1.7.2009 Basware TAG Services Pty Ltd 1.7.2009 Contract Awards
24.10.2008 Biotie elbion GmbH 24.10.2008 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
21.11.2006 Cencorp TMD 21.11.2006 Major Executive Change
26.3.2009 Cencorp Savcor Group Limited /Telecom liiketoiminta 26.3.2009 Debt or Equity Related Event
3.9.2007 Revenio Finnish Led-Signs Oy 3.9.2007 Major Executive Change
13.2.2009 Elisa Xenetic Oy 13.2.2009 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
13.2.2009 Elisa Trackway Oy 13.2.2009 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
27.2.2006 Exel Pacific Composites Pty. Ltd 27.2.2006 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
25.7.2006 Kemira Kolorit Paints 25.7.2006 Joint Venture
22.3.2007 Kemira Arkema 22.3.2007 Debt or Equity Related Event
22.11.2006 Keskisuomalainen Savon Mediat Oy 22.11.2006 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
1.10.2008 Kesko Termalin Oy (Suvi, Palta-veneet) 1.10.2008 Debt or Equity Related Event
1.12.2010 Kone Virginia Elevator Company 1.12.2010 Debt or Equity Related Event
31.7.2007 Konecranes Kongsberg Automation AS 31.7.2007 Debt or Equity Related Event
31.7.2007 Konecranes Reftele Maskinservice AB 31.7.2007 Debt or Equity Related Event
1.8.2007 Konecranes Savcor One Oy 1.8.2007 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
29.7.2009 Konecranes Knight Europe GmbH & Co. KG 29.7.2009 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
8.2.2006 Metso Aker Kvaernerin Pulping ja Power 8.2.2006 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
15.1.2007 Metso Metso-SHI Co., Ltd. 15.1.2007 Contract Awards
27.5.2008 Metso Lignoboost AB 27.5.2008 Acquisition activity 
14.10.2008 Metso G & F Beltline Services Pty Ltd 14.10.2008 Contract Awards
23.8.2010 Metso Camoplast Oy:n kumihihnaliiketoiminta 23.8.2010 Contract Awards
5.11.2010 Metso Karmannin avoautojen kattoliiketoiminnan 5.11.2010 Contract Awards
28.6.2006 Metsäboard Merger of M-real Petofi Printing House Ltd. and M-real Petofi Label Ltd.28.6.2006 New Products
8.8.2006 Nokia Loudeye 8.8.2006 Contract Awards
31.8.2006 Nokia gate5 31.8.2006 Debt or Equity Related Event
4.12.2007 Nokia Avvenu 4.12.2007 Forecasted Changes in Earnings or Sales
3.5.2007 Oral Hammaslääkärit Helsingin Hammaslääkärikeskus 3.5.2007 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
31.10.2006 Oral Hammaslääkärit Espoon Hammaslääkärikeskus 31.10.2006 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
29.4.2009 Oral Hammaslääkärit Maariankadun Hammaspaikka 29.4.2009 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
1.2.2007 Oriola-KD Medith Oy:n sairaalatarvikkeiden ja -laitteiden markkinointiliiketoiminta1.2.2007 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
23.4.2008 Outokumpu SoGePar 23.4.2008 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
16.12.2010 Panostaja Suomen Graafiset Palvelut Oy Ltd 16.12.2010 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
2.10.2006 Pohjola-pankki OKOn ja Opstockin sulautuminen 2.10.2006 Debt or Equity Related Event
21.12.2007 Pohjola-pankki K-Rahoitus Oy 21.12.2007 Forecasted Changes in Earnings or Sales
3.4.2007 Poyry ZAO Giprobum Engineering 3.4.2007 Contract Awards
27.6.2007 Poyry Evata Worldwide Oy 27.6.2007 Contract Awards
5.10.2007 Poyry Ingenieurgemeinschaft Witzenhausen Fricke & Turk GmbH (IGW)5.10.2007 Debt or Equity Related Event
1.10.2008 Poyry ETT Proyectos S.L 1.10.2008 Contract Awards
3.12.2008 Poyry Kündig & Partner AG 3.12.2008 Contract Awards
1.2.2010 Poyry PRG-Tec Oy 1.2.2010 Major Executive Change
14.6.2010 Poyry ETV-Eröterv 14.6.2010 Contract Awards
15.8.2006 Ramirent Konevuokraamo   P. Salminen Oy 15.8.2006 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
25.4.2006 Rautaruukki AZST-Kolor CJSC 25.4.2006 Restructuring/Divestiture
5.2.2010 RuukkiGroup Intermetal Madencilik ve Ticaret A.S.: 5.2.2010 Major Executive Change
13.8.2008 Sanoma Auto Trader 13.8.2008 Debt or Equity Related Event
27.1.2006 Solteq Artekus Oy 27.1.2006 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
23.4.2009 Stora Enso Sunila 23.4.2009 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
27.9.2007 Takoma Hervannan Koneistus Oy:n osakekannan ja Tampereen Laatukoneistus27.9.2007 Major Executive Change
15.12.2010 Tectia Siltanet Oy 15.12.2010 Forecasted Changes in Earnings or Sales
7.2.2008 TeliaSonera LMT, Lattelcom 7.2.2008 Major Executive Change
26.9.2008 TeliaSonera SpiceNepal, Applifone 26.9.2008 Major Executive Change
21.8.2006 TietoEnator TOPAS Consulting GmbH 21.8.2006 Contract Awards
21.9.2006 TietoEnator Laps Care AB 21.9.2006 Contract Awards
6.11.2009 Turvatiimi Otso palvelut Oy 6.11.2009 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
19.8.2010 Turvatiimi Turvatiimi Palvelut Oy 19.8.2010 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
16.10.2006 Wärtsilä Stockholms Fartygsreparationer AB 16.10.2006 Contract Awards
4.5.2007 Wärtsilä McCall Propellers Ltd 4.5.2007 Dividend/Earnings Announcements
3.3.2008 Wärtsilä Maritime Service AS 3.3.2008 Contract Awards
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Table B1. Seven new companies were listed in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki between 
January 2006 and December 2010. 
Company name Stock listing date 
Ahlstrom Oyj  14 March 2006 
Oriola-KD Oyj 3 July 2006 
Outotec Oyj 10 October 2006 
SRV-Yhtiöt Oyj 12 June 2007 
Talvivaara Oyj 11 May 2009 
Aktia Oyj 29 September 2009 
Tikkurila Oyj  26 March 2010 
 
 
Table B2. Twelve de-listings took place in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki between January 
2006 and December 2010. 
Company name Date of de-listing Acquiring company 
Analyste Oyj  January 31, 2006  Basware Oyj 
E.ON Finland Oyj   February 2, 2006  Fortum Oyj, renamed as 
Fortum Espoo Oyj; delisting 
on September 5, 2006) 
Suomen Spar Oyj  May 19, 2006  SOK 
Leo Longlife Oyj 
  
September 19, 2006  Leo Longlife Oyj acquired 
Tiimari Oyj; merger is using 
Tiimari Oyj name 
Sentera Oyj September 26, 2006  Sysopen Digia Oyj 
Kekkilä Oyj  November 30, 2006  Vapo Oy 
Pohjola-Yhtymä Oyj December 31, 2006  OKO Pankki Oyj 
Suomen Helasto Oyj  May 30, 2007  Panostaja Oyj 
Iittala Group Oyj   June 29, 2007  Fiskars Oyj 
Kasola Oyj    December 10, 2007  Nurminen LogisticsOyj 
Larox Oyj    October 15, 2009  Outotec Oyj 
Tamfelt Oyj  November 5, 2009  Metso Oyj 
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Table B3. Fourteen companies changed their names and stock symbols during the 
research period. 
Date Symbol Current name Previous 
Symbol 
Previous name 
27.11.2006 CRA1V Cramo Oyj RAK1V Rakentajain 
Konevuokraamo Oyj 
4.6.2007 GLA1V Glaston Oyj KRO1V Kyro Oyj 
2.1.2008 NLG1V Nurminen Logistics Oyj KASAS Kasola Oyj 
20.4.2009 REG1V Revenio Group Oyj DSO1V Done Solutions Oyj 
22.4.2008 WUF1V Wulff Oyj BTN1V Beltton-Yhtiöt Oyj 
2.5.2007 HKSAV HKScan Oyj HKRAV HK Ruokatalo Group 
12.4.2006 ORA1V Oral Hammalääkärit Oyj END1V Endero Oyj 
1.10.2008 SAA1V Sanoma Oyj SWS1V SanomaWSOY Oyj 
17.3.2008 DIG1V Digia Oyj SYS1V SysOpen Digia Oyj 
12.12.2007 GEO1V Geosentric Oyj BNFSV Benefon Oyj 
21.4.2008 WIC1V Westend ICT Oyj TJT1V TJ Group Oyj 
13.2.2007 XNS1V Ixonos Oyj TIX1V Tieto-X Oyj 
6.4.2010 TEC1V Tectia Oyj SSH1V SSH 
Communications 
Security Oyj 
2.1.2008 TRH1V Trainer's House Oyj SAI1V Satama Interactive 
Oyj 
 
Table B4. Six companies changed their names, but kept the stock symbol and ISIN 
during the research period. 
Date Symbol Current name Previous name 
24.4.2009 EXL1V Exel Composites Oyj Exel Oyj 
30.4.2009 TIE1V Tieto Oyj Tietoenator Oyj 
13.4.2010 TEM1V Tecnotree Oyj Tecnomen Lifetree Oyj 
11.5.2009 TEM1V Tecnomen Lifetree Oyj Tecnomen Oyj 
2.4.2007 AFE1V Affecto Oyj AffectoGenimap Oyj 
3.12.2010 WIC1V Innofactor Oyj Westend ICT Oyj 
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Table B5. Five companies combined their stock series and stock symbols during the 
research period. 
Date  New 
Symbol 
Company name Previous 
Symbol 
Previous 
Symbol 
ISIN used 
20.12.2010 WAT1V Vaahto Oyj WAT1S WATKV FI0009900708 
27.3.2008 WRT1V Wärtsilä Oyj WRTAV WRTBV FI0009003727 
31.7.2009 FIS1V Fiskars Oyj FISAS FISKS FI0009000400 
10.4.2006 SWS1V Sanoma Oyj SWSAV SWSBV FI0009007694 
14.11.2008 PNA1V Panostaja Oyj PNAAS PNABS FI0009800379 
 

